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Abstract 
In multiple ancient Greek texts, the phrase ‘the Great King’ (ὁ μέγας ὁ βασιλεύς) makes a 
frequent appearance. This phrase, when it was introduced to the ancient Greek world, referred 
to the ancient Persian kings such as Cyrus, Cambyses, Darius and Artaxerxes. In addition, it 
also referred to the leaders of hierarchically organised governances. However, Pseudo-Aristotle 
(De mundo 398a.30), Maximus of Tyre (Dissertationes 11.12), Aelius Aristides (Orationes 
26.27) and Philo of Alexandria (De decalogo 61, 177-8, De opificio mundi 71, De somniis 140-
1) adopted this phrase in a distinctive way. This phrase entails an image of the monarchical 
system of governance, in which the Great King, who stays hidden in his palace, rules over his 
empire through his satraps, his eyes and ears and the beacon-signals. These four authors utilised 
this image of the phrase ‘the Great King’, which consists of the Great King, his subjects and 
the beacon-signals. These elements imply the main components of a Middle Platonic frame of 
the cosmos: 1) the prime god who is transcendent from the cosmos, 2) his divine mediators 
who are immanent in the cosmos and 3) the hierarchical order, according to which all existential 
beings are arranged. Consequently, it becomes clear that these four authors utilised this image 
to develop their own arguments on the basis of the Middle Platonic understanding of the 
cosmos prevalent in their time. Because of the function and implication of this image, this 
thesis labels the image as a topos, which indicates a conventional way of dealing with a 
traditional moral-philosophical topic. The main concern of this thesis is indeed to demonstrate 
that the image of the Great King as used by these authors is a moral-philosophical topos and to 
show how this topos is used in the respective texts.  
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Opsomming 
In verskeie antieke Griekse tekste maak die frase ‘die Groot Koning’ (ὁ μέγας ὁ βασιλεύς) ŉ 
gereelde verskyning. Hierdie frase, toe dit aan die antieke Griekse wêreld bekendgestel is, het 
na Persiese konings soos Kuros, Kambuses, Darius en Artaxerxes verwys. Daarby het dit ook 
na die leiers van hiërargies georganiseerde regerings verwys. Nietemin het Pseudo-Aristoteles 
(De mundo 398a.30), Maximus van Tirus (Dissertationes 11.12), Aelius Aristeides (Orationes 
26.27) en Filo van Alexandrië (De decalogo 61, De opificio mundi 71, De somniis 141) hierdie 
frase op ŉ kenmerkende manier aangeneem. Hierdie frase behels ŉ beeld van die monargiese 
regeringstelsel, waarin die Groot Koning, wat verborge in sy paleis bly, oor sy ryk regeer deur 
sy satrape, sy oë en ore en die bakenseine. Hierdie vier outeurs maak gebruik van hierdie beeld 
van die frase ‘die Groot Koning’, wat uit die Groot Koning, sy onderdane en die bakenseine 
bestaan. Hierdie elemente impliseer die hoofkomponente van ŉ Middel-Platoniese raamwerk 
van die kosmos: 1) die hoofgod wat vanuit die kosmos transendeer, 2) sy goddelike 
bemiddelaars wat inherent in die kosmos is en 3) die hiërargiese orde, waarvolgens alle 
eksistensiële wesens georden is. Gevolglik word dit duidelik dat hierdie vier outeurs hierdie 
beeld benut het om hul eie argumente te ontwikkel op grond van die Middel-Platoniese begrip 
van die kosmos wat algemeen in hul tyd was. Vanweë die funksie en implikasie van hierdie 
beeld, klassifiseer hierdie tesis die beeld as ’n topos, wat dui op ŉ konvensionele 
hanteringswyse van ŉ tradisionele moreel-filosofiese onderwerp. Die hoofsaak van hierdie 
tesis is inderdaad om te bewys dat die beeld van die Groot Koning soos deur hierdie outeurs 
gebruik, ŉ moreel-filosofiese topos is en om te toon hoe hierdie topos in die onderskeie tekste 
gebruik word. 
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Chapter One: Introduction 
In multiple ancient Greek writings, the phrase ‘the Great King’ (ὁ βασιλεὺς ὁ μέγας or parallels) 
is often adopted by different authors. This phrase finds its origin in the ancient Eastern tradition 
from 2000 BCE to the time of the Achaemenids (Wiesehöfer 2004:999) and was introduced to 
the Greek world in the context of the Persian wars in 5th century BCE. After having been 
introduced to the Greek world, this phrase made its frequent appearance in various genres of 
literature. This phrase was usually meant in a literal sense but due to later historical events its 
meaning and use were extended. 
Multiple Greek authors such as Herodotus (Historiae 1.188.4), Plato (Alcibiades 120a.3) and 
Isocrates (Evagoras 20.7) adopted this phrase, which was the official title of the ancient Persian 
kings (Wiesehöfer 2001:29). These authors belong to the generation which experienced the 
Persian wars and the dreadful power of ‘the Great King’. They utilised this phrase in order to 
refer to the Persian kings when they were describing their experience of the violent clash of the 
two different cultures. To them, the Great King was an existing threat that caused fear to the 
Greeks. 
Since the conquest of Alexander the Great, even though there were neither the Persian Empire 
nor its kings, the phrase ‘the Great King’ was still being adopted by multiple Greek authors 
(e.g. Plutarch, Pelopidas 30.3.6; Aristeae epistula ad Philocratem 290.2; Oracula Sybillina 
11.141). They utilised the phrase ‘the Great King’ on the basis of a well-known fact that this 
phrase had been the official title of the ancient Persian kings; the legacy of the historical war 
so powerfully impacted the Greek world that it was handed down to the descendants through 
this phrase. This made it possible for the use of ‘the Great King’ to become a cultural and 
conventional phenomenon to the Greek authors when they were giving historical, philosophical, 
and religious instructions to their readers. To them, the Great King became a common title for 
the leaders of the monarchic system of governance. Therefore, the phrase, which basically 
indicated the Persian kings, was also adopted by Hellenistic rulers such as Seleucids, Antiochus 
III, Antiochus IV and by paltry princes (Wiesehöfer 2004:999). It sometimes even referred to 
God due to its metaphorically extended implication (Matt. 5:35, Didache 11.3.2, etc.). 
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This thesis, however, will focus on only four authors who lived during the time of Middle 
Platonism (80 BCE-220 CE), 1  namely, Pseudo-Aristotle (De mundo 398a.11-398b.7), 
Maximus of Tyre (Dissertationes 11.12), Aelius Aristides (Orationes 26.27) and Philo of 
Alexandria (De decalogo 61, 177-8, De opificio mundi 71, De somniis 1.140-1) as they seem 
to use the phrase ‘the Great King’ in a definite way for a specific purpose. The period they 
belong to means that these authors share Middle Platonic views or, at least, that they are 
influenced by Middle Platonism. Especially the imperial backgound of this phrase makes it a 
reasonable assumption that the image behind the phrase could be closely connected to the 
hierarchical system of governance. For example, Pseudo-Aristotle utilises this phrase when 
depicting the hierarchical rule of the Persian Empire in detail. Maximus adopts the phrase along 
with the description of the hierarchical order of a great number of the Great King’s servants. 
Aristides makes use of the phrase to describe the chaos that arose among the Macedonians after 
the death of Alexander the Great as leader of a hierarchical government. Philo uses the phrase 
to explain his Jewish understanding of the hierarchical relationship between God and the 
universe. These four authors do not use the phrase ‘the Great King’ in its literal sense but for 
the image of the Great King constructed on the basis of the well-known historical facts about 
the Great King, in order to draw the readers to their philosophical arguments on the hierarchical 
cosmos ruled by the primary god. In short, they adopted the image of the Great King to explain 
philosophical ideas which are difficult to understand because the former is much easier for the 
readers to approach than the latter. By only reading the phrase literally, therefore, the point the 
authors aim to make will become lost.  
I will now briefly introduce the different contexts in each authors in which the image of the 
Great King appears. One can find the clearest picture of the image of the Great King in De 
mundo (398a.11-398b.7) because it has the most detailed description of the Great King and the 
system of his empire: the Great King, sitting in a concentric multi-walled palace, rules the 
empire through his satraps and is constantly informed by both his eyes and ears and the beacon-
signals. These features are adopted to explain how the transcendent god immanently influences 
                                          
1 I follow Dillon’s (1996) periodisation of Middle Platonism. The beginning and the end of its influence ranges 
from Antiochus of Ascalon (68 BCE-130 CE) to Plotinus (204/5-270) (Gerson 2013:179).  
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the universe (398a.1-11). Maximus of Tyre (Dissertationes 11.12) has a relatively shorter 
description of the Great King than that of De mundo: he does not have descriptions of the Great 
King’s eyes and ears and the beacon-signals. This abbreviated description of the Great King 
reflects his own purpose to emphasise the cosmic hierarchical order by focusing on a great 
number of δαίμονες between god and human beings. Aelius Aristides has a unique form of 
utilising the phrase. Aristides describes a chaos which resulted from the death of Alexander the 
Great: Aristides compares this chaos to the satraps without the Great King. This system of 
satraps without the Great King highlights the Great King’s part in maintaining the order of 
imperial system of governance. By doing so, Aristides attempts to praise the Roman regime, 
which was controlled and preserved by the Roman emperor, who should be justified as a divine 
ruler (Van Nuffelen 2011:139). The sole Jewish author of these four, Philo has three references 
to the Great King in arguing for the ontological difference between God and other deities as 
his creatures (De decalogo 61, 177-8) and describing the journey of the mind towards God (De 
opificio mundi 71) and the role of the angels compared to the Great King’s eyes and ears (De 
somniis 1.140-1).  
However, it should be noted that, in spite of these contextual differences, all the authors utilise 
the image of the Great King to describe the relation between god and the universe as common 
ground on which they develop their own arguments on a philosophical, especially, cosmo-
theological topic. It is also important to point out that they use the image of the Great King as 
comparison because they compare the relation between god and the universe to the relation 
between the Great King and his empire. Nevertheless, this thesis will argue that this image does 
not function as just a comparison because it conveys traditional cosmo-theological notions in 
order to deal with a cosmo-theological topic. Therefore, considering the fact that the four 
different authors utilise this same image in developing their own cosmo-theological arguments, 
the image of the Great King seems to be taken by these authors as a conventional approach to 
deal with a traditional cosmo-theological theme. 
Then, how should this phenomenon among these four authors be defined and explained if it is 
something more than a mere comparison? A means to answer this question can perhaps be 
accomplished through the term topos. Topos is a concept which is not strange to the Western 
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mind (Hadot 1995:66) to the extent that scholars had not felt any serious need to explain this 
concept for a long time. Since 1953, however, after Curtius defined topos, many scholars have 
attempted to define and explicate topos. Among those scholars, Malherbe (1986:144) had a 
significant impact on the research on topos with his definition “a stock treatment”. This means 
that when a method of dealing with a topic is repeated among different authors and appears to 
be conventional, it can be labelled a topos (Thom 2003:567). In short, topos is a conventional 
approach to certain traditional topics and by applying this understanding to the use of the image 
of the Great King, the authors could connect this image to their philosophical ideas in order to 
deal with an abstruse cosmo-theological topic.  
Throughout the thesis, the cosmo-theological ideas implied by the image of the Great King will 
be clarified. For, should the image of the Great King be taken as a conventional approach to a 
traditional topic, the first thing to be conducted is to prove that the image of the Great King is 
not only an acceptable but also effective way of dealing with this cosmo-theological topic. This 
process of proving the validity of topos will be called topos analysis throughout this thesis. 
Owing to the phrase’s historical origin, research on the historical facts about the Great King 
will assist the reader in understanding the philosophical implication of this image. Subsequently, 
the texts of the four authors will be read within its appropriate philosophical context.  
This thesis consists of six chapters: chapter one functions as an introduction and background 
to the topic and in chapter two, the concept of topos will be discussed. The purpose of chapter 
two is to provide a definition of topos, which covers the wide range of its applications. In 
chapter three, the thesis will provide the historical background of the specific elements in the 
image of the Great King and in chapter four the philosophical background of the ancient notion 
of the hierarchical cosmos underlying this image will be discussed by tracing the ancient 
philosophical arguments on νοῦς. 
Chapter five is devoted to the topos analysis of the image of the Great King, which is adopted 
by the four authors, Pseudo-Aristotle, Maximus of Tyre, Aelius Aristides and Philo of 
Alexandria. These four authors’ uses of this image will be analysed in an order, which will 
assist in grasping the philosophical implications conveyed through the image of the Great King. 
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Firstly, this essay will analyse Pseudo-Aristotle’s De mundo because this treatise clearly 
articulates its purpose in using the image of the Great King and describes the Great King in the 
most detailed manner. The analysis of De mundo 398a.11-35 will provide the reader with a 
secure foundation for further analyses of the other texts. Secondly, Maximus’ Dissertationes 
11.12 will be analysed as it is easier to compare Maximus’ description of the Great King with 
that of De mundo than with the other authors’ descriptions. This is due to the fact that Maximus 
has the most similar description of the Great King to that of De mundo. Thirdly, a contemporary 
of Maximus, Aristides’ Orationes 26.27 will be analysed because he adopted this image for his 
political purpose in a distinctive way: his aim is to justify the Roman regime by showing the 
similarity between the Roman governing system and the divine cosmic hierarchical order. This 
thesis will further examine how the image of the Great King serves his political purpose. 
Philo’s De decalogo 61, 177-8, De opificio mundi 71 and De somniis 1.141 will be discussed 
at the end of chapter four because the chronological relationship between Pseudo-Aristotle and 
Philo is still uncertain and the Jewish background of Philo distinguishes him from the other 
three authors. Through this chapter, it will be made clear how the elements of the image of the 
Great King describe the frame of the Middle Platonic cosmology as the basis of the cosmo-
theological arguments.  
Chapter six will confirm that the image of the Great King is a topos by explicating the cosmo-
theological notions which construct the hierarchical frame of the cosmos. Finally, chapter seven 
will present the conclusion of this thesis.  
The goal of the topos analysis is to contribute to mapping out the Greco-Roman moral-
philosophical world. As part of achieving this goal, the topos analysis of the image of the Great 
King will assist readers in mapping a part of the ancient cosmo-theological world by 
deciphering the cosmo-theological notions implied through the image of the Great King. 
Furthermore, one may ask such questions as where the topos of the Great King came from and 
which of the four authors was the first to adopt this image from which the others could have 
drawn significance. Through the process of dating these texts, possible clues to answering these 
two questions can perhaps be found, even though it is unlikely that any definite answer can be 
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given. The main reason why it is difficult to answer these questions is that it is impossible to 
clearly define the relationship between these four authors owing to the fact that the date of De 
mundo, which has the most detailed description of the Great King, is still under dispute. This 
difficulty in dating De mundo indicates that even the relation between the two authors, who 
have similar descriptions of the Great King, namely Pseudo-Aristotle and Maximus of Tyre, 
cannot be clearly defined (Thom 2014a:4). 
Thus far the rationale for further discussions over the topos analysis of the image of Great King 
has been provided. However, before going further, it also should be noted that despite the 
frequent appearance of the phrase ‘the Great King’, only the four authors utilised its image to 
develop their own philosophical arguments on god and the comsos. This thesis therefore should 
depend on the other expressions, which convey the philosophical ideas corresponding to those 
implied through the image of the Great King, when conducting the topos analysis of the image 
of the Great King.  
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Chapter Two: The concept of topos 
As already indicated in the previous chapter, there are six texts by four different authors, who, 
under the influence of Middle Platonism, adopt the image of the Great King to describe a 
traditional cosmo-theological topic concerning the relationship between god and the universe 
(Pseudo-Aristotle, De mundo 398a.11-35; Maximus of Tyre, Dissertationes 11.12; Aelius 
Aristides, Orationes 26.27.20; Philo of Alexandria, De decalogo 61, 177-8, De opificio mundi 
71 and De somniis 1.140-1). The author of De mundo provides the most detailed descriptions 
of the Great King, his palace, and his system of governance and so forth. Maximus of Tyre 
focuses on the relationship between the Great King and a great number of people around him 
to explain the relationship between god and countless δαίμονες. Aelius Aristides describes the 
chaos that occurred among the Macedonians as a result of Alexander the Great’s death and 
compares this chaos to the satraps without the Great King. Philo of Alexandria, as a Hellenised 
Jew, seems to have a different way of using the image of the Great King due to his Jewish 
monotheistic understanding of God. These four authors utilise this image to develop their own 
arguments, starting from a common basis. 
However, it is noteworthy that all these four authors adopt the image of the Great King based 
on the comparison between the image of the Great King and the notion of the universe ruled 
by the supreme god. In other words, the phrase ‘the Great King’ functions as a simile (De 
mundo, Maximus and Aristides) and a metaphor (Philo) for god. Both similes and metaphors 
are formulated based on the similarity of two different objects. A metaphor can be described as 
“the application to one thing of the name that belongs to another” (Hill 2003:116) and a simile 
is “the comparison of one figure with another” (Murphy 2003:148). A simile can thus be 
understood as “a metaphor introduced by specific words of comparison” (Hill 2003:116).2 In 
the context of moral-philosophical teaching, the effective conveyance of instruction depends 
on whether the similarity between the two different objects in comparison is approved by 
culture and convention. Bizzell and Herzberg (1990:542) provide an example of how elements 
                                          
2 The crucial differences between the concepts of simile and metaphor is whether the substitution occurs or not. 
For more information, see Innes (2003:7-27). 
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of two different objects in comparison have connections with each other and make the 
comparison effective in a moral–philosophical teaching: 
St. Jerome imitated the first of these parallels used by Cicero3 in one of his letters to Heliodorus: 
“In giving you this advice I am not like a man whose ship and cargo are unharmed, an 
inexperienced sailor who knows nothing about currents. I am more like a man just cast up on the 
shore from a shipwreck, in a frightened voice warning those about to set a sail. In that tide race 
the Charybdis of self-indulgence engulfs a man’s health of soul; on the other side lust smiling 
like Scylla with fair face entices the ship of modesty onto the rocks. Here is the shore beset with 
barbarian foes; here is that pirate, the devil, with all his crew, ready with chains for those he 
hopes to seize. Do not trust it, do not feel at ease. The sea may smile, smooth as a millpond, the 
surface of the motionless element may hardly be ruffled by a breath of wind, yet this flat plain 
contains great mountains. Under the surface is danger; under the surface is the enemy. Ready the 
ropes, take in the sails. Let the yard-arm be the sign of the Cross before you. That calm is storm.” 
This could be greatly extended if the speaker took all the separate dangers which threaten virtue 
because of sin or wicked men or any other cause and collated them with the various things that 
endanger the lives of sailors, and then brought in comparisons using situations that were greater, 
or less, or different, or contrasting, and finally ornamented the passage where appropriate with 
neat sayings and striking remarks in conclusion. 
As this extract clearly shows, in moral-philosophical teachings, a comparison is understood 
and adopted on the basis of the similarity between two different objects, which is validated by 
custom and culture. In the context of philosophical arguments, the comparison functions as a 
means to introduce an abstruse topic to audiences due to its two effects: 1) “in argumentation, 
the movement is constantly towards something more impressive; a comparison gets its effect 
by starting from something less striking” and 2) “the comparison shows the fresh example as 
something smaller or greater or equal” (Bizzell and Herzberg 1990:527, 540). Likewise, the 
                                          
3 This indicates the first quotation from Cicero’s Pro Murena. The second parallel is of Greek musicians and 
orators, and the first one is of the sailors as follows, “Those just sailing into harbor after long sea-voyage eagerly 
give information to those setting out about likelihood of storms and the pirate situation and what the different 
places are like, because it is natural of feel kindly towards those who are about to face the dangers which we have 
just escaped. What then should be my feelings, who am just coming into sight of land after a terrible tossing, 
towards this man who, as I can see, must go out to face dreadful storms?” (Bizzell and Herzorg 1990: 542). 
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phrase ‘Great King’ does not play the role by itself but only with its image, which was built up 
on the well-known historical facts about the Great King. 
It is, however, not surprising that modern scholars have different interpretations of this image 
as they do not share the same cultural convention as the four authors, who used this image 
through comparison. For example, Thom (2014c:107) asserts that the image of the Great King 
implies the notion of the tension between god’s transcendence and immanence while Van 
Nuffelen (2011:122-146) argues that this image concerns the ideas of the cosmic hierarchy, 
which sustains the universe. Van Nuffelen’s suggestion, however, too narrowly restricts the 
scope of this image because this cosmic hierarchy is merely an aspect of its implication. This 
is a natural consequence because he develops his argument from the analysis of the text of 
Aelius Aristides, who aimed to justify the Roman regime by demonstrating that its hierarchical 
governing system imitates the heavenly cosmic hierarchy. In spite of these two scholars’ points 
being somewhat different from each other’s, they agree that this image should be examined by 
the topos analysis (Van Nuffelen 2011:125).4  
Before proceeding with the topos analysis of the image of the Great King, the concept of topos 
should be first defined. The Greek word topos basically means “a place” (LSJ, s.v. τόπος) and 
its equivalent is locus in Latin. The word is usually translated as “topic” or “common place” in 
the books and articles on classical rhetoric. In the classical rhetoric, the argument has five 
divisions: inventio, dispositio, elocutio, memoria, and pronuntiatio. According to Corbett and 
Connors (1999:17-23), inventio is a systematised way of generating ideas on a certain subject, 
dispositio is the division to arrange the parts of the written or spoken discourse in an effective 
and ordered manner, elocutio is the style to deliver the argument more vividly, memoria is the 
memory of speeches, and pronuntiatio is the delivery of speech through the proper management 
of voice and gesture.  
Since inventio’s main purpose is to formulate arguments with an appropriate rhetorical system 
                                          
4 Thom (2014c:116) does not articulate that the image is a topos but alludes to it by saying that “we find this 
comparison in other contemporary philosophers as well”. 
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or method (Corbett & Connors 1999:19), inventio should not be conducted by any other means 
than the practice of discerning the rhetorical system or method, which is appropriate for the 
present topic, in the depository of ideas. 5  As is well known, inventio, which is often 
misunderstood due to its literal meaning, requires creativity not in devising but in properly 
selecting and effectively utilising the rhetorical system or method. In other words, inventio is 
the division of the argument to find methods proven to be effective in discussing particular 
topics.6 In doing so, authors cannot but have recourse to conventional treatments of traditional 
topics in order to ensure the appropriateness and effectiveness of the methods because they 
were constructed and approved by culture and convention.  
Given that these selected systems or methods can be regarded as topoi, it becomes clear that 
inventio functions on the basis of topoi because in the division of inventio, topoi provide the 
storages of ideas, of which authors make choices of appropriate rhetorical systmes or methods 
for the topics to be discussed. The appropriateness of the ideas chosen for these topics is, of 
course, secured by convention and culture. The properness in selecting the ideas for the topics, 
then, is required for the authors to be successful in communicating with his/her readers. This 
relation between inventio and topoi therefore means that topoi are not invented by certain 
writers or orators, but found by them in the depository of ideas, upon which it is agreed by 
convention and culture that they are effective in persuading audiences with regard to certain 
topics. 
However, it is so difficult to grasp the concept of topos that multiple scholars defined topos 
with different concepts. These definitions of topos should be discussed in order that one may 
                                          
5 Lausberg (1998:119) clues us in on the relation between inventio and topoi: “Inventio … is the ‘discovery’ of 
ideas … Discovery is a natural gift of good fortune … Even someone endowed with fortune’s natural gift must 
search in order to find. The practice of searching (cf. §2) has produced familiar ‘places’ that have often proved 
their worth, where it is evidently advised to look … These ‘places’ (topoi, loci) consist in basic ‘search’ formulas 
which can lead to the discovery of a fitting idea”. 
6 Corbett & Connors (1999:19) state that “the method that the classical rhetoricians devised to aid the speaker in 
discovering matter for three modes of appeal are topics”. But we should rethink the expression “devised” because 
the rhetoricians do not invent or devise the method but only select and adopt them: topoi can merely be found and 
be collected because they cannot be created by some experts but be formulated by a common conventional 
consensus. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
11 
 
synthetically comprehend the concept of topos from diverse viewpoints. It is a well-known fact 
that Aristotle never defined the concept of topos but only utilised the term with distinction 
between common and special topoi. This is because the concept did not need to be explained 
to the people of his time. This fact implies that the concept of topos can be inferred by studying 
the conventional uses of the term topos.  
Pernot (1986:254-55) provides the traditional Greek and Latin understandings of topos. He 
observes that the ancient rhetoricians adopted two metaphors to explain topoi: ἀφορμή and 
locus. The Greek tradition understands it as a starting point of attack in argumentations while 
the Latin tradition regards it as a depository of ideas. Greek and Latin authors emphasise 
different aspects of topoi’s function, but these two facets inseparably work together. In addition, 
the fact that these two metaphors are evolved from the literal sense of topos (Pernot 1986:255) 
indicates that both the Greek and Latin authors regarded topos as a certain space in mind. 
Modern scholars tend to follow the Latin tradition when they define topos. Perelman and 
Olbrechts-Tyteca (1969:83)’s description of topos reflects the Latin understanding of it: 
As used by classical writers, loci are headings under which arguments can be classified. They 
are associated with a concern to help a speaker’s inventive efforts and involve the grouping of 
relevant material, so that it can be easily found again when required. Loci have accordingly been 
defined as storehouse for arguments.7 Aristotle made a distinction between the loci communes, 
or “common places,” which can be used indiscriminately for any science and do not depend on 
any, and the special topics, which belong either to a particular science or a particular type of 
oratory. 
With reference to the twofold categorisation of the common and special topoi, which Aristotle 
introduced and the subsequent rhetoric authors have been following so far, it should be noted 
that the standard of this division theoretically is the applicability of topoi. The common topoi 
can be applied to all discourses, regardless of the genres of writings and the fields of sciences. 
Corbett and Connors (1999:87) provide a list of the common topoi and their sub-topoi, which 
                                          
7 Lausberg (1998:171) also points out that topos is a storage of thoughts. 
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implies that topoi are formulated by similarity, which combines certain ideas under the same 
categorical headings. 
How then should the special topoi be explained? There can be special situations of arguments, 
such as deliberate, juridical and ceremonial speeches (Corbett & Connors 1999:120), in which 
speakers need more specialised methods of speaking. In the process of selecting methods, 
certain topoi are regarded as effective and appropriate only for specific genres of speech. In 
other words, the special topoi are the topoi, which are available only for particular topics. 
Theoretically, the scope of the special topoi can be extended as far as the fields of science are 
varied. The following are general characteristics of topoi that have been discussed thus far: 
1) Basically, topoi are the methods of dealing with certain traditional topics proved to be 
effective in persuading audiences. 
2) Topoi function as the starting points to developing arguments and the reservoirs of ideas 
on these topics. 
3) Special topoi are the topoi with limited ranges of application. 
4) Theoretically, the special topoi which can be called “special” are as diverse as the areas 
of science. 
With regard to 4) above, Robert Curtius is the first modern scholar who applied this 
extensibility of topos’ scope to literary interpretation. The most famous part of his contribution 
is that he defined topos as cliché (Curtius 1953:70). His definition drew the attention of modern 
scholars to defining the concept of topos and applying the topos analysis to literary studies. 
Although his term “cliché” is considered as “too wide and too vague” (Wankel 1983:131; 
Pernot 1986:253),8 there is no room for any doubt that he understood the concept very well. 
Indeed, Curtius’ contribution to literature must not be regarded as useless because he began a 
new era of literary criticism by introducing the topos analysis (Wankel 1983:130). 
The one who more clearly explained the concept is Wankel. He (1983:132) expands on Curtius’ 
                                          
8 Because of this misunderstanding of Curtius’ definition, a group of scholars such as Bradley (1953) and Mullins 
(1972), etc., oversimplified the concept by defining it as certain fixed forms of argument. 
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definition by providing a detailed explanation of the concept: 
„Topos“ wäre zu gebrauchen ‒ und so gebrauche ich den Begriff ‒ wenn häufig bzw. in 
bestimmen Zusammenhangen wiederkehernde Wendungen, Bilder, Vergleiche, Metaphern, 
Denkinhalte, Argumentationen und deren sprachliche Ausformungen allgemein bezeichnet 
werden sollen, dagegen „Klischee“ oder „Formel“ oder „Gemeinplatz“, wenn man erstarrte oder 
stark schmatisierte oder sententiös verfestigte Formel jener Topoi oder die platte Imitation 
benennen will … Man kann sich aber, meine ich, dabei beruhigen, wenn man sich über den 
übegrifflichen Inhalt einigermassen verständigt hat. 
Also, he paves a way of understanding topos with his significant insight: 
Auf mein Thema übertragen heißt das: einen „Topos“ nicht nur den weiten Bezugsreich a natura 
hominum zu nennen, sondern auch das spezielle Argument mit der Sterblichkeit des Menschen, 
also einen Einzelaspekt der natura hominum. 
Wankel explains the concept of topos by linking topoi to human nature that penetrates all 
human life experiences. Considering that topoi basically are the methods of dealing with certain 
traditional topics proved to be effective by cultural convention, they have to be grounded in 
human nature to be effective because human nature is the most common and conventional to 
humanity. Due to the fact that the universality of human nature ties up all various aspects of 
life, one can sympathise with other individuals in different situations, in spite of the diversity 
of individual experiences. In other words, Wankel secures the validity of the topos analysis by 
bringing in the common experience of humanity, which can be understood as convention and 
culture. 
When Pernot (1986:260) explains topoi as rhetorical strategies, he argues that topoi 
interconnect an orator and reality:  
Tόπος suppose à la fois réduction du multiple à l‘unité et transformation de la réalité en objet de 
discours. Puis, une fois que les τόποι ont été définis, l’orateur les utilise comme instruments de 
recherche. Comme tout instrument, le τόπος est une médiation, médiation entre l’orateur et la 
réalité.  
This connection of the orator and reality can be formulated because topoi are formed on the 
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basis of universality, which combines all the different experiences of individuals. In terms of 
the rhetorical strategies, this universality of experience can be secured by rhetorical trandition. 
In literary studies, this universality will be obtained by convention and culture. Pernot 
(1986:283) supports this point by clarifying how topoi generalise common experiences of life 
in spite of individual differences: 
Cette ambivalence de τόπος et de locus est le signe d’une parenté entre les sources des arguments 
et les dévelopements généraux. Par les lieux de l’argumentation, la rétorique réduit la multiplicité 
des données à un petit nombre de rubriques; par les lieux communs, elle ramène une cause précise 
à une question générale. Dans les deux cas, il s’agit d’une remontée du particulier au général: 
tout lieu est dans une certaine mesure ‘commun’. 
This universality of experience ensures the validity of topoi as both rhetorical strategies and 
literary topics. Moreover, this should be accentuated when one explores ancient moral-
philosophical writings as well because the moral-philosophical world of antiquity is structured 
on the basis of moral convention and cultural norm. 
Abraham J. Malherbe is one of the most outstanding scholars who applied the topos analysis 
to ancient moral-philosophical writings. He (1996:124) defines topos as “a fairly systematic 
treatment of a topic of moral instruction which uses clichés, maxims, short definitions, etc., 
rather than the latter themselves”. 9  Malherbe’s more comprehensible definition of topos 
should then substitute for Curtius’ definition which is still being misunderstood by New 
Testament scholars (Thom 2003:556).  
It should be pointed out that Malherbe’s definition of topos consists of three different parts: 1) 
topos, 2) moral-philosophical topics, and 3) clichés, maxims, short definitions, etc. as ways of 
expressions. From these divisions one can infer that 3) are a means to express 2) and that some 
of 2) are regarded as 1). Especially, from the relationship between the divisions 2) and 3), it 
can be deduced that not all the moral-philosophical topics are regarded as topoi. 
                                          
9 Malherbe (1986:144; 1992:320) had defined the concept of topos that “topos is the stock treatment of subjects 
of interest of the moralist”. He changed the term ‘stock’ into ‘fairly systematic’ since he tried to establish a more 
tangible explanation. 
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In order to obtain a more concrete understanding of topos, two questions must be answered:  
1) What differentiates topoi from other moral-philosophical topics? 
2) What does Malherbe exactly mean by his expression “fairly systematic”? 
The answers to the questions are found in the following discussion in which Thom (2003:567) 
explains the difference between topoi and other topics: 
A topos may be distinguished from another topic by its traditional subject matter, evidenced by 
the fact that it recurs in the writings of different authors, and by the conventional treatment it 
receives. 
There are then two conditions to be qualified for topoi can be distinguished from other topics: 
1) whether a topic repeatedly appears in different authors and 2) whether a conventional way 
of dealing with the topic is established. In order to discern whether a topic is topos or not one 
must examine the repetition of certain topics; there is no better way than looking at as many 
ancient texts as possible. However, in examining conventionality of the treatment of a certain 
topic, one can also find some substantive solutions.  
In many cases, certain words or expressions related to particular conventional topics are 
regarded as topoi. For instance, in the Pythagorean Golden Verses, a series of topoi are found. 
This series of topoi begins with the topos of εὐσεβεία (‘piety’ in English; Thom 1995:104): 
 Ἀθανάτους μὲν πρῶτα θεούς, νόμωι ὡς διάκειται, 
τίμα καὶ σέβου ὅρκον. ἔπειθ’ ἥρωας ἀγαυούς  
τούς τε καταχθονίους σέβε δαίμονας ἔννομα ῥέζων  
σούς τε γονεῖς τίμα τούς τ’ ἄγχιστ’ ἐγγεγαῶτας·  
Honor the immortal gods first, in the order appointed by custom, 
And revere your oath. Pay reverence next to the noble heroes 
and the Spirits of the dead by performing the prescribed rites. 
Honor your parents as well as their closest relatives (GV 1-4; transl. Thom 1995:95). 
These lines are connected by the topos of εὐσεβεία. The theme of εὐσεβεία is made clear by the 
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two key words placed in the chiastic arrangement of τίμα-σέβου-σέβε-τίμα and by selecting the 
terms related to this traditional topic (Thom 1995:103). By presenting pairs of elements 
relevant to the topic of εὐσεβεία such as gods-oaths, heroes-demons, parents-relatives, the 
author instructs his readers on life according to εὐσεβεία. The readers can understand the 
purpose in selecting these elements because the elements remind them of the conventional topic 
of εὐσεβεία which is closely connected to the cosmic hierarchy. By naming these elements of 
the topic, the author calls upon the readers to attribute appropriate honour to the members of 
every different rank in the cosmic hierarchy (cf. Thom 1995:102-119). The topos of εὐσεβεία 
plays the leading role in this extract.  
Sometimes, one encounters topoi, which are more difficult to discern than the type of topos 
mentioned above. Malherbe (1996:135) ascertains that the topos of πλεονεξία formulates the 
main argument in Luke 12:13-34. In this passage, however, readers only read the story of a 
farmer, who considers expanding his barn for a fruitful year. They cannot grasp the main point 
of the story without recognising the main theme. This story does not clearly speak out any key 
word or expression directly related to the topic of πλεονεξία but merely describes a situation, 
which might happen as a result of πλεονεξία. Only such a skillful scholar as Malherbe can read 
the theme of πλεονεξία dealt with throughout the story of the farmer. Likewise, just describing 
an accompaying situation of a traditional topic can be a conventional way of dealing with the 
traditional topic.  
There are, however, still other types of topoi which are easier to detect. Treatises usually have 
certain forms of titles such as Plutarch’s De virtute et vitio and Cicero’s De finibus bonorum et 
malorum. These titles are given in the form of περί + genitive noun in Greek and the form of 
de + ablative noun in Latin. This is a typical form of topos because a title indicates the topic, 
which the authors are about to discuss. This form of titles was so typical that it was widely 
applied to the titles of books, treatises and chapters of books and so forth in antiquity (Malherbe 
1992:320-21). 
Also, different forms of questions can be regarded as a type of topos (Thom 2003:568-9). 
Questions have the same function as the titles have because by asking questions concerning 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
17 
 
their topics, authors attract the attention of audiences to what is about to be discussed in a 
paragraph, a chapter, and a book. For example, some of Plutarch’s writings have such titles as 
Quomodo adulator ab amico internoscatur and Quomodo quis suos in virtute sentiat profectus. 
These questions introduce the main topics of the texts.  
In addition, it should be noted that topoi can have sub-topoi. For example, friendship is one of 
the most famous topoi and a number of topics relevant to friendship often make appearances 
within ancient texts. Quomodo adulator ab amico internoscatur and De animorum mutitudine 
by Plutarch deal with such topics pertinent to friendship, including how to practice true 
friendship in various life situations. Also, through the form of its title, Philodemus’ Περὶ 
παρρησίας (On Frankness) indicates a way of dealing with the theme of παρρησία which is a 
sub-topos of the topos of friendship because “as a private virtue, παρρησία denotes the personal 
candor that was prized between true friends” (Konstan, Clay, Glad, Thom and Ware 1998:3-
4).10 This relation between a topos and its sub-topoi can again be extended to the relation 
between a sub-topos and its sub-topoi. Accordingly, the topos of frankness itself, being a sub-
topos of the topos of friendship, can also have its own sub-topoi.11 
Philodemus’ On frankness is a good example of the diverse types of and the relations between 
topoi discussed thus far. This treatise has the form of περί + genitive for its main title and 
different forms of questions as the titles of its sub-topics. In the case of On frankness, the 
relationship between the main title and its subtitles denotes the relationship between a topos 
and its sub-topoi. Konstan et al. (1998:8-9) present a list of fragments with titles under the main 
title Περὶ παρρησίας as follows: 
1) Fr. 53: “Whether they will declare things of their own and of one another to their fellow-
students.” 
2) Fr. 57: “[Whether it seems to us that one will slip up in accord with] the [perfection] of reason 
[by means of what is preconceived.]” 
                                          
10 For more information, see Fitzgerald (1997:23). 
11 Besides, one should regard λόγος as a form of topoi because it sometimes denotes a subject of arguments or 
discussions (Thom 2003:564). 
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3) Fr. 67: “Whether he will also speak frankly to those who do not endure frank criticism, and 
to one who is [irascible] …” 
4) Fr. 70: “How will he handle those who have become angry toward him because of his frank 
criticism?” 
5) Fr. 74: “Whether he is well-disposed toward us; whether he is intense in his goodwill; 
whether he has jettisoned some of the things charged against him, even if not perfected in 
everything; whether toward us and toward [others] [he will be] thankful …” 
6) Fr. 81 (=83 N): “Whether a wise man will communicate his own {errors} to his friends with 
frankness.” 
7) Fr. 88 (=94 N): “How will we recognize the one who has endured frank criticism graciously 
and the one who is pretending {to do so}?” 
8) Col. Ia: “… [to distinguish] one who is frank from a polite disposition and one who is so 
from a vulgar one.” 
9) Col. XXa: “… how, [when they recognize] that some of their number are more intelligent, 
and in particular that some of them are teachers, do they not abide frank criticism?” 
10)  Col. XXIb: “[Why does womankind not accept frank criticism with pleasure?]” 
11)  Col. XXIIb: “Why is it that, when other things are equal, those who are illustrious both in 
resources and reputations abide {frank criticism} less well {than others}?” 
12)  Col. XXIVa: “Why is it that old men are more annoyed {by frankness}?”  
From the types of topoi mentioned above, a dim glimpse of the meaning of “fairly systematic” 
can be obtained. This phrase still functions as a vague description of the concept of topos 
because one may ask, “how systematic should a treatment be to be regarded as a ‘fairly 
systematic’ treatment?”. Furthermore, the term ‘fairly’ cannot be easily defined with accuracy. 
It may thus be suggested that the term “traditional” or “conventional” should substitute for the 
vague phrase “fairly systematic” as the term “conventional” basically means “formed by 
agreement” (Merriam Webster’s Collegiate Dictionary, s. v. conventional). This term 
“conventional” is therefore understood as “agreed by convention and culture” in the previous 
discussion over the universality of experience, which validates the use of topoi. Consequently, 
topos is defined as a conventional treatment of a traditional topic. 
Thom (2003: 566) also emphasises its conventionality when he defines topos as “an ordered 
cognitive space that is culturally determined”. With this definition, he suggests three types of 
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topoi: 1) logical-rhetorical topoi12, 2) literary topoi, and 3) moral-philosophical topoi. As the 
image of the Great King deals with the traditional ideas concerning the tension between god’s 
transcendent existence and immanent influence in god’s relationship with the cosmos (Thom 
2014c:107), this thesis will be confined to mapping out the part of the ancient moral-
philosophical world, especially the cosmo-theological notions conveyed through the image of 
the Great King. 
What then are the traditional topics, which were regarded as topoi in the ancient moral-
philosophical world? For a clearer answer to this question, one should refer to Everette 
Ferguson’s (2003:323) description of topos: 
Certain themes recur among the philosophical moralists with enough frequency to show what 
were matters of interest – marriage and sexual conduct, consolation, covetousness, and anger – 
and what the ideals were – virtue, friendship, civil concord and responsibility for the welfare of 
the state. 
This brief description provides a list of the themes, which recur with enough frequency among 
the ancient philosophical moralists to be labelled topoi.13 Ferguson’s list is not complete, but 
it does assist readers in discerning the type of themes, which can be regarded as moral-
philosophical topoi.14 This point also opens a door to the connection between the moral-
philosophical topoi and popular philosophy because the latter also deals with moral and ethical 
issues as its main concern.15 For this reason, the topos analysis can contribute to research on 
                                          
12 For a further understanding of this type of topoi, see Dyck (2002). 
13 Brouwer (2014:7) suggests that wisdom is a topos as follows: “I will start with the best-known definition of 
wisdom as knowledge of human and divine matters. In fact, it became so well known that it has often been 
designated a common place, with its Stoic character thus played down” (my emphasis). One should discuss his 
appropriateness in using the term ‘common place’ but still acknowledge that he at least shows his understanding 
of how a topos can be distinguished from other topics. 
14 For more detailed list, see Malherbe (1986:144-61) and Thom (2003:567-8). 
15 Thom (2012:281-285) identifies four commonalities of popular philosophy as follows: “1) one of the most 
obvious features is that philosophy has either an ethical-pragmatic or an exegetical focus … 2) A second 
characteristic is the fact that philosophers frequently selected and combined elements from more than one 
philosophical tradition when formulating their own position … 3) A further noted characteristic of philosophy in 
this period is its tendency towards individualism … 4) A fourth common thread is the emphasis on psychagogy 
or moral-spiritual guidance” (numbering is mine). Ferguson (2003:323-326) agrees with Thom in describing the 
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popular philosophy due to its main purpose to map out the ancient moral-philosophical world. 
Once main topoi are defined, the framework is ready for one to build up the whole edifice of 
the ancient moral-philosophical mind-map.16 When this mind-map is completed, it will be able 
to grasp the ancient moral-philosophical world in the same way ancient people would have 
done, through the window of the ancient texts. Moreover, the understanding of the wider 
network of topoi allows readers to have the deeper insight into the ancient moral-philosophical 
world.17 To conclude, the benefits of topos analysis suggested by Thom (2003:569-73) will be 
introduced as follows: 
1) A good understanding of the topos thus helps to identify the issues involved and to locate the 
text within the broader moral discourse … 
2) … A topos may also help us to understand connections within the text between apparently 
unrelated materials … 
3) … A better understanding of the topoi involved may in the same way provide insight into 
the compositional integrity of NT texts such as the Sermon on the Mount (Matt 5-7) … 
4) … The point of a passage may lie in its manipulation or adaptation of a topos that is assumed. 
An extract from Tacitus’ Historiae provides readers with a good example of these benefits of 
topos analysis: 
Nec minus praemia delatorum invisa quam scelera, cum alii sacerdotia et consulatus ut spolia 
adepti, procurationes alii et interiorem potentiam, agerent verterent cuncta odio et terrore, 
                                          
characteristics of popular philosophy. 
16 This is the ultimate purpose of applying the topos analysis, which Thom (2003:569) clarifies, saying “the moral 
universe in the Greco-Roman world is thus divided into regions or topoi, each with its own internal structure, 
based on the questions it is meant to answer … Once the moral world has been mapped out in terms of topoi, an 
author can use these topoi as points of reference: he does not have to describe the topic in detail; a few reminders 
are sufficient.” 
17 In his conclusion, Thom (2003:573) says: “In the words of Milton, ‘the mind is its own place’ and has the 
ability to order and make sense of everyday experience by creating its own world of meaning. Topoi form part of 
this process of mental and cultural construction. By gaining insight into ancient topoi, we also enter the world 
views of ancient authors” (emphasis is mine). This resounds Wankel and Pernot’s emphasis on reality that has 
been previously mentioned. 
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corrupti in dominos servi, in patronos liberti; et quibus deerat inimicus per amicos oppressi.  
The rewards of the informers were no less hateful than their crimes; for some, gaining 
priesthoods and consulships as spoils, others, obtaining positions as imperial agents and secret 
influence at court, made havoc and turmoil everywhere, inspiring hatred and terror. Slaves were 
corrupted against their masters, freedmen against their patrons; and those who had no enemy 
were crushed by their friends (Tacitus, Historiae 1. 2; transl. Moore 1968:7). 
The whole passage describes the virtue of justice distorted by the vices prevalent in Roman 
society. This paragraph consists of two parts arranged in chiasmus: heading-example-example-
heading. The first part begins with a heading, which denounces the situation in which 
corruption is preferred to justice. The details are provided to support this heading, such as 
simonia, the bargain of government offices and the twisted judgments by aggravating hostility 
and chaos behind the curtain. The second part is reversed in order. Tacitus provides examples 
such as the disloyalty of the slaves and freedmen to their masters and patrons before presenting 
the second heading, which reproves the fall of friendship. In terms of the topos analysis, the 
latter part should especially be noted. 
Through these illustrations, Tacitus conveys the typical ills within the Roman society. In fact, 
the connection between the heading and its examples in the first part is understandable because 
its logical sequence is quite clear even to modern readers. As for the second part, however, the 
connection between the heading and its examples seems absurd to modern readers. One may 
then wonder how he/she should understand the relationship between the disloyalty of slaves 
and freedmen and the fall of friendship since the slaves and freedmen are not friends of their 
masters and patrons at all. In such cases, as Thom indicates, the topos analysis can assist in 
defining the relations between elements appearing to be irrelevant by providing a map of the 
ancient conventional ideas on friendship. This is because Tacitus adopted the topos of 
friendship to formulate his argument. 
In essence, friendship was the ideal of social relationships in Greco-Roman society (Ferguson 
2003:68). The value of friendship was so important to ancient people that numerous ancient 
authors provided diverse definitions of friendship. Fitzgerald (1997:17-20) thus points out that 
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friendship of a specific period of time should first be defined before exploring its practice 
because the meaning of friendship altered with the changes of time.18  
In the Homeric era, the most important sign of true friendship was “oneness of mind” which 
was demonstrated through three major issues concering friendship: the abuse of guest-friend 
relationships, the deaths of friends and the alienation of friends from one another (Fitzgerald 
1997:21-25). True friendship was measured mainly by the way one behaves in these three 
situations.  
However, in the time of pan-Hellenic crisis, “trustworthiness” became a prominent value of 
friendship. This shift of prominence from “oneness of mind” to “trustworthiness” resulted from 
the Greek wars waged against the great empire of Persia (Fitzgerald 1997:31). When the Greek 
world was facing the gigantic army of the Persian empire, the Greek cities had no other option 
than fighting as allies. In the situation of this fatal crisis, against which a united front of all the 
Greek cities was desperately required, “trustworthiness” became a priority in relationships. 
Afterwards, Aristotle put forward a new value of friendship “altruism” by categorising 
friendship into three divisions: friendship grounded in virtue, friendship grounded in pleasure, 
and friendship grounded in utility (in Schroeder 1997:37-8). From the meaning of altruism, it 
can be deduced that one should fundamentally seek benefit and interest for others in his/her 
relationship with friends.  
Multiple authors of political upheavals discussed how to distinguish true friends from false 
ones. During early Roman times, for example, Cicero described in what way the traditional 
ideal of friendship was practiced and by doing so, the institution of friendship continuously 
served the Roman society (Fiore 1997:76). Among attempts to define friendship, the Stoic 
notion of friendship was regarded as the most appropriate one by Cicero because friendship 
                                          
18 Fitzgerald (1997:17-20) delineates the notion of the term φίλος in the ancient world: “φίλος, regardless of the 
etymological details, literally expresses not an emotional attachment, but belonging to a social group, and this 
usage is linked to the use of the word as a possessive in Homer, φίλος as ‘one’s own’ is thus an antonym of ξένος 
(ξεῖνος), ‘the stranger who does not belong to one’s group’ and thus is ‘not one’s own.’ Accordingly, the use of 
φίλος to indicate ‘friend’ or ‘loved one’ is a later development, as is the notion of the guest-friend…. the practice 
of friendship thus precedes its precise definition.” 
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was identified with a universal good in Stoicism (Schroeder 1997:47). Arius Didymus made 
use of this Stoic notion of friendship to further his own definition when he classified friendship 
into four categories: of comradeship, of kinship, of hospitality and of sexual desire (Schroeder 
1997:49). Also, friendship was applied to the fields of relationship such as the relationships 
between parents and children, husband and wife, as well as human beings and gods by ancient 
moral philosophers. These categorisations define the dimensions of friendship on the basis of 
the Stoic notion of friendship: “universal amity and universal harmony” (cf. Schroeder 
1997:56). 
Neopythagorean writings also provide more evidence that friendship was a main concern 
across philosophical schools. The Neopythagorean ideal of friendship was “harmonious 
equality” and it was repeatedly expressed in phrases such as “friends have everything in 
common,” “friendship is equality,” and “a friend is another I” (Thom 1997:77). Philodemus 
and Plutarch wrote on the same topic with different titles, Περὶ παρρησίας and Quomodo 
adulator ab amico internoscatur. Philodemus focused on practicing this ideal in Epicurean 
communal life (cf. Dorandi 1999:59) and Plutarch, a well-known Platonist (Russell 
2012b:1165) wrote on practicing this ideal in broader political life situations (cf. O’Neil 
1997:109).  
Moreover, Dionysius of Halicarnassus, a Greek critic and historian (Russell 2012a:460), was 
of the opinion that “patriotism” was a priority among friendly relationships during Roman 
times (Balch 1997:123-144). This indicates another field of the ideal friendship: the 
relationship between the Empire and its people.  
There were also multiple models to encourage people to practise this “ideal relationship”. For 
example, since Homeric time, the famous friendship of Achilles with Patroclus had become a 
typical model of true friendship (Hock 1997:147). Following the Homeric model, Polycharmus 
and Chaereas practised the ideal of friendship in Chariton’s novel. Polycharmus’ devotion to 
saving his friend from every mishap and sharing Chaereas’ every hardship, including death, 
became a model of true friendship (Hock 1997:155). Lucian’s Agathocles also supported his 
friend Deinias by choosing to share his fate when Deinias was expelled from the country (Pervo 
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1997:167). From these fictional or legendary characters, it becomes evident how highly the 
ideal of friendship was esteemed and encouraged among ancient people through the ages. True 
and ideal friendship was thus confirmed by the devotion to share every single moment of fate 
with friends.  
The fact that the emphases on friendship prevailed in the Greco-Roman world indicates that 
Tacitus was so accustomed to the conventional treatment of friendship that he readily adopted 
the topos of friendship to formulate his argument. In short, friendship was the ideal of every 
relationship which points to the universal fellowship and a high regard for the practice of 
friendship. Consequently, it was acceptable, even natural to ancient readers that Tacitus adopted 
the relationships between slaves and masters, freedmen and patrons in order for his readers to 
sympathise with his lament over the fall of friendship.  
Based on this understanding of friendship, the implication of the extract from Tacitus’ Historiae 
should be explored. As has already been observed, the first part describes selling out justice for 
money; friendship should therefore be connected to justice in order to secure the logical 
consistency of the paragraph. It is likely that friendship has a strong connection with the topos 
of pietas (piety; the Greek equivalent is εὐσεβεία). As previously discussed, pietas plays an 
important role in the relationships between siblings, parents, heroes, and even gods: friendship 
also is discussed with a premise of these relationships. Since εὐσεβεία was usually understood 
as ‘duty’ and as a substantive aspect of justice in relationships (Greene & Sheld 2012:1148),19 
pietas was regarded as an important measure of justice, which was one of the cardinal virtues. 
Likewise, friendship was a substantialised form of pietas in relationships. Consequently, it 
becomes clear that friendship referred to the primary Roman virtues. In this sense, damaging 
friendship in such a way as striking down any friend must have been regarded as a serious 
transgression of the most important social convention of the Graeco-Roman world. Arius 
                                          
19 “‘Justice’/‘right’ is a relational term which identifies the fairness or reasonableness between two parameters. 
… In the period following, i.e. via Stoa to Cicero, and, following him, Ulpian (around AD 200), the word … 
iustitia designates the social virtue of human beings and is identified with distributive justice” (Neschke 
2005:1224-1225). 
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Didymus provides clue to the subordinate relationship between these virtues:  
Τῶν δ’ ἀρετῶν τὰς μὲν εἶναι πρώτας, τὰς δὲ ταῖς πρώταις ὑποτεταγμένας.  
Πρώτας δὲ τέτταρας εἶναι, φρόνησιν, σωφροσύνην, ἀνδρείαν καὶ δικαιοσύνην …  
… τῇ δὲ δικαιοσύνῃ εὐσέβειαν, χρηστότητα, εὐκοινωνησίαν, εὐσυναλλαξίαν …  
… Εὐσέβειαν δὲ ἐπιστήμην θεῶν θεραπείας.  
Of the virtues, some are primary, while others are subordinate to the primary virtues.  
These are four which are primary: intelligence, self-restraint, bravery, and justice …  
… To justice are subordinated piety, kindness, good fellowship, and fair dealing …  
… Piety is a knowledge of the service of the gods (Liber de philosophorum sectis 64. 2. 2-4, 16-
18; 65. 1. 7-8; transl. Pomeroy 1999:15-17; my emphases). 
The crooked value of friendship described by Tacitus cannot find any room for itself in its 
relationship with superordinate values of pietas and justice. Moreover, such a fall of friendship 
was an extreme menace to the Roman society. Indeed, the collapse of friendship by the 
freedmen and servants who were corrupted “against” their patrons and masters must have been 
regarded as signs of the subversion of the social system. 
Through the conventional way of dealing with friendship, the description of the Roman ills by 
Tacitus has come to be comprehended in the Roman moral-philosophical context. As the ideal 
of all the relationships, it was accepted by ancient people as a very important value to be 
preserved. However, considering its relationship with its super-virtues, which are piety and 
justice, the damage to friendship could be accepted even as the overturn of the social value and 
system. Therefore, by utilising the topos of friendship, Tacitus intended to maximise his readers’ 
contempt for the horrible downfall of the early Roman society. 
In conclusion, Van Nuffelen’s (2011:125) suggestion of the premises and the benefits of the 
topos analysis will be presented. Van Nuffelen here argues for the validity of the topos analysis: 
Without grasp of the traditional topoi associated with the comparison, we shall not be able to see 
how Aristides subtly plays with his readers’ expectations. They will also help us to understand 
the malleable nature of that image: the Persian Great King can be made to fit Platonist and 
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Aristotelian concepts of the divine, thus illustrating that it is rather a cipher for the perfect 
hierarchy than the translation of a specific philosophical position.  
Van Nuffelen is almost the first scholar to propose the application of the topos analysis to 
interpretation of the image of the Great King.20 Furthermore, his comment assists one in 
understanding the way the topos analysis contributes to interpreting ancient texts.  
This thesis will analyse a complex image in which the various descriptive elements imply 
different philosophical concepts that together construct a Middle Platonic cosmic framework. 
To analyse the image of the Great King in this way is not simply a matter of clarifying the 
Middle Platonic cosmic system behind this image. Instead, the thesis will first specify the 
philosophical concepts to which each element of the image refers, based on the historical 
accounts of these elements and the cosmological notions behind the arguments on νοῦς. Next, 
the concepts will be confirmed by analysing the terms relevant to them. Finally, by 
demonstrating that the image of the Great King, on the one hand, implies the Middle Platonic 
cosmic frame and, on the other hand, functions as a conventional way of discussing a traditional 
topic, I will propose that this image be regarded a topos. 
Before commencing in the interpretation of the image of the Great King through the topos 
analysis, brief research on historical references to the Great King, his palace, the system of 
satraps, his eyes and ears, and the beacon-signals should be conducted, so that one may 
establish the boundaries and scope of the image of the Great King. Therefore, the next chapter 
will look into historical sources on the ancient Persian empire with relevance to the descriptive 
elements of the Great King in order to discuss the philosophical notions implied through the 
image of the Great King.  
  
                                          
20 Nevertheless, the title of the chapter which includes the extract, “the Great King of Persia and his Satraps” is 
too narrow to include the whole scope of the arguments behind the description of the Great King. 
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Chapter Three: Historical backgrounds of the image of the Great King 
There was a traditional philosophical topic concerning the relationship between god and the 
universe. In dealing with this topic, the tension between god’s transcendent existence and 
immanent influence on the earth was an abstruse dilemma to be solved by ancient philosophers 
throughout the ages. The image of the Great King was adopted to explain sophisticated 
philosophical notions based on the well-known historical facts included in this image. This 
means that the research on historical facts, which constitute this image, assists one in 
deciphering the philosophical implications of the image. The image of the Great King includes 
multiple elements, which represent certain cosmo-theological notions: the Great King secluded 
in a gigantic palace, his satraps, his eyes and ears, and the beacon-signals. Once the historical 
facts about these elements are outlined, the plausible connecting points between them and the 
philosophical notions, which are represented by the image of the Great King, will be defined. 
Accordingly, the main concern of this chapter will be to clarify historical facts on which the 
image of the Great King is formed. In doing so, the scope of this chapter should be narrowed 
down to the aforementioned elements: the Great King’s palace, the Persian governing system 
represented by his satraps, and the empire’s communication systems such as the Great King’s 
eyes and ears and the beacon-signals. Fortunately, multiple modern historians conducted 
research on these elements. 
It is well known that the Great King was hidden in his palace so that even the closest people to 
the Great King were able to approach him only when they obtained permission (Brosius 
2007:22). Cook (1983:135), Huart (1972:73) and other scholars also agree that the Great King 
enjoyed absolute exaltedness and seclusion due to the fact that his subjects were hardly able to 
see him.21 Although none of the Persian kings had ever been proclaimed to be god (Kuhrt 
2010:475), it is very clear that there was no one equal to these kings on earth. The Great King’s 
majesty and awesomeness were demonstrated in multiple ways such as the Great King’s palace 
                                          
21 Herodotus (Historiae 1.99.2) indicates Deioces as the first king who established a rule to assure the security 
and to awe the people into subordination. This story provides us with the basic purpose and function of the gigantic 
palace of the emperors. 
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and the system of governance, including his uncountable subjects. 
The palace functioned as a means to reinforce the greatness of the Great King. In Herodotus’ 
Historiae, a similar description of the massive palace to that of the Great King in Pseudo-
Aristotle’ De mundo is found. Herodotus here described the palace of the Median king, Deioces. 
This similarity between the descriptions of the Persian and the Median royal palaces is 
confirmed by the historical connection between these two empires. First, the city named 
Ecbatana or Agbatana where the palace was built brackets the similarity between the Median 
and the Persian palaces because the city was the capital of the Median Empire and a capital of 
the latter as well. Secondly, the fact that Cyrus, the founder of the Persian Empire finds his 
origin in the Medians is a possible cause of the similarity between the two empires in social 
systems and cultural styles. Therefore, it is clear that Cyrus, the founder of the Persian Empire 
modeled his own palace after the Median palace. Asheri, Lloyd and Corcella (2007:150) also 
support this connection between these two empires by indicating another point, which is that 
Achaemenids utilized the same regional place (Ecbatana/Agbatana) for the kings to summer. 
The description of the palace of Deioces as follows: 
And when all was built, it was Deioces first who established the rule that no one should be dealt 
with by the means of messengers; that the king should be seen by no man; and moreover that it 
should be in particular a disgrace for any to laugh or to spit in his presence. He was careful to 
hedge himself with all this state in order that the men of his own age (who had been bred up with 
him and were as nobly born as he and his equals in manly excellence), instead of seeing him and 
being thereby vexed and haply moved to plot against him, might by reason of not seeing him 
deem him to be changed from what he had been So he built the great and mighty circles of walls 
within walls which are now called Agbatana. This fortress is so planned that each circle of wall 
is higher than the next outer circle by no more than the height of its battlements; to which end 
the site itself, being on a hill in the plain, somewhat helps, but chiefly it was accomplished by 
art. There are seven circles in all; within the innermost circle are the king’s dwellings and the 
treasuries; and the longest wall is about the length of the wall that surrounds the city of Athens. 
The battlements of the first circle are white, the second black, of the third circle purple, of the 
fourth blue, and of the fifth orange: thus the battlements of five circles are painted with colours; 
and the battlements of the last two circles are coated, these with silver and those with gold 
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(Herodotus, Historiae 1.98.2; transl. Godley 1966:131). 
Albeit its grandiloquent style, this description of the king Deioces’ palace has significance in 
understanding the function of the palace-description in ancient writings. In particular, it should 
be noted here that the palace was surrounded by seven walls with different colours. According 
to historical surveys, the emphasis on the seven colours is a means to imply that the palace is 
the center of the universe: 
It is generally held that the Babylonians, and later the Medes and the Persians, used seven colours 
to paint royal palaces and temples, seven being a sacred colours …. These seven colours – as 
also metals, precious stones, flavours, etc. – corresponded in Chaldean astrology to the seven 
Mesopotamian divine planets (Asheri, Lloyd & Corcella 2007:150). 
Observations on the Great King’s palace so far are summarised as follows:  
1) The Great King himself was secluded in his huge palace. 
2) His palace was placed in the center of the fortress.  
3) The Great King was surrounded by multi-walled palace with his bodyguards and 
servants. 
These three points describe the Great King as being perfectly hidden from all the others. The 
Great King’s thorough separateness from the world, however, was not the only point, which 
was intended to be made by the hugeness of his palace. The power of the Great King, which 
was swayed through his subjects reinforced his majestic image even though he stayed out of 
the sight of his people.22  
This way of demonstrating the Great King’s majesty through the combination of his huge 
palace and his system of governance was highlighted through the seasonal marching of the 
Great King. This royal marching was seasonally conducted from one capital to another, in order 
                                          
22 Doubtlessly, the main purpose of the palace was to secure the king’s safety and convenience, but at the same 
time one should not ignore its symbolically important function as the center of the empire. From the anecdote of 
Deioces (Herodotus, Historiae, 1. 98) that he ordered people who brought him forward as a king to build houses 
worthy of his royal power, we can ascertain this main symbolic function of the palace. 
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to display the Great King’s greatness by demonstrating how orderly and powerfully he 
controlled his uncountable subjects. There were five capitals of the Persian Empire: Babylon, 
Susa, Ecbatana, Pasargade and Persepolis as residences and places for the Great King’s subjects 
and the royal court (Allen 2005:59). Brosius (2006:37) explains how spectacular the Great 
King’s seasonal marching was and what massage it conveyed to the people of the Great King: 
To visit his royal cities the king travelled with his court which formed a large entourage in the 
king’s train. It included the royal bodyguard, the 10,000 Immortals, courtiers and court officials 
and their families, the king’s family, including the king’s mother, the royal wives and the women 
of the king, the children, members of the Persian nobility and their families, attendants, cooks, 
bakers, wine-bearers, etc. The entourage would travel on foot, on horseback, and in carriages 
along the Royal Road to their destination. Passing through villages and towns along the route the 
royal entourage provided a most spectacular sight. The sheer size of the king’s entourage must 
have been overwhelming, but it was further enhanced by the opulence and splendour of the court. 
The message conveyed in this spectacle was, however, more than just the display of royalty; it 
demonstrated the king’s presence in the empire, and showed him as the surveyor of his realm 
and as a king in control. 
Especially, Brosius’ conclusion, “the message conveyed in this spectacle was, however, more 
than just the display of royalty; it demonstrated the king’s presence in the empire, and showed 
him as the surveyor of his realm and as a king in control” means that the people of the ancient 
empire of Persia must have seen the Great King’s greatness not by seeing the Great King 
himself in person, but by watching the splendor of his power and majesty, which were 
exaggeratedly demonstrated through the spectacular parade.  
Furthermore, the court society, where the Great King exercised his power to the closest subjects, 
should be discussed in detail. It is reasonable to assume that a monarch of such a spacious 
territory as the Persian Empire must have needed a great number of trustworthy subjects around 
him so that he might maintain his power and efficiently rule over the whole empire.23 Curtis 
                                          
23 Brosius (2007:19) finds the origin of the hierarchical court society from the natural ranking of the heads of 
families. 
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and Razmjou (2005:54) supports this assumption by giving an account of the capacity of the palace as 
the core place of the Persian royal court: 
The reliefs on the Apadana at Persepolis show delegations from twenty-three countries under 
Persian control bringing gifts to a meeting that was also attended by nobles or important officials. 
The Apadana could hold up to 10,000 guests at ground level alone, not including other levels in 
the building. Some palaces such as the Hall of 100 Columns were used for a similar purpose but 
for receiving different types of guest. This palace was perhaps a meeting place for military 
officials after it was completed in the time of Artaxerxes I. 
A well-defined concept of the court will assist the reader in properly understanding the 
characteristics of the Persian governing system. The governing body of the Persian Empire was 
the royal court, which consisted of these faithful people around the Great King. Spawforth 
(2012:389-90) defines the Persian royal court as follows: 
Courts are best understood as ‘universal social configurations’ (G. Herman) which arise in 
societies where power becomes the monopoly of a monarch … Anthropological emphasis on the 
‘theatre of power’ underscores the importance of ‘trappings’ in sustaining monarchy: ceremonies 
and spectacle, dress, palaces and the arts, the main fields of ‘court culture’ … The elaborate and 
hierarchical court of the Persian Achaemenids made a great impression on the ancient Greeks 
(Herodotus; Ctesias; Dinon). 
Brosius (2007:18) also defines the Persian royal court by explaining its components and 
function: 
Thus, ‘court’ describes on the one hand the people surrounding the king, and on the other hand 
the institutional context within which the king operates, that is, the centre of his political 
administrative, judicial and military power. 
From these two definitions, the following points can be confirmed: 1) the court society was the 
core of the Persian governing system, 2) the Great King’s palace is the center of the court 
society, and 3) the Persian court was very impressive to the Greek people because they had 
never had such an elaborate hierarchical system of governance. This hierarchical system of the 
Persian governance is represented by the system of satraps.  
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The Persian system of satraps was an extended version of this royal court and the satraps were 
the most important figures of this extended court society (Brosius 2007:35). The satraps were 
local kings and they had their own court societies in their fiefs. This system was an effective 
method to govern the massive territory in peace according as Cyrus held a basic policy that he 
left the present systems of the conquered nations as they had been and merely implanted his 
authority and will into their systems by appointing the satraps (Brosius 2006:47). This extended 
application of the hierarchical court system is thus the Persian political innovation.24 In other 
words, the satraps were representatives of the Great King himself, who enjoyed lesser 
privileges than those of the Great King (Briant 2002:345-348). Through the system of satraps, 
the hierarchical order of the empire, along with the Great King’s power, was able to reach the 
end of the territory.  
Brosius (2006:40) pointed out that meritocracy placed each member of the court society in their 
hierarchical ranks. Through this meritocracy, which functions based on the important value of 
pistis, the Great King encouraged his subjects to compete in loyalty towards him, so that he 
could effectively administer the vast territory of the empire (Briant 2002:324-326). 
However, the Great King had to keep watch his satraps and to communicate with his subjects 
in order to hold his authority and influence over his empire. He thus appointed spies called the 
Great King’s eyes and ears to achieve this purpose. Cook (1983:143) provides a brief survey 
of ancient authors’ references to the eyes and ears of the Great King: 
The Greeks found a source of amusement in the official they called the King’s eye. Xenophon 
in his Cyropaedia expressly stated that this was not a unique office, and he claimed that the King 
had many ‘eyes’ and ‘ears’ who kept him informed. As regards the ‘ears’ he has the support of a 
fifth-century papyrus from Elephantine which speaks of ‘listeners’ (a word corresponding to Old 
Persian ‘gaushaka’) in Achaemenids Egypt. So we can accept that the raj had such informers; 
                                          
24 Olmstead (1948:59) provides the reader with a historical survey on the system of the satraps for a more balanced 
understanding of the government of this wide-extending territory: “he adopted in principle the organization first 
devised by the Assyrians, who replaced the states they had conquered by formal provinces. … the chief difference 
between these Assyrian provinces and the twenty satrapies established by Cyrus lay in the fact that the satrapies 
took the place of far larger independent monarchies.” Allen (2005:29) also indicates the well-known fact that it 
was Cyrus who introduced this system to his empire. 
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indeed, Herodotus traces secret informers back to the beginning of the Median kingdom under 
Deiokes. But according to Plutarch (probably following Ctesias) there was an official with the 
title of the King’s Eye who brought Artaxerxes II the news that his brother Cyrus was dead on 
the battlefield; and the three fifth-century Greek writers, Aeschylus, Herodotus, and Aristophanes, 
all speak as though the King had a trusty servant who was called his Eye. 
Frye (1984:108-9) distinguishes the eyes from the ears of the Great King. According to him, 
the Great King’s eyes were his chief overseers and his ears were spies. However, whatever they 
were, it is clear that they held a very important position in operating the whole system by 
transferring messages and information between the Great King and his subjects. In other words, 
the Great King’s eyes and ears functioned as an invisible network between the Great King, who 
was sitting in the center of the empire, and his satraps, who were representatives of the Great 
King in the sub-regions of his empire.  
However, without well-developed systems of the road, the post stations, and so forth, the 
Persian governing system was never able to function properly because they accelerated the 
communication between the Great King and his satraps through his eyes and ears (Kuhrt 
2010:730-762). The Persian Empire also had beacon signals as an effective system of 
communication, which transmits information from the farthest distance to the Great King.  
The beacon-signals were the fastest and most effective communication device in the Persian 
empire. These beacon-signals enabled the Great King to be instantly informed from the farthest 
distance. Herodotus (Historiae 9.3.1) provides an anecdote in which the beacon-signals 
instantly informed the Great King even across islands: 
A great yearning had seized him (Mardonius) to take Athens a second time. Partly this was 
arrogance, partly he wanted to show the king in Sardis by beacons across the islands that he held 
Athens (transl. Kuhrt 2010:756). 
In this chapter, multiple historical facts that refer to the elaborate hierarchical government of 
Persia have briefly been introduced. These will assist in defining the philosophical discussions 
implied through the image of the Great King: 
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1) The gigantic palace where the Great King enjoyed the perfect seclusion from all the 
others. 
2) The satraps who transmitted the Great King’s power and will to every corner of his 
massive empire. 
3) The Great King’s eyes and ears which effectively connected the Great King with his 
subjects outside the palace, including his satraps. 
4) The beacon-signals which assisted the Great King in being informed instantly from the 
farthest part of his empire. 
On the basis of these facts, in the next chapter the thesis will identify the ancient notion of the 
hierarchical frame of the comos by looking at the ancient arguments on νοῦς. This is because, 
in ancient philosophy, νοῦς is connected to the cosmic order and it is sometimes even identified 
with diverse cosmo-theological elements such as god and divine intermediaries. These 
elements are essential constituents of the cosmic hierarchy. Accordingly, by tracing the 
arguments on these topics, chapter 4 will provide a philosophically proper background for 
analyzing the topos of the image of the Great King. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
35 
 
Chapter Four: Philosophical background of the notion of the hierarchical cosmos 
The notion of the hierarchical cosmos makes its appearance in the writings of the pre-Socractic 
philosophers. However, it is not explicitly articulated by these philosophers but only implied 
through their arguments on νοῦς. Through these arguments, three essential elements of the 
hierarchical cosmic frame are revealed: the prime god, his intermediaries and the hierarchical 
system represented by the cosmic order. Due to the dates of the texts which this thesis will 
analyse, this chapter will discuss only the arguments on νοῦς by the philosophers before 
Plotinus who inaugurated the era of Neoplatonism.  
Νοῦς is usually translated as ‘mind’ or ‘sense’ in English (LSJ, s.v. νόος). In ancient Greek 
philosophy, however, it means intellectual faculty and is translated as ‘intellect’ and conveys 
the two main meanings: a) divine substance; and b) human cognition (Szlezák 2005:842). For 
the present discussion, only the former will be discussed in this chapter. 
Only νοῦς as divine substance concerns the purpose of this chapter because it implies the notion 
of the prime god and his divine intermediary together with the cosmic hierarchy, of which νοῦς 
is the cause.25 This is categorised in two parts: 1) νοῦς as divine intermediary and 2) νοῦς as 
god. The latter is again divided into two: 1) the subtle identification of νοῦς with god and 2) 
the direct identification of νοῦς with god. 
1) Νοῦς as divine intermediary 
From the pre-Socratic era, the notion of divine intermediary appeared through the notion of 
νοῦς. Νοῦς is especially identified with divine power by Ecphantus, a Pythgorean of the 4th 
century BCE: 
κινϵῖσθαι δὲ τὰ σώματα μήτε ὑπὸ βάρους μήτε πληγῆς, ἀλλ᾽ ὑπὸ θείας δυνάμεως, ἣν νοῦν καὶ 
ψυχὴν προσαγορεύει. 
                                          
25 To conduct research on the pre-Socratic argument on νοῦς, Diels and Kranz’s (1952c:296-8) word index was 
used. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
36 
 
The bodies, however, are moved neither by weight nor by impact, but by divine power, which he 
calls Mind and Soul (Ecphantus, DK 51.1.11-13, p. 442; my translation).  
Ecphantus held that the world is governed by the divine providence (O’Meara 2012:486) 
and the concept of νοῦς as divine power in his cosmology reminds the reader of the Pseudo-
Aristotelian divine power in De mundo 398a. The relation between the Ecphantian and 
Pseudo-Aristotelian divine powers is unclear, but νοῦς is identified with the divine power, 
which is an intermediary between the bodies moved by the power and the ultimate mover 
of these bodies, the holder of the power. 
Examples of νοῦς as the divine intermediary are very scarce. This scarcity does not seem to 
be irrelevant to the fact that a philosophical tradition in which νοῦς was identified with the 
prime god was prevalent in antiquity (Opsomer 2005:61). This identification of νοῦς with 
god appears in two ways: 1) by imposing the same role on νοῦς and god to hold the cosmos 
in order, 2) by directly identifying one with the other. Anaxagoras provides the reader with 
examples of the first way of identifying νοῦς with god. 
2) Νοῦς as the cause of the movement and order of the universe 
καὶ νοῦν μὲν ἀρχὴν κινήσεως. 
And Mind is the source of motion (Anaxagoras, DK 59.A.1, p. 5.30-31; transl. Graham 
2010:295). 
πάντα διεκόσμηνε νοῦς. 
All these did mind set in order (Anaxagoras, DK 59.B.12, p. 11-12; transl. Graham 2010:291).  
τὸ δὲ ποιοῦν αἴτιον νοῦν τὸν πάντα διαταξάμενον. 
die Wirkursache jedoch der Geist, der alles ordnend gestalte (Anaxagoras, DK 59.A.46, p. 19.3-
4; transl. Mansfeld and Primavessi 2011:619).  
Not as a creator God but as a Greek artisan (Cleve 1973:80), the Anaxagorean νοῦς can be 
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regarded as the proto-type of the Platonic δημιουργός which occupies a high rank in the 
presupposed cosmic hierarchical order.26 From Fr. 12, which includes a series of his arguments 
on νοῦς, Lesher (1995:126) summarises the attributes of the Anaxagorean νοῦς: 
(1) Mind is unlimited, self-controlling, and unmixed with anything else, while all other things 
have a portion of everything (lines 1-3 and 25-26); 
(2) Mind is the finest and purest of all things (9-10); 
(3) Mind has every discerning judgement (πᾶσαν γνώμην) about everything (10); 
(4) Mind is the greatest strength (10-11); 
(5) Mind controls all things that possess soul (11-12); 
(6) Mind controlled the whole revolution so that it began to rotate (12-13); 
(7) Mind knew (ἔγνω) all things, the things being mixed together and the things being separated 
off and distinguished (16-17); 
(8) Mind ordered (διεκόσμησε) all things (17-19); and 
(9) Mind is all alike in things both great and small (27-28). 
The Anaxagorean notion of νοῦς is based on its intellectuality and this pure intellect is involved 
in the movement and order of all things. The creation which is not creatio ex nihilo (Cleve 
1973:77) is carried out through νοῦς by setting all things in order. This notion is also introduced 
by Pseudo-Aristotle when the etymology of the word ‘cosmos’ is provided (De mundo 397a.5-
8). This order implies the notion of cosmic hierarchy that distinguishes all existential beings 
from each other according to their ontological ranks. This concept of νοῦς as the cause of order 
thus indicates that νοῦς is regarded as the first principle as the creator of the cosmos. 
Van Riel (2013:27-8) specifically adopts the Anaxagorean notion of νοῦς to represent the 
notion of νοῦς in the ancient philosophical tradition: 
The same can be said of the term ‘intellect’ (νοῦς), which contains in a nutshell the evolution of 
                                          
26  Cleve’s (1973:80) explanation of the Anaxagorean νοῦς should be introduced because it supports this 
assumption: “The Anaxagrean Nous, however, is not the Jewish God, not a Creator absolutely omnipotent, who 
out of nothingness conjures up the world to be subservient to His ends, the ends of the Lord. The Nous of 
Anaxagoras is a Hellenistic artist, the architect of the world, a mathematical and physical intelligence of the 
highest rank, but of a might only relatively highest. A skillful mechanician, knowing all that can be made of the 
world, but performing as well all the conditions in dispensable for accomplishing the chosen possibilities.” 
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Greek religious attitudes. In Homeric times, the word ‘νοῦς’ was used to indicate the ‘leadership’ 
of the gods, but also their whims. In philosophical explanations, the term was used to indicate 
the intellect that governs the order of the universe (as in Anaxagoras), while at some time being 
used to indicate ‘wisdom’ and ‘thoughtfulness’ of the morally good person. 
This notion of νοῦς, namely that it is the source of cosmic order, was shared by the ancient 
Greek philosophers such as the Platonists and the Stoics when they explained divine providence 
of the universe (Sharples 2010a:143). With regard to divine providence, god and νοῦς are 
interchangeably described as the generator of cosmic order. The thesis will now look into 
multiple authors who directly identify νοῦς with god.  
3) Νοῦς as god 
As the first philosopher who, against the anthropomorphic description of god, inaugurated 
the systematic concept of theology, Xenophanes influenced Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics 
(Kahn 2012b:1580).27  This notion of god as the everlasting mind is a very important 
concept in the Aristotelian notion of god as Unmoved Mover.28 As indicated, this excessive 
emphasis on divine intellectuality must be closely connected to god’s preservation of the 
world through order: 
οὐσίαν θεοῦ σφαιροειδῆ, μηδὲν ὃμοιον ἔχουσαν ἀνθρώπωι˙ ὅλον δὲ ὁρᾶν καὶ ὅλον ἀκούειν, μὴ 
μέντοι ἀναπνεῖν˙ σύμπαντά τε εἶναι νοῦν καὶ φρόνησιν καὶ ἀίδιον. 
The being of God is spherical, not at all like that of man. All of him sees and all of him hears, 
but he does not breathe. He is all mind and thought and is everlasting (Xenophanes, DK 
                                          
27 Thales states, “God is the mind of the world (νοῦν τοῦ κόσμου τὸν θεόν; DK 11.A.23; transl. Graham 2010:35)”. 
This reflects Thales’ panentheism (Kahn 2012a) which was revived and developed by the hands of the Stoics. 
Aristotle comments on Thales, saying, “some say the soul is mixed in with the whole universe, and perhaps this 
is why Thales supposed that all things are full of gods” (De anima 1.5.411.a.7–8; transl. Cohen, Curd and Reeve 
2011:12). In Pythagorean tradition as well, this direct identification of νοῦς with god can be found: ὅπερ ἐστὶ νοῦς 
ὁ θεός (Pythagorean School, DK 58.B.15, p. 454.39-40). These are, however, too fragmental to ascertain a definite 
understanding of the notion of νοῦς. 
28 To see how these arguments were inherited by Plato and Aristotle, see Kenny (2006:289-302). From this, it can 
be construed that their succesors would inherit these arguments on god and νοῦς.  
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21.A.1.25-27, p. 113; transl. Graham 2010:99). 
However, an attempt to keep god away from being involved in the toil of creation is also 
found in the pre-Socratic identification of νοῦς with god: 
ἀέρα καὶ νοῦν τὸν θεὸν, οὐ μέντοι κοσμοποιὸν τὸν νοῦν. 
God is air and mind, yet the mind is not the creator of the universe (Archelaus, DK 60.A.12; my 
translation). 
Logically, this statement is read to mean that god is not the creator of the world because if A=B 
and B്C, then A്C. As a pupil of Anaxagoras, Archelaus followed his teacher in the notion 
that νοῦς is the cause of movement but denied that νοῦς is pure, “cosmopoeic” and the source 
of order (Guthrie 1965:339-41). This detachment of the cosmopoeic task from god was 
repeated by Platonists at the beginning of the first millennium CE in order to secure the prime 
god’s dignity.29 
Plato made use of the term νοῦς 421 times throughout his oeuvre and 89 of them are found in 
one dialogue: Leges. Among those 89 references to νοῦς in Leges, only two need to be 
discussed at this point as they include this comparison of νοῦς to the law: 
ὅπως ἡ νομοθετουμένη πόλις ἐλευθέρα τε ἔσται καὶ φίλη ἑαυτῇ καὶ νοῦν ἕξει. (Leges 701d). 
First, that the city for which he legislates should be free; and secondly, be at unity with herself; 
and thirdly, should have understanding (transl. Jowett 1892:84). 
This statement connects the law with νοῦς by designating the latter as one of the characteristics 
of the city ruled by the law. Jowett’s translation of νοῦς as ‘understanding’ reflects here the 
difficulty of describing the intricate notion of νοῦς in one word. His translation of this word is 
too general and simplistic idea to emphasise the subtle connotation of νοῦς. One may ask, for 
                                          
29 This identification of νοῦς with god concerning their role to preserve the universe through order is most 
effectively conveyed through the metaphor of the law (Opsomer 2005:60). In this sense, it is noteworthy that νοῦς 
is frequently identified with the law by post-Socratic philosophers.  
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example, how one should understand the expression ‘the city has understanding’. In view of 
the fact that νοῦς qualifies a city in his statement, νοῦς should rather be translated as 
‘orderliness’. Even though ‘orderliness’ is not the direct translation of the term νοῦς, it implies 
the most important role of νοῦς. The meaning of νοῦς therefore changes with the specific 
context in which it appears, for example, the governance of a city. The next instance clearly 
designates the order generated by νοῦς as the law: 
τὴν τοῦ νοῦ διανομὴν ἐπονομάζοντας νόμον (Leges 714a). 
Giving the reason’s ordering the name of “law” (transl. Bury 1967:287). 
Likewise, νοῦς is frequently described by Plato as the cause of order (Phaedo 97c.1, 3; 98a.7; 
Cratylus 400a.9; Philebus 28e.3, 30c.6; Leges 966e.4, 967b.5) and at other times identified 
with god (Philebus 28c.7). These descriptions indicate that Plato had in mind the pre-Socratic 
notion that νοῦς is god (cf. Opsomer 2005:53-57).30 
In Aristotle, there are multiple references to νοῦς which are similar to those in Plato. Aristotle 
has only one direct reference to νοῦς which is identified with god (Protrepticus Fr. 110. 1). 
Furthermore, he often implied that νοῦς is god by denoting it as the cause of the universe (De 
anima 404b.2; 405a.15; 407a.6; 411b.18; Metaphysica 1065b.4; Physica 196a.30; 198a.6; 
265b.22; Protrepticus Fr. 27.3). It should therefore be noted that Aristotle also regarded νοῦς 
as god which is the preserver of the universe. Moreover, the clear identification of νοῦς with 
the law is found in Aristotle: 
διόπερ ἄνευ ὀρέξεως νοῦς ὁ νόμος ἐστίν (Aristotle, Politica 1287a.32). 
The law is reason unaffected by desire (transl. Jowett 1921). 
Considering the Aristotelian notion of Unmoved Mover, which is described as pure thought, 
Aristotle implicitly acknowledges that νοῦς is identified with god. This identification of νοῦς 
                                          
30 Opsomer (2005:61) clearly indicates: “there was a strong tradition (the “nous theology”) that considered (the 
supreme) god to be an intellect”.  
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with god indicates that Aristotle held that god, as the immobile νοῦς, preserves the universe 
through order. This understanding is reflected by Pseudo-Aristotle in his identification of god 
with the law: 
ἐν ἀκινήτῳ γὰρ ἱδρυμένος δυνάμει πάντα κινεῖ καὶ περιάγει, ὅπου βούλεται καὶ ὅπως, ἐν 
διαφόροις ἰδέαις τε καὶ φύσεσιν, ὥσπερ ἀμέλει καὶ ὁ τῆς πόλεως νόμος ἀκίνητος ὢν ἐν ταῖς τῶν 
χρωμένων ψυχαῖς πάντα οἰκονομεῖ τὰ κατὰ τὴν πολιτείαν· 
For he, established in the immobile, moves all things with power and leads them around, where 
and how he wills, in different forms and natures, just as, for instance, the law of the city, being 
immovable in the souls of those who use it, administers all things in public life (De mundo 400b. 
11-15; transl. Thom 2014b:53). 
These two aspects of divine νοῦς and the presupposed notion of cosmic hierarchy were 
inherited and gathered together by the Middle Platonists to formulate their cosmological frame: 
1) The prime god who is not involved in the creation; this can be understood as his 
transcendence, 2) the divine intermediary and 3) the cosmic hierarchy which is the passageway 
of god’s preserving influence.  
Two philosophers, who lived in the interim of Middle and Neoplatonism, provide comments 
on the Stoic and Aristotelian notion of νοῦς which evince that the Middle Platonic frame of the 
cosmos had already become a fixed basis for the cosmo-theological discussions of their time. 
Bénatouïl (2009:33, 34-35) assists the reader in further understanding νοῦς by presenting its 
Stoic notion as perceived by Diogenes Laertius:31  
To understand it (sc. gradation as the way in which the Stoic νοῦς penetrates the cosmos), let 
us follow the various uses of the term νοῦς in Diogenes (sc. Diogenes Laertius)’ testimony.32 (1) 
                                          
31  It is conjecturable that he lived during the first half of the third century from Diogenes’ omission of 
Neoplatonists and philosophers after Saturnius (Long & Sharples 2012:457).  
32 Diogenes Laertius’ testimony is as follows: Τὸν δὴ κόσμον διοικεῖσθαι κατὰ νοῦν καὶ πρόνοιαν, καθά φησι 
Χρύσιππός τ’ ἐν τῷ πέμπτῳ Περὶ προνοίας καὶ Ποσειδώνιος ἐν τῷ τρισκαιδεκάτῳ Περὶ θεῶν, εἰς ἅπαν αὐτοῦ 
μέρος διήκοντος τοῦ νοῦ, καθάπερ ἐφ’ ἡμῶν τῆς ψυχῆς· ἀλλ’ ἤδη δι’ ὧν μὲν μᾶλλον, δι’ ὧν δὲ ἧττον. δι’ ὧν μὲν 
γὰρ ὡς ἕξις κεχώρηκεν, ὡς διὰ τῶν ὀστῶν καὶ τῶν νεύρων· δι’ ὧν δὲ ὡς νοῦς, ὡς διὰ τοῦ ἡγεμονικοῦ. οὕτω δὴ 
καὶ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον ζῷον ὄντα καὶ ἔμψυχον καὶ λογικόν, ἔχειν ἡγεμονικὸν μὲν τὸν αἰθέρα, καθά φησιν 
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The world is ruled κατὰ νοῦν: νοῦς is the norm according to which the world is organized. (2) 
Νοῦς pervades every part of the world: νοῦς is the ubiquitous agent administering the world. (3) 
(a) God passes through the aether or the heaven ὡς νοῦς: there is a part of the world where νοῦς 
is present as itself, and (b) this part dominates and administers the rest of the world as its 
‘commanding’ or ‘ruling part’ (ἡγεμονικόν).  
From Diogenes Laertius’ testimony, one can deduce the important features of the Stoic notion 
of νοῦς: 1) νοῦς is the ruling principle of the universe; 2) as god, νοῦς penetrates the universe; 
and 3) it is the cause of the cosmic order. This description of the Stoic νοῦς by Diogenes 
Laertius is clothed in the Middle Platonic framework of the cosmos of his time.  
The Peripatetic notion of νοῦς also assists the reader in understanding the ancient idea of νοῦς 
handed down to the imperial era. Alexander Aphrodisias (CE 200), while his aim was 
“explaining Aristotle in Aristotelian terms” (Sharples 2012:59), had a different concept of νοῦς 
from that of Aristotle. The former identified νοῦς with the Unmoved Mover, while the latter 
did not as far as Metaphysica 12.7 is concerned (in Gabriel 2009:398). This difference is a 
result of Alexander’s adaptation of the Stoic notion of νοῦς, which dictates that νοῦς penetrates 
the universe (Sharples 2007:619):  
εὐθὺ μὲν γὰρ τῇ πρώτῃ καταβολῇ τοῦ σπέρματός ἐστιν ὁ ἐνεργείᾳ νοῦς διὰ πάντων γε 
κεχωρηκὼς καὶ ὢν ἐνεργείᾳ, ὡς καὶ ἐν ἄλλῳ τινὶ σώματι τῶν τυχόντων. ἐπειδὰν δὲ καὶ διὰ τῆς 
ἡμετέρας δυνάμεως ἐνεργήσῃ, τότε ἡμέτερος νοῦς οὗτος λέγεται καὶ ἡμεῖς νοοῦμεν, ὥσπερ εἴ 
τις τεχνίτην ἐννοήσαι τοτὲ μὲν ἄνευ ὀργάνων ἐνεργοῦντα κατὰ τὴν τέχνην, τοτὲ δὲ καὶ μετ’ 
ὀργάνων, ὅτε καὶ ἡ κατὰ τὴν τέχνην ἐνέργεια αὐτῷ περὶ τὴν ὕλην γίνεται. τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον καὶ 
ὁ θεῖος νοῦς ἀεὶ μὲν ἐνεργεῖ διὸ καὶ ἔστιν ἐνεργείᾳ, καὶ δι’ ὀργάνου δέ, ὅταν ἐκ τῆς συγκρίσεως 
τῶν σωμάτων καὶ τῆς εὐκρασίας γένηται ὄργανον τοιοῦτον. ὑλικὴν γὰρ ἤδη τινὰ τότε ἐνέργειαν 
ἐνεργεῖ καὶ ἔστιν οὗτος ἡμέτερος νοῦς.  
(5) For straight away, at the first deposing of the seed, the intellect which is in actuality is there, 
                                          
Ἀντίπατρος ὁ Τύριος ἐν τῷ ὀγδόῳ Περὶ κόσμου. Χρύσιππος δ’ ἐν πατρος ὁ Τύριος ἐν τῷ ὀγδόῳ Περὶ κόσμου. 
Χρύσιππος δ’ ἐν ῷ πρώτῳ Περὶ προνοίας καὶ Ποσειδώνιος ἐν τῷ Περὶ θεῶν τὸν οὐρανόν φασι τὸ ἡγεμονικὸν τοῦ 
κόσμου, Κλεάνθης δὲ τὸν ἥλιον. ὁ μέντοι Χρύσιππος διαφορώτερον πάλιν τὸ καθαρώτατον τοῦ αἰθέρος ἐν ταὐτῷ, 
ὃ καὶ πρῶτον θεὸν λέγουσιν αἰσθητικῶς ὥσπερ κεχωρηκέναι διὰ τῶν ἐν ἀέρι καὶ διὰ τῶν ζῴων ἁπάντων 
καὶ φυτῶν· διὰ δὲ τῆς γῆς αὐτῆς καθ’ ἕξιν (Diogenes Laertius, Vitae philosophorum 7.138-39). 
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going through all things and being [there] in actuality, as also in any other body whatsoever. But 
when it is also active through our potentiality, then this is said to be our intellect and we think; 
just as if someone thought of a craftsman who sometimes is active in accordance with his craft 
without instruments, and sometimes with instruments when his activity in accordance with the 
craft is in relation to the matter. (6) In the same way the divine intellect, too, is always active - 
which is why it is in actuality - and it [is also active] through an instrument when, form the 
combination of bodies and their satisfactory blending, an instrument of this sort comes to be. For 
then [the divine intellect] is active with a certain activity involving matter, and this is our intellect 
(Alexander Aphrodisias, Mantissa 112.21-30; transl. Sharples 2010b:269). 
It should be noted that Alexander wrote his philosophy under the philosophical influence of his 
time, Middle Platonism. His main purpose in discussing divine providence was to harmonise 
the two extremes: the Epicurean transcendent god and the Stoic immanent god (Sharples 
1982:198). This was also the catalyst of the Middle Platonic division of the prime god and his 
intermediary δαίμονες which fulfill the demiurgic role.  
Thus far, the chapter has discussed the elements which constitute the Middle Platonic frame of 
the cosmos. This philosophical notion of god as the cause of cosmic order has more importance 
in the Middle Platonic notion of the cosmos. The Middle Platonists bring back νοῦς to the 
centre of their cosmology. Plutarch (De animae procreatione in Timaeo 1015D.11-E.6; transl. 
Cherniss 1976:195-197) attributes the orderly preserved cosmos to νοῦς: 
Ὁ γὰρ Πλάτων μητέρα μὲν καὶ τιθήνην καλεῖ τὴν ὕλην αἰτίαν δὲ κακοῦ τὴν κινητικὴν τῆς ὕλης 
καὶ περὶ τὰ σώματα γιγνομένην μεριστὴν ἄτακτον καὶ ἄλογον οὐκ ἄψυχον δὲ κίνησιν, ἣν ἐν 
Νόμοις ὥσπερ εἴρηται ψυχὴν ἐναντίαν καὶ ἀντίπαλον τῇ ἀγαθουργῷ προσεῖπε ψυχὴ γὰρ αἰτία 
κινήσεως καὶ ἀρχή, νοῦς δὲ τάξεως καὶ συμφωνίας περὶ κίνησιν. 
In fact, while Plato calls matter mother and nurse, what he calls the cause of evil is the motion 
that moves matter and becomes divisible in the case of bodies, the disorderly and irrational but 
not inanimate motion, which in the Laws, as has been said, he called soul contrary and adverse 
to the one that is beneficent. For soul is cause and principle of motion, but intelligence of order 
and consonance in motion. 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
44 
 
In the extract, νοῦς is described as the cause and principle of order and harmony. According to 
Gerson (2013:193), by identifying demiurge with νοῦs, Plutarch attempts to introduce 
demiurge as the first principle of all: Plutarch’s demiurge is the highest god (Opsomer 2005:81).  
Furthermore, a clearer description of the way in which the Middle Platonic νοῦs influences the 
universe is provided by Alcinous: 
Ἐπεὶ δὲ ψυχῆς νοῦς ἀμείνων, νοῦ δὲ τοῦ ἐν δυνάμει ὁ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν πάντα νοῶν καὶ ἅμα καὶ 
ἀεί, τούτου δὲ καλλίων ὁ αἴτιος τούτου καὶ ὅπερ ἂν ἔτι ἀνωτέρω τούτων ὑφέστηκεν, οὗτος ἂν 
εἴη ὁ πρῶτος θεός, αἴτιος ὑπάρχων τοῦ ἀεὶ ἐνεργεῖν τῷ νῷ τοῦ σύμπαντος οὐρανοῦ. Ἐνεργεῖ δὲ 
ἀκίνητος, αὐτὸς ὢν εἰς τοῦτον, ὡς καὶ ὁ ἥλιος εἰς τὴν ὅρασιν, ὅταν αὐτῷ προσβλέπῃ, καὶ ὡς τὸ 
ὀρεκτὸν κινεῖ τὴν ὄρεξιν ἀκίνητον ὑπάρχον· οὕτω γε δὴ καὶ οὗτος ὁ νοῦς κινήσει τὸν νοῦν τοῦ 
σύμπαντος οὐρανοῦ. 
Since intellect is superior to soul, and superior to potential intellect there is actualized intellect, 
which cognizes everything simultaneously and eternally, and finer than this again is the cause of 
this and whatever it is that has an existence still prior to these, this it is that would be the primal 
God, being the cause of the eternal activity of the intellect of the whole heaven. It acts on this 
while remaining itself unmoved, as does the sun on vision, when this is directed towards it, and 
as the object of desire moves desire,33 while remaining motionless itself. In just this way will 
this intellect move the intellect of the whole heaven (The Handbook of Platonism 10.2; transl. 
Dillon 1993:17). 
As one can easily discern from the extract, νοῦs is identified with the prime god because the 
role of νοῦs to cause the eternal activity of the intellect of the whole heaven is traditionally 
attributed to god. Opsomer (2005:80) summarises Alcinous’ notion of νοῦs as follows: 
His (sc. Alcinous’) highest god (1) is then identified as the cause of the activity of intellect, but 
is nonetheless itself an intellect. The cosmic intellect has two aspects or two states (2 (sc. the 
active intellect) and 3 (sc. the potentially thinking intellect of the world)). Due to the influence 
of the first god cosmic intellect it is in a perpetual state of actuality and never in a state of mere 
                                          
33 This reminds the reader of the Aristotelian answer of ὄρεξις to the question of how the cosmos is properly 
governed according to the universal hierarchical order. 
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potentiality. The distinction between (2) and (3) is therefore not one between two logically 
distinguishable states or aspects of one single entity. 
This obvious identification of νοῦs with the prime god was not strange to ancient philosophies 
(Opsomer 2005:62) and Middle Platonism is not an exception. As discussed in multiple extracts 
by Middle Platonic writers, it becomes clear that this role of god to hold the universe by 
providing order and harmony is attributed to νοῦs in Middle Platonism.  
In this sense, the metaphor of the law in De mundo 398 400b.28 and Dissertationes 11.12.17 
should be noted for its significant role in describing the way god rules over the cosmos. Van 
Nuffelen (2011:129) comments that for Maximus, the law is identical with providence 
(Dissertationes 5. 4-5). This supports the implication of νοῦς in the law because this 
providential role of god is conducted by order, and this order is produced by the divine νοῦs in 
ancient philosophy. Consequently, when Maximus, a well-known Middle Platonist describes 
god as the law, νοῦς, which is identified with god in being the source of order, is implied 
through the image of the Great King (Opsomer 2005:74, 77). In De mundo (400b.28) as well, 
this identification of νοῦς with the law is found as the most proper metaphor to explain the the 
transcendent prime god’s monarchic governance of the cosmos (Opsomer 2005:60).  
In conclusion, under Middle Platonism, the notion of the hierarchical cosmos, which had been 
scattered through the arguments on νοῦς, was systematised in order to explain god’s 
preservation of the cosmos without damaging his dignity. This Middle Platonic frame of the 
cosmos includes the prime god, the divine intermediaries and the cosmic hierarchical system 
which holds everything together. This cosmological frame is implied through the image of the 
Great King and it provides the four authors with the common ground on which they develop 
their own cosmo-theological arguments. In the next chapter, how the image of the Great King 
functions for these four authors’ cosmo-theological arguments will be clarified through the 
topos analysis of the image of the Great King. 
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Chapter Five: The topos analysis of the image of the Great King  
The main concern of this chapter is to demonstrate that the image of the Great King implies 
the Middle Platonic frame of the cosmos. The historical information outlined in chapter three 
will be utilised as the foundation to explicate the adaptation of this image for philosophilcal 
arguments by Pseudo-Aristotle, Maximus of Tyre, Aelius Aristides and Philo of Alexandria. 
These authors are not chronologically arranged because two points need to be emphasised: 1) 
the uncertainty of chronological order between Philo and De mundo and 2) Judaism which 
distinguishes Philo from the other three. These four authors, however, can be grouped together 
by their philosophical propensity to the Middle Platonism. Their tendency towards Middle 
Platonism allows the reader to predict their similarity in applying this image to their own 
philosophy.  
5.1. De mundo 
The authenticity of this treatise transmitted under the name of Aristotle has been one of the 
most violently disputed points in scholarship. In spite of the fact that many influential scholars, 
such as G. Reale and A. P. Bos (Reale & Bos 1995:15), still argue for Aristotle’s authorship, it 
has been generally accepted amongst academics since the 19th century that Aristotle was not 
the author of this treatise (Thom 2014a:5-8) and multiple evidence from diverse fields of 
studies indicate that De mundo could not have been written by Aristotle himself.34 For example, 
geographically, the reference to the island of Taprobane, which had not been known by the time 
of Aristotle, indicates that this treatise must have been written after the time of Aristotle (Burri 
2014:90). Also, philosophically, De mundo’s Middle Platonic propensity presents itself as 
written after the time of Aristotle (Thom 2014a:7). The plausible date of this treatise may thus 
be the middle of the 1st century BCE and Gerson’s (2013:179) periodisation of the Middle 
                                          
34 Gottschalk (1987:1135-1139) convincingly disputes Reale’s opinion that this treatise should be dated between 
342-336 BCE because Reale’s conclusion does not harmonise with his evidence. To Gottschalk, he seems biased 
for asserting Aristotelian authorship. Gottschalk thus argues for dating it between the middle of the 1st century 
BCE and 2nd century CE. For the historical survey of debates on authenticity, see Kraye (2014:181-187). 
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Platonism supports this date.35  
The period of time during which this treatise could have been written is extended to the early 
2nd century CE due to Apuleius’ (ca. 125 CE) Latin translation of De mundo (Harrison 2012:128) 
and the extract from Maximus (Orationes 11.12; 2nd century CE) which is generally regarded 
as having a similarity with Pseudo-Aristotle’s De mundo (398a.11-35) in adopting the image 
of the Great King and the metaphor of the law in a city (Thom 2014a:3-4).36 Accordingly, it is 
safe to say that this treatise should be dated between 50 BCE - 150 CE. 
Thom (2014a:14-15) and Chandler (2014:73-78) agree that this treatise has a didactic purpose 
because it focuses on persuading the reader to study philosophy by demonstrating the 
excellence of philosophy through theologising the universal phenomena (391a.1-391b.8). Due 
to the fact that there is no need for persuading philosophers to study philosophy, this treatise 
should be regarded as written not for qualified philosophers but for those who are educated 
enough to have a general understanding of somewhat sophisticated philosophical arguments. 
This assumption concerning the target readers represents the popular-philosophical disposition 
of De mundo. 
In theologising the universal phenomena, the main purpose is to emphasise god’s majesty by 
showing how harmoniously and orderly he maintains the universe, which consists of opposite 
elements. In order to develop his argument, the author of De mundo adopted diverse sources 
by writers with different philosophical backgrounds.37 In other words, he wrote this treatise 
                                          
35 According to Schenkenveld, linguistically, it is not impossible to date this treatise during the time of Aristotle 
or the time which is not far from his death (in Chandler 2014:72-73). However, one may doubt as to whether it is 
proper to adopt a linguistic evidence to determine the terminus post quem of any ancient text because the linguistic 
experience is inherently accumulative so that no one has any experience of language which has not been exposed 
to him/her. In other words, one can never adopt any expression of the time which is later than his own but only of 
the time earlier. Therefore, an analysis of the oldest linguistic evidence is not convincing when one uses it to 
decide the date of any ancient text. Instead, only an analysis of the latest linguistic evidence should be adopted to 
support any argument for the date of ancient texts. 
36 Bos (1991:312), one of the most famous advocates for Aristotelian authorship, suggests that the terminus ante 
quem must be 250 BCE on the basis of his assumption that the Stoic Chrysippus (280-207 BCE) depended on De 
mundo. However, it is questionable if one can be convinced of his assumption which is based on another 
indefinable assumption. 
37 The diverse philosophical notions included in this short treatise may have come from Posidonius (Capelle 
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under the tradition of eclecticism (Thom 2012:293). Eclecticism also is one of the important 
characteristics which indicate De mundo’s propensity to popular philosophy. 
In De mundo 6, the author gives an account of his theology on a great scale. Before continuing 
the discussion on the theology of De mundo, one should first understand the Pseudo-
Aristotelian design of the cosmos. It has the earth-centered view of the cosmos which is bound 
to heaven, the home of gods: 
Ταύτης δὲ τὸ μὲν μέσον, ἀκίνητόν τε καὶ ἑδραῖον ὄν, ἡ φερέσβιος εἴληχε γῆ, παντοδαπῶν ζῴων 
ἑστία τε οὖσα καὶ μήτηρ. Τὸ δὲ ὕπερθεν αὐτῆς, πᾶν τε καὶ πάντῃ πεπερατωμένον εἰς τὸ ἀνωτάτω, 
θεῶν οἰ-κητήριον, οὐρανὸς ὠνόμασται. Πλήρης δὲ ὢν σωμάτων θείων, ἃ δὴ καλεῖν ἄστρα 
εἰώθαμεν, κινούμενος κίνησιν ἀίδιον, μιᾷ περιαγωγῇ καὶ κύκλῳ συναναχορεύει πᾶσι τούτοις 
ἀπαύστως δι’ αἰῶνος. 
The centre of this orderly arrangement, being unmoved and fixed, is allotted to “life-bearing 
earth”, as the hearth and mother of all kind of living things. The uppermost part of it, on the other 
hand, which is completely and on all sides bounded towards its highest region, the home of the 
gods, is called heaven. Being full of divine bodies (which we usually call stars) [and] moving 
with an eternal movement, it dances in a chorus with all of them without pause throughout 
eternity in a single revolution and orbit (391b.12-19; transl. Thom 2014:23).  
This notion of the earth that it is the centre of the universe is very Peripatetic (Bos 1988:77). 
However, this dichotomy of the heaven and the earth was generally accepted by ancient 
philosophers. This is the basis of the concept of multi-layered cosmos, which would have surely 
been familiar to Pseudo-Aristotle as well. To him, the heaven is also divided by the concentric 
seven cycles: 
Τὸ μὲν οὖν τῶν ἀπλανῶν πλῆθος ἀνεξεύρετόν ἐστιν ἀνθρώποις, καίπερ ἐπὶ μιᾶς κινουμένων 
ἐπιφανείας τῆς τοῦ σύμπαντος οὐρανοῦ· τὸ δὲ τῶν πλανήτων, εἰς ἑπτὰ μέρη κεφαλαιούμενον, 
ἐν τοσούτοις ἐστὶ κύκλοις ἐφεξῆς κειμένοις, ὥστε ἀεὶ τὸν ἀνωτέρω μείζω τοῦ ὑποκάτω εἶναι, 
                                          
1905). According to Maguire (1939:111, 166), however, this treatise came from Neopythagorean sources. Strohm 
(1970:267) attempted to show that this was written under Platonic influence. Reale and Bos’s (1995:15) concern 
was to attribute this treatise to Aristotle. 
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τούς τε ἑπτὰ ἐν ἀλλήλοις ἐμπεριέχεσθαι, πάντας γε μὴν ὑπὸ τῆς τῶν ἀπλανῶν σφαίρας 
περιειλῆφθαι.  
The multitude of planets, on the other hand, grouped into seven parts, is [placed] in just as many 
circles located next to one another, so that the higher circle is always larger than the one below 
it, and so that the seven circles are contained within one another, but all [seven] are again 
surrounded by the sphere of fixed stars (392a.16-23; transl. Thom 2014b:23). 
These divine bodies are fixed and distanced by the groups of different ranks between ether and 
the circuit of the moon (392a.23-31). This concept of multi-layeredness can also be applied to 
the elements of the cosmos.: 
Πέντε δὴ στοιχεῖα ταῦτα ἐν πέντε χώραις σφαιρικῶς ἐγκείμενα, περιεχομένης ἀεὶ τῆς ἐλάττονος 
τῇ μείζονι—λέγω δὲ γῆς μὲν ἐν ὕδατι, ὕδατος δὲ ἐν ἀέρι, ἀέρος δὲ ἐν πυρί, πυρὸς δὲ ἐν αἰθέρι—
τὸν ὅλον κόσμον συνεστήσατο, καὶ τὸ μὲν ἄνω πᾶν θεῶν ἀπέδειξεν οἰκητήριον, τὸ κάτω δὲ 
ἐφημέρων ζῴων. 
These five elements, then, situated in spheres in five regions, the smaller always being 
encompassed by the larger – I mean, earth within water, water within air, air within fire, and fire 
within ether – make up the whole upper part into a dwelling for the gods and the lower part into 
one for short-lived creatures (392b.35-393a.5; transl. Thom 2014b:27). 
The whole universe is divided into five levels according to Aristotle. Being the centre of the 
universe, the earth is designated as the lowest part of it. The levels of the cosmos are 
gradationally arranged by the principle in which the larger and higher part encompasses the 
smaller and lower part. 
Also, in chapter five, Pseudo-Aristotle draws attention to the question ‘how has the cosmos 
which constitutes opposite principles been preserved up to now?’ (396a.33-396b.4). As the 
answer to this question, the author suggests a single harmony (396b.23-397a.1) and order when 
he etymologically explains the meaning of the word cosmos: 
Τίς γὰρ ἂν εἴη φύσις τοῦδε κρείττων; ἣν γὰρ ἂν εἴπῃ τις, μέρος ἐστὶν αὐτοῦ. Τό τε καλὸν πᾶν 
ἐπώνυμόν ἐστι τούτου καὶ τὸ τεταγμένον, ἀπὸ τοῦ κόσμου λεγόμενον κεκοσμῆσθαι. 
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For what being could be better than this [sc. the cosmos]? Whatever one may mention, is a part 
of it. Everything beautiful and well-arranged is named after it, because it is said ‘to be ordered’ 
from the word ‘cosmos’ (397a.5-8; transl. Thom 2014b:41). 
The author paves the way for the next discussion by providing his understanding of the 
gradationally structured cosmos and implying harmony and order as his own answers to the 
question ‘how god preserves this universe’. Pseudo-Aristotle further develops his discussion 
on god and the cosmos based on these premises. 
Subsequently, chapter six deals with the cause which holds the universe together (397b.9-10). 
The author begins with a reference to the ancient wisdom that all existential beings depend on 
god’s preserving influence (397b.13-16). He again appeals to the ancient notion that the 
universe is not the essence of god but the manifestation of his divine power (397b.13-20). On 
the basis of these conventional notions, the author attempts to answer the question, ‘how does 
the transcendent god immanently preserve this universe?’ by adapting the divine power, which 
is distinguished from god’s essence and untiringly penetrates the universe (397b.20-27).38 This 
thorough differentiation of god’s power from his essence is a particular characteristic of De 
mundo (Smith 2014:124). The divine power which is situated in heaven is the cause of all 
things preserved (398a.3-4) and the influence of this divine power is gradated as it passes 
through the layers of the cosmos: 
μάλιστα δέ πως αὐτοῦ τῆς δυνάμεως ἀπολαύει τὸ πλησίον αὐτοῦ σῶμα, καὶ ἔπειτα τὸ μετ’ ἐκεῖνο, 
καὶ ἐφεξῆς οὕτως ἄχρι τῶν καθ’ ἡμᾶς τόπων. Διὸ γῆ τε καὶ τὰ ἐπὶ γῆς ἔοικεν, ἐν 
ἀποστάσει πλείστῃ τῆς ἐκ θεοῦ ὄντα ὠφελείας, ἀσθενῆ καὶ ἀκατάλληλα πλείστῃ τῆς ἐκ θεοῦ 
ὄντα ὠφελείας, ἀσθενῆ καὶ ἀκατάλληλα εἶναι καὶ πολλῆς μεστὰ ταραχῆς· οὐ μὴν ἀλλὰ καθ’ ὅσον 
ἐπὶ πᾶν διικνεῖσθαι πέφυκε τὸ θεῖον, καὶ ἐπὶ τὰ καθ’ ἡμᾶς ὁμοίως συμβαίνει τά τε ὑπὲρ ἡμᾶς, 
κατὰ τὸ ἔγγιόν τε καὶ πορρωτέρω θεοῦ εἶναι μᾶλλόν τε καὶ ἧττον ὠφελείας μεταλαμβάνοντα. 
The body closest to him has most benefit of his power, and then the body next to it, and so in 
sequence until the regions where we are. So the earth and the things on the earth, being at the 
                                          
38 This penetration of the divine power is reminiscent of the penetration of the Stoic logos (Opsomer 2005:61). 
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greatest distance from the assistance of god, seem to be weak and incongruous and full of much 
confusion; but nevertheless, in as far as the divine naturally penetrates to everything, it happens 
to the things in our region in the same way as to the things above us: they share to a greater or 
lesser extent in god’s assistance according to whether they are closer or further from him 
(397b.27-398a.1; transl. Thom 2014b:43) 
God, however, assures cosmic order and harmony in the universe through the medium: the 
divine power. By adapting the divine power, which penetrates the universe through the cosmic 
hierarchical system and is thus reminiscent of the Stoic logos (Opsomer 2005:61),39 the author 
of De mundo preserves both the transcendental essence and the immanent influence of god, 
who is referred to as the cause of the universe held together (397b.9), the preserver (397b.20), 
and so forth. Therefore, his adaptation of the divine power enables chapter seven of De mundo 
(401a. 12-29) to introduce god with many names according to the diverse phenomena caused 
by the divine power. Through the divine power, god can be recognised as the cause to produce 
different movements and the cause to harmonise all differences.  
The way in which the divine power transmits its influence throughout the universe is compared 
to the following diverse images: the images of an engineer (398b.14-5), a puppeteer (398b.16-
7), a key-note (398b.26) and a man who throws different shapes and animals (398b.27-399a.1). 
These images describe the principle of succession in which one movement incurred by the 
divine power causes diverse movements. These images do not explain ‘how’ but merely state 
‘it is so’ by citing instances of the successive transmission of movements. 
Subsequently, after referring to cosmic harmony and order given by god (399a.12), the author 
                                          
39 If the author of De mundo attempted to harmonise the Stoic notion that god is industrious in preserving the 
universe and the Epicurean doctrine that god is transcendent from this world, the divine power would be the most 
plausible answer for the dilemma which these two philosophical notions result in (Sharples 2010a:154-55, Van 
Riel 2013:70-81; Elders 1972:16). Tzvetkova-Glaser (2014:135) listed the divine power’s characteristics in De 
mundo: 1) δύναμις is clearly different from οὐσία, since the one is immanent and the other is transcendent; 2) 
God’s power is the source of all movement and of all things living; 3) God’s power is responsible for sustaining 
the world. The author thus adapted the divine power to his theology to secure its consistency. It should especially 
be noted that the last two characteristics of δύναμις suggested by Tzvetkova-Glaser can also be applied to god 
who is the cause of movement and harmony throughout De mundo 6. The differentiation between god’s essence 
and his power is thus added by Pseudo-Aristotle to both to keep god in his transcendence and acknowledge his 
immanent influence. 
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gives examples for this harmony which holds different members together. From the previous 
statement that cosmic harmony and order are essential for god’s preserving action (397b.20), 
one may discern that this single harmony ensures the preservation of the cosmos through the 
divine power. The image of the leader of chorus (399a.14) who issues the key-note to lead all 
the members with different roles into harmony (399a.19) recalls the leader who is referred to 
as the principle (ἀρχή) of the chorus in Aristotle, Metaphysica Δ1018b.25-29. This describes 
the cosmos which is sustained by the single harmony in spite of its different elements. Likewise, 
the soldiers with different roles are to be prepared as one army for a battle when the trumpet 
signals them (399b.1-10). It should be noted that there is no explicit answer to the question 
‘how can the authority or power of one leader harmonise multiple members?’. However, one 
may conjecture that it would indeed be possible for the authority of a leader to place every 
member in order due to the cosmic hierarchy which arranges every member according to their 
lots.40 The reason why these images are not concerned with how it is possible may be because 
this hierarchical order was unquestionably clear to people of antiquity. 
Pseudo-Aristotle concludes the section by presenting the images of a helmsman, a charioteer, 
a chorus leader and the law in a city (400b.6-11) as a means to demonstrate the manner in which 
god preserves the universe through his power. Each of the four images takes steps which 
increase in profundity in order to explain the principle of the divine power penetrating the 
cosmos. The first two images function as an introduction, explaining how a small part 
influences the big whole. Then, the image of the chorus leader alludes to the way in which the 
different preassigned roles are played by the members at the fixed signals by the leader. In the 
three images, the helmsman, the charioteer and the chorus leader represent triggering of the 
most harmonious movement of all.  
However, when the author comes to the law, he moves to a more recondite implication than 
that of the other images. At this point, he subtly answers the question of ‘how’ by means of the 
                                          
40  Aristotle’s ὄρεξις may be another answer to the question, ‘how god becomes the cause of movements? 
(Metaphysica Λ1076a. 3-4)’, because it makes god himself the ultimate and final purpose of all things. Then, all 
things cannot but pursue god’s perfection in every aspect by nature. For a brief discussion, see Elders (1972:35-
43). However, Pseudo-Aristotle does not adopt this to answer the question of god’s providence. 
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law. Particularly, when referring to the law, the author seems to paraphrase the Aristotelian 
comparison between νοῦς and the law (διόπερ ἄνευ ὀρέξεως νοῦς ὁ νόμος ἐστίν; Politica 
1287a.32):41 
νόμος γὰρ ἡμῖν ἰσοκλινὴς ὁ θεός (400b.28). 
For god is an evenly balanced law to us (transl. Thom 2014b:53). 
The law is described as being immobile in the soul and controlling all things (400b.14). As the 
law, all god should do to preserve the universe is to exist. However, this ontic influence requires 
a deliberate system which inherently passes through every existence. The way the law governs 
the city implies the Homeric Golden Chain as its passageway. From Homeric time, this notion 
of the cosmic hierarchy was implied through the golden scale or the golden chain which 
indicates the extended hierarchical order through the cosmos (Hunter 1986:27). A valuable 
example of this is the description of Achilles and Meno being weighed against each other on 
the golden scale (Illiad 22.209-13; West 2003:2), which represents that every being in the 
cosmos, from the prime god to the humankind, has different ontic value. Due to this difference 
between existential beings in ontological value, they by nature obey those in higher ranks. 
This cosmic hierarchical order ensures that all the members of the city obey the law (400b.15-
20) which ordains all the festivals (400b.21-3) and controls the city with an approved authority 
(400b.24). God must be the perfect law, because he is infallible, the strongest and clearest 
(400b.28-31). Like the law, god thus motionlessly preserves the universe in harmony (400b.31) 
only through his existence (Opsomer 2005:60). 
In discussing the concept of god, Pseudo-Aristotle follows both Platonic and Aristotelian 
concepts of god because he insists that god is one (De mundo 401a.12) and admits the existence 
of many other gods (De mundo 391b.14-16) as well. As to the Platonic concept of god which 
De mundo follows, we may mention Mason’s (2014:229) comment on the Timaeus: 
                                          
41 This is one of the cases in which Aristotle identifies the first principle with νοῦς (cf. Menn 1992:546). 
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The last section (69a-92c) deals with the construction of the human body, together with the lower 
elements of the soul (which, here as in the Republic, includes spirited and appetitive elements as 
well as the rational one). In order to fulfill the plan of creation, these must be mortal, so they are 
not constructed by the supreme God, but by his servants, the lesser gods, since we are told (41a) 
that everything made by the supreme God is necessarily immortal. 
The combination of the Aristotelian concept of one transcendent god and the concept of his 
subject deities may also be found in Bos’s (1998:70) explanation of the way Aristotle assisted 
Philo in overcoming the limit of the Platonist demiurgy when describing Judaism only with the 
Platonic theology: 
He was also the one who had provided Philo with the means of overcoming Plato’s 
anthropomorphic concept of the divine Demiurge of the world by distinguishing between the 
pure intuitive activity of the theoretical intellect and the practically oriented activity of discursive 
reason, which formed the basis of Aristotle’s double theology of the transcendent Unmoved 
mover and the plurality of cosmic gods.  
It is not important for the reader to choose between the two at this moment because De mundo’s 
concept of god cannot be explained by any single philosophical position. Pseudo-Aristotle 
disposed of the image of the Platonic demiurge as the personalised creator and imposed the 
image of the impersonal initiator of every movement and harmony on god who is transcendent. 
This combination of the one transcendental god (Aristotelian) and his subordinate deities 
(Platonic) should rather be regarded as the Middle Platonic modification, both to secure the 
prime god’s dignity and to admit his immanent providential influence (Opsomer 2005: 55). 
Based on these notions of god and the cosmos, Pseudo-Aristotle begins his explanation of the 
way the divine power functions as an intermediary between god and the whole universe by 
adopting the image of the Great King (398a.11-35). This image is the gateway to the cosmo-
theology of De mundo, which provides the reader with a guideline to interpreting those images 
which were previously dealt with. 
The image of the Great King has two main parts. The first part describes the Great King and 
his servants inside of the palace (398a.11-23) and the second part describes his servants outside 
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of the palace (398a.23-35). The author gives account of the image of the Great King in De 
mundo 398a.11-35 as follows: 
Τὸ γὰρ Καμβύσου Ξέρξου τε καὶ Δαρείου πρόσχημα εἰς σεμνότητος καὶ ὑπεροχῆς ὕψος 
μεγαλοπρεπῶς διεκεκόσμητο· αὐτὸς μὲν γάρ, ὡς λόγος, ἵδρυτο ἐν Σούσοις ἢ Ἐκβατάνοις, παντὶ 
ἀόρατος, θαυμαστὸν ἐπέχων βασίλειον οἶκον καὶ περίβολον χρυσῷ καὶ ἠλέκτρῳ καὶ ἐλέφαντι 
ἀστράπτοντα· πυλῶνες δὲ πολλοὶ καὶ συνεχεῖς πρόθυρά τε σύχνοις εἰργόμενα σταδίοις ἀπ’ 
ἀλλήλων θύραις τε χαλκαῖς καὶ τείχεσι μεγάλοις ὠχύρωτο· ἔξω δὲ τούτων ἄνδρες οἱ πρῶτοι καὶ 
δοκιμώτατοι διεκεκόσμηντο, οἱ μὲν ἀμφ’ αὐτὸν τὸν βασιλέα δορυφόροι τε καὶ θεράποντες, οἱ δὲ 
ἑκάστου περιβόλου φύλακες, πυλωροί τε καὶ ὠτακουσταὶ λεγόμενοι, ὡς ἂν ὁ βασιλεὺς αὐτός, 
δεσπότης καὶ θεὸς ὀνομαζόμενος, πάντα μὲν βλέποι, πάντα δὲ ἀκούοι. Χωρὶς δὲ τούτων ἄλλοι 
καθειστήκεσαν προσόδων ταμίαι καὶ στρατηγοὶ πολέμων καὶ κυνηγεσίων δώρων τε 
ἀποδεκτῆρες τῶν τε λοιπῶν ἔργων ἕκαστοι κατὰ τὰς χρείας ἐπιμεληταί. Τὴν δὲ σύμπασαν ἀρχὴν 
τῆς Ἀσίας, περατουμένην Ἑλλησπόντῳ μὲν ἐκ τῶν πρὸς ἑσπέραν μερῶν, Ἰνδῷ δὲ ἐκ τῶν πρὸς 
ἕω, διειλήφεσαν κατὰ ἔθνη στρατηγοὶ καὶ σατράπαι καὶ βασιλεῖς, δοῦλοι τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως, 
ἡμεροδρόμοι τε καὶ σκοποὶ καὶ ἀγγελιαφόροι φρυκτωριῶν τε ἐποπτῆρες. Τοσοῦτος δὲ ἦν ὁ 
κόσμος, καὶ μάλιστα τῶν φρυκτωριῶν, κατὰ διαδοχὰς πυρσευόντων ἀλλήλοις ἐκ περάτων τῆς 
ἀρχῆς μέχρι Σούσων καὶ Ἐκβατάνων, ὥστε τὸν βασιλέα γινώσκειν αὐθημερὸν πάντα τὰ ἐν τῇ 
Ἀσίᾳ καινουργούμενα.  
For the pomp of Cambyses, Xerxes, and Darius was ordered in a magnificent manner to the 
height of dignity and authority. The King himself, they say, was based in Susa or Ecbatana, 
invisible to everyone, occupying a marvellous palace and an enclosure flashing with gold, 
electrum, and ivory. The many gate-towers and entrances in succession, separated from one 
another by many stades, were fortified with bronze doors and huge walls. Outside these the first 
and most esteemed men were set up in order, some as bodyguards and attendants around the 
King himself, others as guards of each outer wall, called Gatekeepers and Listeners, so that the 
King himself, named Master and God, might see everything and hear everything. Apart from 
these others were appointed as controllers of revenue, commanders of war and of the hunt, 
receivers of gifts, and curators of the remaining tasks, each appointed according to need. The 
whole empire of Asia, limited by the Hellespont on the western side and by the Indus on the 
eastern side, was divided according to nations among generals and satraps and kings, slaves of 
the Great King, as well as among couriers and scouts and messengers and overseers of the 
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production of beacon-signals. So comprehensive was the arrangement, and especially of the 
system of signal-beacons, signaling to one another in succession from the ends of the Empire to 
Susa and Ecbatana, that the King knew the same day all new developments in Asia (transl. Thom 
2014b:45). 
The image of the Great King has elements which assist the reader in further understanding its 
implied philosophical notion: the Great King’s palace, the Great King’s eyes and ears (listeners 
in the text), the satraps and the beacon-signals. These elements will be individually discussed 
so that the reader may ascertain the way these elements represent the author’s philosophical 
understandings of god and the cosmos.  
Before commencing analysis, it should first be noted that De mundo 398b. 1-16 warns readers 
to be careful lest they apply the list of the Great King’s helpers directly to god himself: 
Νομιστέον δὴ τὴν τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως ὑπεροχὴν πρὸς τὴν τοῦ τὸν κόσμον ἐπέχοντος θεοῦ 
τοσοῦτον καταδεεστέραν ὅσον τῆς ἐκείνου τὴν τοῦ φαυλοτάτου τε καὶ ἀσθενεστάτου ζῴου, 
ὥστε, εἴπερ ἄσεμνον ἦν αὐτὸν αὑτῷ δοκεῖν Ξέρξην αὐτουργεῖν ἅπαντα καὶ ἐπιτελεῖν ἃ βούλοιτο 
καὶ ἐφιστάμενον ἑκασταχοῦ διοικεῖν, πολὺ μᾶλλον ἀπρεπὲς ἂν εἴη θεῷ. Σεμνότερον δὲ καὶ 
πρε|πωδέστερον αὐτὸν μὲν ἐπὶ τῆς ἀνωτάτω χώρας ἱδρῦσθαι, τὴν | δὲ δύναμιν διὰ τοῦ σύμπαντος 
κόσμου διήκουσαν ἥλιόν τε κινεῖν καὶ σελήνην καὶ τὸν πάντα οὐρανὸν περιάγειν αἴτιόν τε 
γίνεσθαι τοῖς ἐπὶ τῆς γῆς σωτηρίας. Οὐδὲν γὰρ ἐπιτεχνήσεως δεῖ καὶ ὑπηρεσίας τῆς παρ’ ἑτέρων, 
ὥσπερ τοῖς παρ’ ἡμῖν ἄρχουσι τῆς πολυχειρίας διὰ τὴν ἀσθένειαν, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο ἦν τὸ θειότατον, 
τὸ μετὰ ῥᾳστώνης καὶ ἁπλῆς κινήσεως παντοδαπὰς ἀποτελεῖν ἰδέας, ὥσπερ ἀμέλει δρῶσιν οἱ 
μηχανοτέχναι, διὰ μιᾶς ὀργάνου σχαστηρίας πολλὰς καὶ ποικίλας ἐνεργείας ἀποτελοῦντες. 
Now the authority of the Great King compared to that of god who has power over the cosmos 
must be considered just as much weaker as the authority of the most inferior and weakest creature 
compared to that of the King, so that, if it would be undignified for Xerxes to appear to do all 
things himself and to complete what he wanted to be done and to oversee and administer all 
things <everywhere>, it would be much more unbecoming for god. It is more dignified and 
becoming for him based in the highest region and for his power, penetrating through the whole 
cosmos, to move the sun and moon and to cause the whole heaven to revolve and to be the cause 
of preservation for the things on earth. For he has no need of the contrivance and service from 
others, as the rulers with us need the help of many hands because of their weakness; on the 
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contrary, the most divine characteristic would be this: to produce all kinds of forms with ease 
and a simple movement, just as indeed the engineers do, producing by means of the single release 
mechanism of an engine of war many varied activities. (transl. Thom 2014b:45-47) 
The author of De mundo requires of the reader to follow an important rule when deciphering 
the image of the Great King. De mundo 398b. 1-16 develops the argument based on the topos 
of a minore ad maiorem, which is one of the logical strategies to compare anything inferior to 
the superior. Due to the undeniable difference in quality between god and the Great King, the 
author warns the reader not to regard those elements as divinities inferior to god, the helpers of 
god. Instead, the reader should keep in mind that the divine power is part of god’s inherent 
attribute.  
The image of the Great King describes the palace as the innermost part of the fortress which 
was surrounded by multiple walls and watch towers with guards and servants. In comparison 
with the palace mentioned in Herodotus’ Historiae 1.98.2, the meaning of the description of 
the palace in De mundo becomes clearer. The emphasis laid on the magnitude of the palace 
represents the Great King’s majesty and his perfect seclusion. The author of De mundo used a 
lesser number of colours to portray the palace than that of Herodotus. The former mentioned 
only three colours of the palace, although the symbolism of the seven colors is clearly 
consistent with the Pseudo-Aristotelian understanding of the heavenly sphere which is divided 
by seven planets (Reale and Bos 1995:326-7). However, his selection of three colours would 
be acceptable if the literary function of the reference to the gigantic palace was clear to his 
readers.42 As such, the main concern of the author was not to provide his readers with a piece 
of historically correct information, but rather to convince them of his cosmo-theological 
opinion by means of a literary allusion which was familiar to them. Therefore, by referring to 
only three colors of the palace, the author could have achieved his aim to daub the Great King 
with the royal and exotic mystique in order to render him completely alien to the world outside. 
When the notion of seclusion is applied to god, it means transcendence. In order to introduce 
                                          
42 For a more detailed argument of this description’s literary allusion, see Regen (1972:206-214). 
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this concept of divine transcendence, the author of De mundo alienated the Great King even 
from his closest subjects. This perfect seclusion of the Great King is De mundo’s exclusive 
feature (Bos 1989:152) and it reminds the reader of the Aristotelian Unmoved Mover (ὃ οὐ 
κινούμενον κινεῖ; Metaphysica Λ.1072a.25), which is absolutely transcendent.43  
There are two means to reinforce the Great King’s majesty: 1) the mystical hiddenness of the 
Great King which lies in the gigantic size of his palace and 2) the elaborate system of 
governance by which the secluded Great King ruled the vast empire as if he did it with his own 
hands. He needed a means to transmit his power and will to every single corner of his empire 
without either touching his people or being touched by them. 
According to De mundo 398a, the royal court consisted of the Great King, the bodyguards and 
attendants around him, gatekeepers, listeners, controllers of revenues, commanders, gift-
receivers, curators, generals, satraps, and kings. Modern historians also provide the reader with 
the lists of the Great King’s subjects which are quite similar to that of De mundo.44 These are 
arranged by the distance from the Great King and this list denotes the multi-layered cosmos in 
gradational order when applied to the philosophical notion of the cosmos.  
However, it is not necessary to decipher the meaning of every member of the royal court as the 
emphasis lies in that these elements arranged by distance from the Great King depict the 
concept of the cosmos in gradation. Still, certain elements are still important to define the 
philosophical notion prevalent in the image of the Great King: the Great King’s eyes and ears, 
his satraps and the beacon-signals. 
                                          
43 This notion of god’s transcendence was also shared by Platonists, Academics, Peripatetics and even Epicureans 
(Bénatouïl 2009:23-4). However, the immobility of the first principle is peculiar to Aristotle (Menn 1992:543). 
44 Brosius (2006:32-43; 2007:27) offers a list of members of the court and indicates, “there were six vassals of 
merit who helped Darius I to take the throne back; those who called ‘king’s friends and benefactors’ by their 
loyalty, royal women, the king’s spear-bearer, his bow- and axe-bearer, the heads of the king’s bodyguard, palace 
administration and royal treasury, the chief scribe, the keeper of the gate, and the priest(s), along with the Persian 
nobles serving as the king’s councilors, as royal judges, and as the king’s eye.” This shows us a list that scholars 
usually agree upon, even though there may be some arguments concerning some contents. e. g. Frye (1984:108) 
expresses doubt about the historical existence of such a formal cabinet like the six vassals of merit. 
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These essential elements can be categorised under two headings: 1) the system of government 
and 2) the system of communication. The author adopted the elements of these two categories 
to explicate how the power of god penetrates the universe. These two parts have their own roles 
in De mundo’s theology. God is introduced as the cause of motion and the cause of order and 
harmony. It is, however, his power which carries out these roles of god as the preserver of the 
universe. Nevertheless, the fact that god is the possessor of this power, presents god as the 
ultimate cause of the cosmic order and harmony. This relationship of god and his power is 
described through the story of the sculptor Phidias: 
Φασὶ δὲ καὶ τὸν ἀγαλματοποιὸν Φειδίαν κατασκευάζοντα τὴν ἐν ἀκροπόλει Ἀθηνᾶν ἐν μέσῃ τῇ 
ταύτης ἀσπίδι τὸ ἑαυτοῦ πρόσωπον ἐντυπώσασθαι, καὶ συνδῆσαι τῷ ἀγάλματι διά τινος ἀφανοῦς 
δημιουργίας, ὥστε ἐξ ἀνάγκης, εἴ τις βούλοιτο αὐτὸ περιαιρεῖν, τὸ σύμπαν ἄγαλμα λύειν τε καὶ 
συγχεῖν. 
They say that the sculptor Phidias, when he was making the Athena on the Acropolis, also carved 
his own face in the middle of her shield and attached it to the statue by means of a secret form 
of workmanship, so that, if someone would wish to remove it, he would inevitably break up and 
demolish the whole statue (399b.33-400a.3; transl. Thom 2014b:45). 
God is the creator of the world45 in the same way Phidias became the maker of the statue of 
Athena but it is divine power which makes it possible for god, only by being the center of the 
universe, to preserve it in such a mysterious way, just as the carved face of Phidias preserves 
the entire statue. Likewise, the Persian system of government and communication assist the 
Great King in preserving his empire only through his existence. These two systems represent 
the manner in which the divine power functions, penetrating throughout the universe. 
The Persian system of government is represented by the system of the satraps, through which 
                                          
45 Pseudo-Aristotle also indicates god as the begetter of the universe (De mundo 397b.21) but one should not 
misunderstand its concept because the author means by the term “begetter” that god is the cause of every harmony 
and movement. God did not give birth to the universe. Unlike the Platonic demiurge, the Aristotelian god namely 
preserves it (De mundo 397b.20) and he does not make it but begins its existence by the first action. The 
Aristotelian god is thus called Unmoved Mover (Bos 1998:76). Accordingly, this expression seems Platonic but 
its implication is clearly Aristotelian (Bos 2003:319). The term ‘creator’ which I adopt here should be understood 
in this way. 
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the influence of the Great King reaches every post of his empire. This enables the Great King 
to sway his power to the borders of his empire. This way of governance can be applied to god’s 
power as follows: as the system of satraps, so does the power of god penetrate and take care of 
the universe. The divine power proves god’s essence because people can recognise god’s 
existence only through the visible effect of his power. The satraps act as mediators by 
exercising the Great King’s power under his authority. In this way, the satraps also become the 
channel of the Great King’s power and authority. It is thus clear that the system of satraps 
describes the divine power and its passageway (397b.24). The author explains the relationship 
between god’s essence and power through the relationship between the Great King and his 
satraps. Van Nuffelen (2011:131) defines the concept of the cosmic hierarchy as a normative 
category which was rooted in an assumption that all things are different in ontological quality. 
This notion of cosmic hierarchy is represented by the imperial elements which are listed by the 
distance from the Great King. According to Bos (1989:150-1), the reference to the Persian royal 
court itself refers to the cosmic hierarchy which connects all in order. 
In De mundo, therefore, the system of satraps implies the immanence of god through his power 
which is gradationally transmitted throughout the whole universe. 46  This function of the 
satraps as the passageway of the divine power overlaps the main function of the system of 
communication which implies the gradational system of the cosmos through which god is 
informed from its lowest division.47 
As described in the previous chapter, the listeners, who were usually called the Great King’s 
                                          
46 Sometimes, as in Cleanthes’ Hymn to Zeus (vv. 11-13), one can also see separation of λόγος from god in Stoic 
literature, which leads the readers to assume that even though Stoic theology shared this common notion of god’s 
intermediary being, this sharing of the intermediary may not have come from their joining in the argument on the 
tension between god’s immanence and transcendence because it is also well-known that in the Stoic notion of god 
usually not his deputies like power, but god himself penetrates the whole universe and every creature. The Greek 
text of Cleanthes and its translation are as follows: τοῦ γὰρ ὑπὸ πληγῇς φύσεως πάντ’ ἔργα βέβηκεν, ᾧ σὺ κα
τευθύνεις κοινὸν λόγον, ὃς διὰ πάντων φοιτᾷ μιγνύμενος μεγάλῳ μικροῖς τε φάεσσιν… “For by its strokes 
all works of nature <are guided>. With it you direct the universal reason, which permeates everything, min
gling with the great and the small lights” (transl. Thom 2001:482). 
47 For an interesting connection between this hierarchy and the Homeric golden chain, see Reale and Bos 
(1995:319-20). 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
61 
 
eyes and ears, were spies and their most important role was to transfer information between the 
Great King and his satraps. The clearest point which can be made from this role of the Great 
King’s eye and ears, is that the Great King, staying secluded, is still in contact with the universe 
and informed. The listeners were the connecting point between the Great King and his subjects 
outside of the palace. This represents the notion of the bisected cosmos shared among ancient 
philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle and the Stoics (Bénatouïl 2009:32).48  
When the author of De mundo presents the description of the beacon-signals to the reader, the 
idea of god, who is continuously in contact with the universe, is extended to the sublunary 
world. The beacon-signals were the most effective device for the Great King to be informed 
from the farthest distance of his empire. Despite the physically impassible distance, nothing 
was able to hinder him from obtaining information. From this, it can be easily discerned by the 
reader that god, who is transcendent, is in contact with the universe much more easily and 
perfectly than the Great King is. 
It is important to note that the author of De mundo particularly articulates the manner in which 
the beacon-signals successively send signals to each other toward the Great King. This is due 
to the fact that this is an unobtainable description from any other ancient writings but that of 
De mundo: 
So comprehensive was the arrangement, and especially of the system of signal-beacons, 
signaling to one another in succession from the ends of the Empire to Susa and Ecbatana, that 
the King knew the same day all new developments in Asia (398a.32-3; transl. Thom 2014b:45) 
When Reale and Bos (1995:319-20) and Bos (1989:144-7) comment on 397b.26, they assert 
that Homer’s mythic Golden Chain is embedded in the theology of De mundo. This Golden 
Chain symbolises an invisible cosmic bond which connects all kinds of beings in the universe. 
This notion of the Golden Chain is the implied premise of the image of the Great King. Thus, 
one can rather confidently conclude that not only the beacon-signals but also the multi-walled 
palace and the gradational arrangement of the Great King’s subjects collaborate to depict this 
                                          
48 Bos (1991:329) suggests that the multi-walled palace of the Great King indicates this distinction.  
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archaic notion of Golden Chain.  
The implication of the image of the Great King is summarised by Thom (2014c:116) as follows: 
(a) Like the King, god’s dignity requires that he be separated from the cosmos.  
(b) For the same reason, he is not directly responsible for the execution of mundane and 
menial tasks. 
(c) Despite his separation from the cosmos, he nevertheless maintains contact with the 
whole cosmos, just like the Persian king by means of his signal-beacons. 
(d) Unlike the King, god acts on the cosmos without help of other beings.49 
This list indicates three elements which specify the Middle Platonic understanding of the 
cosmos: 1) The prime god, enjoying his eminence in transcendence, holds the cosmos and takes 
care of it 2) through the intermediary divine power which penetrates the whole universe 3) 
according to the cosmic hierarchy. 
At the beginning of the common era, the Platonists began to regard the demiurge as the prime 
god. They thus needed to detach the demiurgic role from god because it was not decent of the 
prime god to be involved in menial tasks (Opsomer 2005:55). As time went by, the Middle 
Platonists consequently came to have three principles which particularise their cosmology: the 
prime god, the intermediary deity (Opsomer 2005:55) and the cosmic hierarchy (Van Nufellen 
2011:129). To secure the prime god’s dignity, the Middle Platonists divided the first principle 
into the prime god and his intermediaries. It should thus be asserted that the image of the Great 
King reflects the Middle Platonic understanding of the relationship between god and the 
universe while De mundo does not entirely follow the Platonic tradition (Opsomer 2005:59). It 
                                          
49 It was customary to compare god to a king (Strohm 1952:163). The image of the Great King does, however, 
specifically describe god not as just a king, but as a monarchic ruler (Runia 2001:232) which includes the elaborate 
system of government laid on the hierarchical order. Therefore, the image of the Great King was adopted by the 
author in order to explain his monotheistic theology that a supreme god who is transcendent preserves the universe 
by means of his power which penetrates the universe through the cosmic hierarchy. In other words, the divine 
power is the answer of the author of De mundo to the dilemma between god’s transcendent existence and 
immanent influence.  
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should then be acknowledged that Pseudo-Aristotle adapted the divine power50 for the role of 
divine intermediary in the Middle Platonist cosmological setting. 
With Pseudo-Aristotle’s De mundo fully discussed, this thesis will now analyse the use of the 
image of the Great King by three Platonists, namely Maximus of Tyre, Aelius Aristides and 
Philo of Alexandria on the basis of the similar implications of the image of the Great King. The 
aim is to confirm the Middle Platonic cosmic principles that are shared by the three Platonists 
as well as Pseudo-Aristotle, through the analyses.  
5.2. Maximus of Tyre 
There is not much information about Maximus of Tyre. He lived during the second century CE 
and 41 lectures are transmitted under his name (Koniaris 1982:87). Three sources, namely the 
Chronicle of Eusebius, the Suda and the Dissertationes of Maximus describe him as Tyrian and 
Platonist (Trapp 1997:xii). However, it is important to note, then, that this author’s 
philosophical tendencies are a mixture of multiple philosophies (Trapp 1997:xvi-xxx; cf. Trapp 
2012:915-916; Van Nuffelen 2011:125).  
Maximus deals with the notion of god in full scale in Dissertationes 11 which is titled ‘Plato 
on the identity of God’ (Trapp 1997:xiv). When analysing his Dissertationes 11, therefore, one 
can easily observe that he inclines to Platonism, specifically Middle Platonism (Van Nuffelen 
2011:125). Although he did not contribute to Platonism, he provides an important source of the 
Platonism of his time (Trapp 2007:467). 
In his bisected cosmology (Dissertationes 9.6.15-20), Maximus wrote that, as the sinews of the 
body does, so do δαίμονες have a central role to connect god and human beings (Dissertationes 
                                          
50 Dillon (1996:161) opines that the concept of Aristotelian Energeia was adopted by Middle Platonism for this 
purpose of keeping god in his dignity and the divine power of De mundo is influenced by this Middle Platonic 
adoption. The philosophical propensity of De mundo to Middle Platonism reinforces his opinion. However, this 
should not be regarded as anything more than a possible conjecture because the relation between Aristotelian 
Energeia and the divine power in De mundo still needs to be examined.  
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9.6.3-8). One must understand Maximus’ concept of δαίμονες in order to grasp his cosmology: 
Θεὸς μὲν οὖν αὐτὸς κατὰ χώραν ἱδρυμένος οἰκονομεῖ τὸν οὐρανὸν καὶ τὴν ἐν οὐρανῷ τάξιν· εἰσὶ 
δ’ αὐτῷ φύσεις ἀθάνατοι δεύτεραι, οἱ καλούμενοι δαίμονες, ἐν μεθορίᾳ γῆς καὶ οὐρανοῦ 
τεταγμένοι· θεοῦ μὲν ἀσθενέστεροι, ἀνθρώπου δ’ ἰσχυρότεροι· θεῶν μὲν ὑπηρέται, ἀνθρώπων 
δὲ ἐπιστάται· θεῶν μὲν πλησιαίτατοι, ἀνθρώπων δὲ ἐπιμελέστατοι. ἦ γὰρ ἂν τῷ διὰ μέσου πολλῷ 
τὸ θνητὸν πρὸς τὸ ἀθάνατον διετειχίσθη τῆς οὐρανίου ἐπόψεώς τε καὶ ὁμιλίας, ὅτι μὴ τῆς 
δαιμονίου ταύτης φύσεως, οἷον ἁρμονίας, κατὰ τὴν πρὸς ἑκάτερον συγγένειαν καταλαβούσης 
δεσμῷ τὴν ἀνθρωπίνην ἀσθένειαν πρὸς τὸ θεῖον κάλλος.  
God himself, settled and immobile, administers the heavens and maintenance their ordered 
hierarchy. But he has a race of secondary immortal beings, the so-called daimones, which have 
their station in the space between earth and heaven. These daimones are inferior in power to God, 
but superior to men; they are the gods’ servants and men’s overseers, more closely related than 
men to the gods, but more closely concerned than the gods with men. The mortal realm would 
indeed be separated from the immortal and from any sight or dealings with the heavens by a great 
intervening gulf, were it not for the harmonizing effect of these daimones, who bind and connect 
human beings to divine beauty in virtue of their kinship with both (Dissertationes 8.8.1-11; transl. 
Trapp 1997:76). 
Maximus also explains the intermediate role of δαίμονες between god and human beings in 
detail. They serve god in ruling over the cosmos through patrolling the good and the evil and 
involve themselves in men through helping the good and punishing the evil (Dissertationes 
9.6.33-37). Their dual involvement in divine and human affairs becomes inevitable to preserve 
the universe due to the difference in quality between the three, namely, god, δαίμονες and 
human beings: 
ἐπεὶ δὲ τῆς δαιμονίων φύσεως πέρι σκοπούμεθα, ἣν φαμὲν μεσότητα εἶναι πρὸς ἄνθρωπον καὶ 
θεόν, ἴδωμεν εἴ πῃ δυνατὸν ἐξελέσθαι αὐτὴν καὶ διασῶσαι τὰ ἄκρα. ἆρ’ οὖν ὁ θεὸς ἀθάνατον 
μὲν γάρ, ἐμπαθὲς δέ; οὐδαμῶς, ἀλλὰ ἀθάνατον μέν, ἀπαθὲς δέ· τί δὲ ἄνθρωπος; θνητὸν μέν, 
ἀπαθὲς δέ; οὐδὲ τοῦτο· ἀλλὰ θνητὸν μέν, οὐ μὴν ἀπαθές. ποῦ τοίνυν ἡμῖν οἰχήσεται τὸ ἀθάνατον 
ὁμοῦ καὶ ἐμπαθές; δεῖ γὰρ συστῆναι ἐξ ἀμφοῖν οὐσίαν κοινήν, κρείττονα μὲν ἀνθρώπου, θεοῦ 
δὲ ἐλάττονα, εἰ μέλλει ἔσεσθαι τῶν ἄκρων πρὸς ἄλληλα ἀναλογία· δύο γὰρ πραγμάτων 
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κεχωρισμένων τῇ φύσει χωρισθήσεται καὶ ἡ ἐπιμιξία παντάπασιν, ἐὰν μή τις κοινὸς ὅρος 
ἀμφότερα ὑποδέξηται … λείπεται δὴ τὴν δαιμόνων φύσιν ἐμπαθῆ τε εἶναι καὶ ἀθάνατον, ἵνα τοῦ 
μὲν ἀθανάτου κοινωνῇ τῷ θεῷ, τοῦ δὲ ἐμπαθοῦς τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ. 
But since we are considering the nature of daimones, whom we have said constitute a middle 
term between man and God, we must ask whether it is possible to remove them from the system, 
while still preserving the terms to either side. Is God immortal but emotional? No, he is immortal 
and free from emotion. What about man? Is he mortal but free from emotion? No again, he is 
mortal and emotional. What then will become of the combination of immorality with 
susceptibility to emotion? There has to exist a being that combines the two, superior to man but 
inferior to God, if there is going to be any relationship between the two extremes. If two things 
are separate in their natures, then all association between them is precluded, unless there is some 
common term that is receptive to both … we must therefore conclude that daimones are being 
susceptible to emotion and immortal, sharing their immortality with God and their susceptibility 
with men (Dissertationes 9.2.7-19, 9.4.14-16; transl. Trapp 1997:78-9, 80). 
Δαίμονες can reach god in heaven and human beings on earth because of their characteristics 
which are partly shared with god and partly with human beings. The explanation that the human 
souls shed their bodies when they change from men to δαίμονες, implies that the latter are both 
immortal and emotional (Dissertationes 9.6.21-33). Δαίμονες are the cosmic hierarchy itself 
which connects heaven and earth. Maximus holds both that there is one god who is the father 
and the king of all and that the intermediate existence and the diverse roles of the uncountable 
δαίμονες are essential to the maintenance of the whole cosmos (Dissertationes 11.5.1-4, 9.7.1-
2). 
With these basic notions, Maximus explains his Middle Platonic understanding of god’s 
influence on this world by adopting the image of the Great King (Trapp 1997:94): 
Εἰ δὲ ἐξασθενεῖς πρὸς τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς καὶ δημιουργοῦ θέαν, ἀρκεῖ σοι τὰ ἔργα ἐν τῷ παρόντι 
ὁρᾶν καὶ προσκυνεῖν τὰ ἔγγονα, πολλὰ καὶ παντοδαπὰ ὄντα, οὐχ ὅσα Βοιώτιος ποιητὴς λέγει· 
οὐ γὰρ τρισμύριοι μόνον θεοί, θεοῦ παῖδες καὶ φίλοι, ἀλλ’ ἄληπτοι ἀριθμῷ· τοῦτο μὲν κατ’ 
οὐρανὸν αἱ ἀστέρων φύσεις· τοῦτο δ’ αὖ κατ’ αἰθέρα αἱ δαιμόνων οὐσίαι. βούλομαι δέ σοι δεῖξαι 
τὸ λεγόμενον σαφεστέρᾳ εἰκόνι. ἐννόει μοι μεγάλην ἀρχὴν καὶ βασιλείαν ἐρρωμένην, πρὸς μίαν 
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ψυχὴν βασιλέως τοῦ ἀρίστου καὶ πρεσβυτάτου συμπάντων νενευκότων ἑκόντων· ὅρον δὲ τῆς 
ἀρχῆς οὐχ Ἅλυν ποταμὸν οὐδὲ Ἑλλήσποντον οὐδὲ τὴν Μαιῶτιν οὐδὲ τὰς ἐπὶ τῷ Ὠκεανῷ ἠϊόνας· 
ἀλλὰ οὐρανὸν καὶ γῆν, τὸν μὲν ὑψοῦ, τὴν δ’ ἔνερθεν· οὐρανὸν μὲν οἷον τεῖχός τι ἐληλαμένον ἐν 
κύκλῳ ἄρρηκτον, πάντα χρήματα ἐν ἑαυτῷ στέγον, γῆν δὲ οἷον φρουρὰν καὶ δεσμοὺς ἀλιτρῶν 
σωμάτων, βασιλέα δὲ αὐτὸν δὴ τὸν μέγαν ἀτρεμοῦντα ὥσπερ νόμον, παρέχοντα τοῖς πειθομένοις 
σωτηρίαν ὑπάρχουσαν ἐν αὑτῷ· καὶ κοινωνοὺς τῆς ἀρχῆς πολλοὺς μὲν ὁρατοὺς θεούς, πολλοὺς 
δὲ ἀφανεῖς, τοὺς μὲν περὶ τὰ πρόθυρα αὐτὰ εἱλουμένους, οἷον εἰσαγγελέας τινὰς  καὶ βασιλεῖ 
συγγενεστάτους, ὁμοτραπέζους αὐτοῦ καὶ συνεστίους, τοὺς δὲ τούτων ὑπηρέτας, τοὺς δὲ ἔτι 
τούτων καταδεεστέρους. διαδοχὴν ὁρᾷς καὶ τάξιν ἀρχῆς καταβαίνουσαν ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ μέχρι γῆς. 
But if you are not strong enough to see the Father and Creator, then it must suffice for the moment 
to contemplate his works and to worship his offspring, who are many and varied, far more 
numerous than the Boeotian poet says. God’s divine children and relatives are not a mere thirty 
thousand in number, but countless: the stars and planets in the heavens, and the daimones in the 
ether too. 
In order to explain to you what I am saying, I should like to invoke a still more lucid image. 
Think of a great empire and a mighty kingdom, in which all bow willingly to one soul, that of 
the best and most revered of kings. The boundary of this empire is not the River Halys or the 
Hellespont or Lake Maeotis or the shores of Ocean, but the heavens above and earth below: the 
heavens like the circuit of an impenetrable wall, completely enclosing the universe and shielding 
all within itself; the earth like a watch-house and a prison for sinful bodies. The Great King 
himself sits motionless, like the law, bestowing on his subjects the security that resides in him. 
As his partners in power, he has a whole host of visible and invisible deities, some gathered close 
round the vestibule of his throne-room, like a king’s viziers and close relatives, sharing his table 
and his hearth, others subordinate to these, and yet others further subordinate to them. Here is a 
succession, a hierarchy for you to behold, from God above to the earth below (Dissertationes 
11.12; transl. Trapp 1997:105-106). 
The image of the Great King consists of two parts (Dissertationes 11.12). The first part 
concerns the Great King’s exaltedness (Dissertationes 11.12.7-18) and the second describes 
how many subject deities he has so that he can rule over his vast territory (Dissertationes 
11.12.18-24). These two sections serve one purpose, which is to instruct the reader on the 
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cosmic order and hierarchy as perceived by Maximus. 
The description of the heavens as impassible walls between god and the earthly world, the 
prison of the sinful bodies (Dissertationes 11.12.15-16), is very Platonic in nature. God the 
perfect Intellect (Dissertationes 11.8) is secluded not from the whole universe, but only from 
the earthly part of it. Maximus holds that god directly influences the heavenly sphere. The 
notion that god must maintain his dignity by not touching the ground is maintained by this 
concept of the barrier of heaven between ether and earth.  
Moreover, the account that this barrier is filled with divine children and relatives, who differ in 
distance from god, describes the notion of the cosmic hierarchy which links god to human 
beings. This emphasis on the cosmic hierarchy as the passageway of god’s preserving influence 
is characteristically Middle Platonic (Van Nuffelen 2011:128). This cosmic hierarchy is very 
important for Maximus’ cosmology, seeing that Maximus articulates ‘succession’ and 
‘hierarchy’ in the conclusion of this dissertation (Dissertationes 11.12.23-4). As such, Maximus 
has the notion of god as motionless and hidden, but still in charge of the preservation of the 
universe through granting order and harmony to the hierarchy of δαίμονες.51 The function of 
referring to a great number of inferior deities is therefore to describe the sinews of this cosmic 
hierarchy which put the god’s preserving influence in action (Dissertationes 9.6.3-9). 
One should take notice of the fact that the first part of the description of the Great King ends 
and the second part begins with the comparison of god to the law (Dissertationes 11.12.17). In 
the middle of the excerpt, Maximus again emphasises the cosmic order and hierarchy through 
this comparison. According to Van Nuffelen (2011:128-29), through this comparison, the 
author implies that god functions as the divine law which ensures security for this cosmic 
hierarchy. Like the law, god stays immobile and grants order to the cosmic system. In other 
words, he preserves the universe by doing nothing but being present. 
In order to perfectly transmit god’s preserving influence throughout the universe, it is necessary 
                                          
51 If Dillon’s (1996:91) opinion of the strong possibility that Antiochus brought Platonic δαίμονες back into 
Platonism, this could be regarded as a Middle Platonic device to elaborate its cosmic frame. 
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for inferior deities like δαίμονες to be scattered through every layer of the universe. God’s 
dignity is thus not harmed at all because he takes care of the universe by making use of his 
subjects, namely the δαίμονες, thus not touching the earth himself (Thom 2014c:116). The 
conclusion may thus be drawn that Maximus adopted the image of the Great King to represent 
the Middle Platonic understanding of the cosmos which consists of 1) the prime god, 2) his 
intermediary δαίμονες and 3) the cosmic hierarchy as the passageway of the preserving 
influence of god.  
This thesis will now move on to analyse Aelius Aristides’ use of the image of the Great King 
in his Orationes 26.27. Aristides utilised this image to praise the Roman regime and ultimately 
the Roman emperors. The aim of this section is also to look into how Aristides adapted the 
image of the Great King for his political purpose. 
5.3. Aelius Aristides 
Aelius Aristides shared the same era with Maximus and his panegyric On Rome (Orationes 26) 
is one of the most famous orations among 53 orations which are transmitted under his name 
(Ewen 2002:1096). In this oration, according to its epideictic purpose,52 Aristides praises the 
Roman governance, which he perceives as the best empire in history (Fontanella 2008:203). 
He compares the Roman empire to the heavenly system of governance in order to justify the 
Roman regime by demonstrating the similarity of the two (Orationes 26.103-105; Van Nuffelen 
2011:122-23). According to Oliver (1953:874), this is conducted by the collaboration of two 
indissoluble themes: the praise for the ideal state and the creation of Rome which is parallel to 
the creation of the universe. This encomium thus includes a cosmological notion, which is very 
Platonic, even though Aristides could not be free from the Stoic influence of his time (Oliver 
1953:874-878). Also, it should be noted that Orationes 26 is quite political in purpose and this 
becomes clear through his praise of the Roman emperors and the Roman empire (Pernot 
2008:175, 188).53 In doing so, he adopted the image of the Great King as a means to assist his 
                                          
52 For the characteristics of panegyric, see Aune (2003:162, 328). 
53  Throughout his article, Pernot (2008) warns the reader to read this encomium Orationes 26 with the 
understanding of the rhetorical device of figured speech and to divulge its implicit meanings under the surface. 
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praise of the Roman governance through his philosophical notions. 
Among the negative critiques against the Macedonians throughout Orationes 26.24-27, one 
should not overlook 26.27 which describes the result of the death of Alexander the Great: 
ἐπεί γε μὴν ἐκεῖνος ἐτελεύτησεν, εὐθὺς μὲν ἐσχίσθησαν εἰς μυρία οἱ Μακεδόνες, ἔργῳ δείξαντες 
ὑπὲρ αὑτοὺς εἶναι τὴν ἀρχὴν, κατέχειν τε οὐδὲ τὴν αὑτῶν ἔτι ἠδύναντο, ἀλλ’ εἰς τοῦτο τύχης 
ἀφίκοντο ὥστε ἠναγκάσθησαν τὴν σφετέραν αὐτῶν ἐκλιπεῖν, ἵνα τῆς ἀλλοτρίας σθησαν τὴν 
σφετέραν αὐτῶν ἐκλιπεῖν, ἵνα τῆς ἀλλοτρίας ἄρχωσιν, ὥσπερ ἐξῳκισμένοι μᾶλλον ἢ κρατεῖν 
δυνάμενοι, καὶ ἦν ὥσπερ αἴνιγμα, Μακεδόνες οὐκ ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ, ἀλλ’ οὗ δύναιντο βασιλεύοντες 
ἕκαστοι, ὥσπερ φρουροὶ μᾶλλον τῶν πόλεων καὶ τῶν χωρίων ὄντες ἢ ἄρχοντες, ἀνάστατοί τινες 
βασιλεῖς, οὐχ ὑπὸ τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως, ἀλλ’ ὑφ’ ἑαυτῶν αὐτοὶ γεγενημένοι, εἰ δὲ οἷόν τ’ εἰπεῖν, 
ἐοικότες σατράπαις ἐρήμοις βασιλέως. καίτοι τὴν τοιαύτην κατάστασιν πότερον λῃστείᾳ μᾶλλον 
ἢ βασιλείᾳ προσεοικέναι φήσομεν; 
When he [sc. Alexander] died, the Macedonians were immediately split into innumerable parts, 
proving in fact that empire was beyond them. They were no longer even able to keep possession 
of their own country, but they sank to so low a fortune that they were forced to leave their own 
country, in order to rule another’s, more like men had been expelled from their homeland than 
men able to rule. And it was like a riddle, Macedonians not in Macedonia, but each ruling where 
they could, as if they were garrisons for these cities and lands rather than rulers, having become 
in a way uprooted kings, not through the Great King, but through themselves, and if it can be 
said, like satraps without a king. Shall we say that such a state is more like brigandage or kingship? 
(transl. Behr 1981:78-9) 
The extract above describes the aftermath of Alexander the Great’s death. To explain the chaos, 
which resulted from his death, Aristides adopted the image of the Great King. This chaos is 
effectively depicted by the image of the Great King’s satraps without the Great King. Without 
the Great King, any empire or country should rather be regarded as being under brigandage 
than kingship (Orationes 26.27.12-3) because there is no centripetal power which holds all the 
                                          
However, one should keep in mind that this reading does not cancel out the explicit meaning of this oration. 
Furthermore, Oliver (1953:876-877) emphasises that the deep influence of Timaeus on Orationes 26, e.g. the 
repetition of the word ἀρχή, which Aristides might have adopted from Plato. 
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components of the universe together. If his absence incurs chaos within the system of 
governance, one can logically deduce that the Great King ensures the preservation of the empire 
through his existence. By introducing the situation of the satraps without the Great King, 
Aristides made the monarch of the system the main concern of his argument. 
As Pernot (2008:175) indicates, Aristides repeatedly expressed his greatest respect for the 
Roman emperors; he celebrated the advantages of the Roman regime and asked the gods to 
keep the imperial family in their favor. This explains why he aimed to emphasise the Great 
King himself rather than the system when he was utilising the image of the Great King. In 
doing so, his main purpose was to justify the Roman regime by validating the divine 
rightfulness of the Roman emperors.  
There are multiple other elements which support this point of justification. The first is Aristides’ 
inordinate criticism against the Persian kings. Their failure in fulfilling the ideal of the rightful 
ruler (Van Nuffelen 2011:138) is one of the most important themes to emphasise the 
exaltedness of the Roman emperors (Orationes 26.15-23). Even their seasonal marching from 
one capital to another is described as an indication of their dullness and inability to rule over 
the vast empire (Orationes 26.18). Among the historians, however, it has been generally 
accepted that this seasonal marching effectively demonstrated the Persian kings’ greatness and 
pomp. Aristides’ point of inordinate criticism is mainly to exaggerate the Persian kings’ 
stupidity and incompetence as the rulers of the great empire. By doing so, he paves the way for 
the justification of the Roman regime controlled by the Roman emperors who will be justified 
as the divine rulers at last. 
Aristides adopts the image of the Great King as a means to compare the Roman emperor, who 
provides the order to the Roman system of governance, with god, who is the preserver of the 
universe through providing the order and harmony to the cosmic hierarchy. Without god, the 
cosmic hierarchy itself cannot be preserved because it cannot maintain the order to sustain itself:  
ἀτεχνῶς δὲ, ὥσπερ οἱ ποιηταὶ λέγουσι, πρὸ τῆς Διὸς ἀρχῆς ἅπαντα στάσεως καὶ θορύβου καὶ 
ἀταξίας εἶναι μεστὰ, ἐλθόντος δὲ ἐπὶ τὴν ἀρχὴν Διὸς πάντα δὴ καταστῆναι, καὶ τοὺς Τιτᾶνας εἰς 
τοὺς κατωτάτω μυχοὺς τῆς γῆς ἀπελθεῖν, συνωσθέντας ὑπ’ αὐτοῦ τε καὶ τῶν σὺν αὐτῷ θεῶν, 
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οὕτως ἄν τις καὶ περὶ τῶν πρὸ ὑμῶν τε καὶ ἐφ’ ὑμῶν πραγμάτων λογιζόμενος ὑπολάβοι, ὡς πρὸ 
μὲν τῆς ὑμετέρας ἀρχῆς ἄνω καὶ κάτω συνετετάρακτο καὶ εἰκῆ ἐφέρετο, ἐπιστάντων δὲ ὑμῶν 
ταραχαὶ καὶ στάσεις ἔληξαν, τάξις δὲ πάντων καὶ φῶς λαμπρὸν εἰσῆλθε βίου καὶ πολιτείας, νόμοι 
τε ἐξεφάνησαν καὶ θεῶν βωμοὶ πίστιν ἔλαβον. 
Indeed, the poets say that before the rule of Zeus everything was filled with faction, uproar, and 
disorder, but that when Zeus came to rule, everything was put in order and the Titans were 
banished to the deepest corners of the earth, driven there by him and the gods who aided him. So 
too, in view of the situation before you and under you, one would suppose that before your 
empire everything was in confusion, topsy-turvy, and completely disorganised, but that when 
you took charge, the confusion and faction ceased and there entered in universal order and a 
glorious light in life and government and the laws came to the fore and the altars of the gods 
were believed in (Orationes 26.103; transl. Behr 1981:96). 
The three principles which constitute the Middle Platonic frame of the cosmos are ascertained 
from the extract above: 
1) The Great King represents Zeus as the prime god. 
2) The satraps represent the divine assistants to Zeus, who arranges the universe in order. 
3) The relationship between the Great King and his satraps represents the hierarchy 
between Zeus and the subordinate gods.  
In the next section, this thesis will go back to the early part of the 1st century CE and look at 
the three texts by Philo of Alexandria. The use of the image of the Great King by this well-
known Middle Platonist will function as a means to investigate the way in which the cosmology 
of the time reflects on the Jewish understanding of God and the universe. 
5.4. Philo of Alexandria 
Philo of Alexandria (15 BCE – CE 50), also called Judaeus, is the most valuable author in 
understanding Hellenistic Judaism (Runia 2007:55). This author clearly presented his loyalty 
to the Jewish tradition: Mosaic Law had absolute authority over him. However, he was also 
very familiar with Hellenistic philosophy, especially Platonism, and his life was devoted to 
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explaining his Jewish tradition through Hellenistic philosophy (Runia 2001:31-2; Tzvetkova-
Glazer 2014:137). With his propensity to Platonism, it should be noted that his philosophy was 
written under the eclecticism of his time (Colson & Whitaker 1991:xvii). However, he was 
distinguished from his contemporaries by his polemical purpose in utilising the Hellenistic 
philosophies of his time to demonstrate the superiority of Judaism (Van Nuffelen 2011:206).  
Among his extensive oeuvre, three writings will be analysed in this thesis because they contain 
the image of the Great King: De decalogo 61, 177-8, De opificio mundi 71 and De somniis 
1.140-1. The first treatise allegorises the reasons why the ten commandments were given in the 
desert and that it was given by God Himself as ten in number (Colson 1937:3). The second is 
the most famous and important exegetical work which deals with the first three chapters of 
Genesis to found the basis for his allegorical exegesis on the entire Genesis and the last forms 
part of a series of allegorical commentaries on Genesis (Runia 2007:56-7).  
The image of the Great King concerns Philo’s notion of God and the cosmos in these three 
writings. Philo argues for the praise-worthiness and the prominence of God through the image 
of the Great King (De decalogo 61, 177-8). This shows his monotheistic zeal for God even 
though he seems to acknowledge the divine hierarchy of his time, which is based on polytheism. 
His understanding of the cosmos is partly revealed through the notions of God who is sitting 
on the highest place (De opificio mundi 71) and the angels as the Great King’s eyes and ears 
(De somniis 1.140-1). It is important to note how Philo harmonises his Jewish religion and the 
Hellenistic philosophy in the image of the Great King.  
5.4.1. De decalogo  
Philo is one of the most well-known Platonists, but his fundamental loyalty to Judaism warns 
that the reader should not naively consider every philosophical idea in Philo’s work as Platonic. 
As an apologist (Runia 1990:5), Philo’s aim was to reveal Judaism to be the most prominent 
and prime philosophy. In doing this, Philo adopted Platonism supplemented by Aristotle’s 
criticism in order to explicate his Judaism (Bos 1998:71).54 Philo topped the Platonic created 
                                          
54 Runia (1986:4-5) recognises Philo’s great fondness for Plato’s dialogues so that he sets the aim of his study in 
1986 “to make a comprehensive examination of the way in which Philo understands and utilises Timaeus by Plato 
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cosmos with Aristotelian transcendental intelligence to distinguish eternal God from the 
transient cosmos (Runia 1986:149). As the Platonic demiurge cannot represent the concept of 
God due to its createdness and involvement in menial tasks, Philo’s concept of God as the 
creating father of the universe should inevitably be supplemented with Aristotle’s concept of 
transcendent intellect to maintain God’s exaltedness (Bos 1998:73). This combination indicates 
that he could not be free from the propensity of his time towards Middle Platonism.  
In allegorising the reasons why God granted his commandments as ten in number, as well as 
in the desert, Philo made his monotheism clear, which dictates that only God is praiseworthy 
and should be worshiped through the image of the Great King. This is not the first use of this 
image by Philo but provides the reader with a clearer understanding of it: 
(61) καθάπερ οὖν τοῦ μεγάλου βασιλέως τὰς τιμὰς εἴ τις τοῖς ὑπάρχοις σατράπαις ἀπένειμεν, 
ἔδοξεν ἂν οὐκ ἀγνωμονέστατος μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ ῥιψοκινδυνότατος εἶναι χαριζόμενος τὰ 
δεσπότου δούλοις, τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἂν τοῖς αὐτοῖς εἴ τις γεραίρει τὸν πεποιηκότα τοῖς γεγονόσιν, 
ἴστω πάντων ἀβουλότατος ὢν καὶ ἀδικώτατος, ἴσα διδοὺς ἀνίσοις οὐκ ἐπὶ τιμῇ τῶν ταπεινοτέρων 
ἀλλ’ ἐπὶ καθαιρέσει τοῦ κρείττονος. 
So just as anyone who rendered to the subordinate satraps the honours due to the Great King 
would have seemed to reach the height not only of unwisdom but of foolhardiness, by bestowing 
on servants what belonged to their master, in the same way anyone who pays the same tribute to 
the creatures as to their Maker may be assured that he is the most senseless and unjust of men in 
that he gives equal measure to those who are not equal, though he does not thereby honour the 
meaner many but deposes the one superior (De decalogo 61; transl. Colson 1937:37) 
In this extract, Philo seems to have been accustomed to the implication of the image of the 
Great King: the cosmic hierarchy which is established on the Middle Platonic polytheistic 
understanding of the cosmos. Therefore, although Philo was of a monotheistic disposition, he, 
like his contemporaries, also made use of the notion of the divine hierarchy (Van Nuffelen 
                                          
in his entire oeuvre.” Bos (2003:315) also observes that Philo is thoroughly acquainted with Plato’s oeuvre, and 
that Plato’s Timaeus was his source of inspiration. On crucial points, Philo differs from typically Platonic dogmas, 
however, because he considered Aristotle’s criticism of them to be convincing. 
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2011:205, 210). 
As recognised from the excerpt, however, Philo rejects the polytheistic notion of this image 
and emphasises only God sitting at the top of the system by sharply differentiating Him, the 
maker, from his products. Van Nuffelen (2011:210) explicates the purpose of Philo in utilising 
this image: 
Whereas in Post-Hellenistic philosophy the comparison is normally used to visualise the correct 
understanding of the pantheon, Philo uses it to question the validity of the way in which his 
Greco-Roman counterparts conceive of the pantheon. 
The purpose of this Hellenised Jewish writer in adopting this image is to affirm the validity of 
the Jewish monotheism to the world under the polytheistic cosmology. However, as indicated 
above, what Philo rejected was not the divine hierarchy of his time but the polytheistic notion 
which dictates that all the deities should be worshiped. For Philo, other beings than God are 
merely his creatures that do not deserve divine praise. Even if there could be inferior deities to 
God, they should not be regarded as praiseworthy because they are simply creatures of His 
design. 
The second use of this image in this treatise occurs in the end of it. Here, Philo tries to secure 
the dignity of God by keeping Him away from violence conducted in order to preserve the 
cosmos, such as the punishment of sinners. God should stay in peace and purity: 
οἰκειότατον οὖν ὑπολαβὼν αὑτοῦ τῇ φύσει τὰ σωτήρια κελεύειν ἀμιγῆ καὶ ἀμέτοχα τιμωρίας, 
ἵνα μή πως | φόβῳ τις ἄφρονι συμβούλῳ χρησάμενος ἄκων ἀλλ’ ἔμφρονι λογισμῷ καθ’ ἑκούσιον 
γνώμην αἱρῆται τὰ βέλτιστα, μετὰ κολάσεως οὐκ ἠξίωσε θεσπίζειν, οὐκ ἀσυλίαν τοῖς 
ἀδικοπραγοῦσι διδούς, ἀλλ’ εἰδὼς τὴν πάρεδρον αὑτῷ δίκην καὶ τῶν ἀνθρωπίνων ἔφορον 
πραγμάτων οὐκ ἠρεμήσουσαν ἅτε φύσει μισοπόνηρον καὶ ὥσπερ τι συγγενὲς ἔργον 
(178) ἐκδεξομένην τὴν κατὰ τῶν ἁμαρτανόντων ἄμυναν. ἐμπρεπὲς γὰρ ὑπηρέταις μὲν καὶ 
ὑπάρχοις θεοῦ καθάπερ τοῖς πολέμου στρατηγοῖς ἐπὶ λιποτάκταις οἳ λείπουσι τὴν τοῦ δικαίου 
τάξιν ἀμυντηρίοις χρῆσθαι, τῷ δὲ μεγάλῳ βασιλεῖ τὴν κοινὴν ἀσφάλειαν ἐπιγεγράφθαι τοῦ 
παντός, εἰρηνοφυλακοῦντι καὶ τὰ τῆς εἰρήνης ἀγαθὰ πάντα τοῖς πανταχοῦ πᾶσιν ἀεὶ πλουσίως 
καὶ ἀφθόνως χορηγοῦντι· τῷ γὰρ ὄντι ὁ μὲν θεὸς πρύτανις εἰρήνης, οἱ δ’ ὑποδιάκονοι πολέμων 
Stellenbosch University  https://scholar.sun.ac.za
  
75 
 
ἡγεμόνες εἰσίν. 
So then He judged that it was most in accordance with His being to issue His saving 
commandments free from any admixture of punishment, that men might choose the best, not 
involuntarily, but of deliberate purpose, not taking senseless fear but the good sense of reason 
for their counsellor. He therefore thought right not to couple punishment with His utterances 
though He did not thereby grant immunity to evil-doers, but knew that justice His assessor, the 
surveyor of human affairs, in virtue of her inborn hatred of evil, will not rest, but take upon 
herself as her congenital task the punishment of sinners. For it befits the servants and lieutenants 
of God, that like generals in war-time they should bring vengeance to bear upon deserters who 
leave the ranks of justice. But it befits the Great King that the general safety of the universe 
should be ascribed to Him, that He should be the guardian of peace and supply richly and 
abundantly the good things of peace, all of them to all persons in every place and at every time. 
For indeed God is the Prince of Peace while His subalterns are the leaders in war (De decalogo 
177-8; transl. Colson 1937:93-95). 
The Middle Platonic division of the first principle into the prime god and his intermediary 
deities and the consequential emphasis of the cosmic hierarchy meets his purpose to preserve 
God’s dignity. Philo imposes any task, which may stain God’s dignity, on Justice, the assessor 
of God, because the punishment for evil does not befit God, the Prince of Peace, to be involved.  
Here again, Philo does not show any abhorrence or rejection of the cosmic hierarchy and its 
constituent subordinate deities, but utilises this notion behind the image of the Great King to 
describe God’s sole exaltedness. Then, it should be acknowledged that Philo fully understood 
the implication of the image of the Great King, that is “a hierarchy of divine beings with a 
single God at the top (Van Nuffelen 2011:210)”. This is very much a Middle Platonist 
understanding of the cosmos but the only difference that separates Philo from his 
contemporaries, is his polemical stance against attributing glory, which should be ascribed only 
to God, to his subjects: 1) God who is distinguished and transcendent from all the creatures, 
needs 2) intermediaries to carry out the tasks to preserve the universe and 3) the cosmic 
hierarchy as the relationship of God and his intermediaries. With this foundation, this thesis 
will go on to analyse Philo’s two other treatises, De opificio mundi and De somniis. 
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5.4.2. De opificio mundi 
This treatise, written in 30-40 CE, has been regarded as a commentary and one of its most 
important themes is the distinction between the transcendent god and all the other creatures in 
the universe (Runia 2001:4-5, 22). This understanding of god, who is above and beyond all the 
creatures, is presented by the image of the Great King in De opificio mundi. Following is the 
image of the Great King in De opificio mundi 71: 
καὶ ὧν εἶδεν ἐνταῦθα αἰσθητῶν ἐν ἐκείνῃ τὰ παραδείγματα καὶ τὰς ἰδέας θεασάμενος, 
ὑπερβάλλοντα κάλλη, μέθῃ νηφαλίῳ κατασχεθεὶς ὥσπερ οἱ κορυβαντιῶντες ἐνθουσιᾷ, ἑτέρου 
γεμισθεὶς ἱμέρου καὶ πόθου βελτίονος, ὑφ’ οὗ πρὸς τὴν ἄκραν ἁψῖδα παραπεμφθεὶς τῶν νοητῶν 
ἐπ’ αὐτὸν ἰέναι δοκεῖ τὸν μέγαν βασιλέα· γλιχομένου δ’ ἰδεῖν, ἀθρόου φωτὸς ἄκρατοι καὶ ἀμιγεῖς 
αὐγαὶ χειμάρρου τρόπον ἐκχέονται, ὡς ταῖς μαρμαρυγαῖς τὸ τῆς διανοίας ὄμμα σκοτοδινιᾶν. 
And when the intellect has observed in that realm the models and forms of the sense-perceptible 
things which it had seen here, objects of overwhelming beauty, it then, possessed by a sober 
drunkenness, becomes enthused like the Corybants. Filled with another longing and a higher 
form of desire, which has propelled it to the utmost vault of the intelligibles, it thinks it is heading 
towards the Great King himself. But as it strains to see, pure and unmixed beams of concentrated 
light pour forth like a torrent, so that the eye of the mind, overwhelmed by the brightness, suffers 
from vertigo (transl. Runia 2001:64). 
The author took the soul flying through these two realms, a famous topos which is found also 
in De mundo 391a.11-16, which presupposes the concept of the multi-layered universe (Runia 
2001:231). Philo incorporated the image of the Great King into the journey of the soul in order 
to reinforce God’s transcendence. Runia (2001:232) rightly points out that the Great King was 
the fixed term for the ancient Persian kings and indicates that the application of the phrase ‘the 
Great King’ to God himself by Philo is focused on the monarchic way of God to rule over the 
universe. This can be derived from Philo’s exaggerated description that even the soul finds 
itself unable to see God because of the torrential light of extreme brightness.  
When Philo described God as the Great King, he put God on the topmost seat of the 
presupposed hierarchy through the leveled comic structure. The image of the Great King was 
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adopted by Philo to describe God as the monarchic ruler who is absolutely hidden in the highest 
place of the multi-layered universe: God’s transcendence is reinforced by the inaccessibility to 
him even by the soul. 
Philo emphasises God’s transcendence from the universe by adopting the image of the Great 
King. His transcendental God, who must not be involved in menial tasks, is the first principle 
in the Middle Platonic cosmology. This thesis now moves on to Philo’s other treatise, De 
somniis, where Philo utilises the image of the Great King with a different point of emphasis. 
5.4.3. De somniis 
As stated above, this treatise by Philo belongs to the series of allegorical commentaries on 
Genesis. This is, in fact, the second book of De somniis, which follows the lost first book 
(Colson & Whitaker 2001:285). When expounding the story of Jacob’s ladder, Philo made 
another use of the image of the Great King: 
ἄλλαι δ’ εἰσὶ καθαρώταται καὶ ἄρισται, μειζόνων φρονημάτων καὶ θειοτέρων ἐπιλαχοῦσαι, 
μηδενὸς μὲν τῶν περιγείων ποτὲ ὀρεχθεῖσαι τὸ παράπαν, ὕπαρχοι δὲ τοῦ πανηγεμόνος, ὥσπερ 
μεγάλου βασιλέως ἀκοαὶ καὶ ὄψεις, ἐφορῶσαι πάντα καὶ ἀκούουσαι. ταύτας δαίμονας μὲν οἱ 
ἄλλοι φιλόσοφοι, ὁ δὲ ἱερὸς λόγος ἀγγέλους εἴωθε καλεῖν προσφυεστέρῳ χρώμενος ὀνόματι· 
καὶ γὰρ τὰς τοῦ πατρὸς ἐπικελεύσεις τοῖς ἐγγόνοις καὶ τὰς τῶν ἐγγόνων χρείας τῷ πατρί. 
Others there are of perfect purity and excellence, gifted with a higher and diviner temper, that 
have never felt any craving after the things of earth, but are viceroys of the Ruler of the universe, 
ears and eyes, so to speak, of the great king, beholding and hearing all things. These are called 
“demons” by the other philosophers, but the sacred record is wont to call them “angels” or 
messengers, employing an apter title, for they both convey the biddings of the Father to His 
children and report the children’s need to their Father (De somniis 1. 140-1; transl. Colson & 
Whitaker 2001:371-73). 
This section describes spiritual beings as mediators between God and men, namely the angels 
of God (Colson & Whitaker 2001:289). After indicating that they have excellent dispositions, 
which are closer to that of God than men, Philo introduced them as viceroys, eyes and ears of 
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the Great King, and δαίμονας. The title ‘the ears and eyes of the Great King’ signifies a specific 
role of this special kind of beings. As discussed in the previous chapter, the main role of the 
Great King’s eyes and ears was to spy on the satraps, which keeps the Great King informed in 
spite of his seclusion. Then, one can acknowledge that the Aristotelian Unmoved Mover and 
the Platonic δαίμονες are combined in the image of the Great King because God in 
transcendence is described as keeping informed by his angels which are introduced as 
δαίμονες.55 This combination, as indicated in previous sections, is the Middle Platonist cosmic 
setting meant to secure the eminence of God. 
In this extract, especially, Philo designates God as the source of dreams. In doing so, however, 
he does not damage God’s dignity by implying that God does not directly touch the earthly 
bodies of men to infuse dreams. Philo thus took the angels of God for this job of messengers. 
In order to access God, the angels should be pure, excellent, higher and diviner than humans 
and in order to access the earthly bodies, they should be distinguished from God himself. This 
explanation of the divine intermediary is very Middle Platonic, as seen in Maximus 
(Dissertationes 8.8.1-11). These aforementioned characteristics are required for the angels 
going up and down the ladder laid on the ground to connect Jacob and God (Gen. 28.11-15). 
Hence, God often reveals his plan and will to human beings through dreams but it is the angels 
who transmit the messages from God to men. 
In Philo’s use of the image of the Great King as well, the three elements that the Middle 
Platonist cosmic setting are imbedded to secure the prime god’s dignity. As can be noted in his 
works, Philo develops his arguments based on these three elements: 1) God who is sitting at 
the top of 2) the hierarchical order and 3) the intermediary divine beings for menial tasks to 
take care of the universe. This is similar to the other three writers.  
5.5. Conclusion 
Throughout this chapter, it has become clear that all the authors utilised the image of the Great 
                                          
55 This notion sounds Middle Platonic because god has a great number of intermediaries, which were split from 
the Platonic demiurge (Thom 2014c:115). 
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King to introduce their cosmo-theological arguments to readers, particularly with the Middle 
Platonic cosmological elements to secure the prime god’s dignity: 1) the transcendental prime 
god, 2) divine intermediaries and 3) the cosmic hierarchical order which passes through the 
universe. Accordingly, this image should be regarded as a means to convey the Middle Platonic 
cosmological frame which forms the common ground for further discussions.  
In other words, the image of the Great King represents the Middle Platonic synthesis of 
traditional cosmo-theological issues which had been sporadically and fragmentarily 
transmitted through the arguments on νοῦς from the pre-Socratic era. The image of the Great 
King was the effective conveyer of the Middle Platonist cosmology. In the next chapter, this 
thesis will thus explore the ancient discussions on νοῦς to demonstrate how these discussions 
were combined by the Middle Platonists when they attempted to solve the problem which the 
demiurgic theology of their time faced through their cosmology. 
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Chapter Six: The topos of the Great King 
In the previous chapter, it becomes clear that the image of the Great King implies the Middle 
Platonic frame of the cosmos. The four authors differ in details such as identifying the 
intermediary beings but share arguments on the Middle Platonic setting of the cosmos which 
is implied by the image of the Great King. Therefore, the image of the Great King should be 
regarded as a topos because it functions both as the reservoir of a conventionally discussed 
topic and as the starting point of philosophical arguments. Now, this chapter will discuss the 
main points which constitute the Middle Platonic frame of the cosmos, so that the 
conventionality of the philosophical notions implied through the image of the Great King can 
be validated.  
1) The prime god who is transcendental from the universe 
The Middle Platonic notion that the prime god should be separated from the universe is 
reflected in the use of the image of the Great King. In the previous chapter, it was clarified that 
the transcendence of god is described through the Great King’s seclusion. In De mundo, the 
depictions of the multi-walled palace, the number of the Great King’s subjects, including the 
satraps, and the description that the Great King himself was staying in Susa or Ecbatana, hidden 
from everyone (398a. 13-14; transl. Thom 2014b:45) clearly emphasise the Great King’s 
invisibility (ἀόρατος). This seclusion functions as a means to prevent the Great King from 
losing his dignity as it means that he stays untouchable even though he rules over the empire 
(398b.1-6). There are a few references to god as unchangeable and utterly secluded, of which 
Bos’ (1977:324) interpretation of the analogy of the beacon-signals is a valuable example: 
In his palace the Persian king receives intelligence concerning everything that occurs within the 
realm via the central nervous system of his signal-beacon service. Similarly, the divinity has no 
direct knowledge of all that passes in Physis; he knows indirectly and generally. In that sense 
this god, as in De philosophia fr. 12 (Ross), may be called ἐπιστημονικώτατος. 
This passive intellectuality of god functions as a means to maximise the transcendence of god 
by extending the distance between god and the universe. 
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In Maximus, another reference to the Great King’s seclusion makes an appearance. He sits 
motionless like the law (Dissertationes 11.12.16-7). The word ‘motionless’ (ἀτρεμοῦντα) 
alludes to Aristotle’s Unmoved (ἀκίνητος) Mover. If the phrase ‘like law’ indicates the state of 
sitting unmoved as in De mundo (400b.13-15), it can be discerned that the Great King is sitting 
motionless and invisible as the law does. If this immobility can be understood as the nature of 
god’s existence, which is not affected by anything, the two terms ‘immobility’ and ‘invisibility’ 
can be taken as representing the same notion, namely god’s transcendence. 56  Again in 
Maximus, a great number of the Great King’s subjects (Dissertationes 11. 12. 19-24) assist him 
in staying invisible and motionless by functioning as his hands and feet. 
Philo also stresses God’s invisibility when calling God the Great King (De opificio mundi 71.5-
8). In particular, the fact that even the soul (διάνοια) cannot see God indicates God’s extreme 
hiddenness from the world. This is because, if even the soul cannot see god, there is nothing 
which can see God. Moreover, it should be noted at this point that Philo emphasises the 
incomparable ontic difference between God and other inferior deities (De decalogo 61). 
To Aristides, the satraps without the Great King are mere brigands because they cannot rule 
over the vast empire through order and harmony (Orationes 26.27). By this distinction of the 
Great King from his satraps, Aristides reinforces the Great King’s absolute superiority over his 
subjects. The Great King is the organiser and preserver of the system which consists of his 
satraps. 
This idea of god’s transcendence was also a traditionally discussed topic among ancient 
philosophers. As Bénatouïl (2009:23-24) indicates, the Epicureans were exclusively 
emphasising the transcendence of god. Mansfeld (1999:463) explains the primary role of the 
god-argument in the Epicurean natural philosophy as follows: 
                                          
56 Regarding Plato’s contribution to the ancient theology, Kenny (2006:296) comments: “Plato’s argument for 
the priority of soul over the body was the progenitor of a long series of arguments for the existence of God based 
on an analysis of motion and change.” Aristotle also introduces his god as Unmoved Mover. These descriptions 
of god in terms of motion and change imply that motion and change were accepted as a result from an external 
influence. Therefore, god’s immobility and immutability of god indicates that god is absolutely transcendent 
without being influenced from outside of himself. 
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[T]heir role in the context of Epicurean natural philosophy is entirely different from that 
attributed to them by other philosophers. Epicurus’ primary aim is to establish that the gods 
cannot, consistently with their blessed state, be in any way involved in what happens in nature, 
let alone in what happens to humans. 
The Epicurean stress on the extreme separation of god from the universe does not allow the 
Epicurean god to care about the universe at all. This transcendence of god was often implied 
through his ‘invisibility’ and ‘immobility’ through the ages.  
A Pythagorean of the late 5th century BCE, Philolaus (Freeman 1959:220) lists the 
characteristics of god who is the leader and ruler of the universe: oneness, eternity, stability, 
immobility, uniqueness and otherness: 
ἔστι γὰρ ἡγεμὼν καὶ ἄρχων ἁπάντων, θεός, εἷς, ἀεὶ ὤν, μόνιμος, ἀκίνητος, αὐτὸς ἑαυτῶι ὅμοιος
, ἕτερος τῶν ἄλλων (Fr. 20.16).  
With these traits, god achieves his absolute independence from the whole universe. Aristotle 
(De Xenophane, de Zenone, de Gorgia 977b.9-10) also held fast to god’s immobility and 
Plutarch (Amatorius 756d.5-6) mentioned that this immobility of god was well-known among 
the people of antiquity. Furthermore, Philo (De opificio mundi 100.10) quoted this statement 
of Philolaus to clarify his theology under eclectic tradition.57 In Middle Platonism, this idea of 
god in transcendence could be seen as a development to keep the prime god away from the 
mortal. Instead, they evoked the Platonic innovation, δαίμονες, which fill the gap between god 
and men (Baltes 2004:276).  
2) The divine intermediary which is immanent 
The Stoics were the most faithful heirs of this divine immanence. It is a well-known fact that 
                                          
57 For more examples, see Onatas (Fr. 139.9; 140. 20), Philo (Legatio ad Gaium 318.4; Quaestiones in Exodum 
Fr. 3.6, 2. Fr. 37.1; De cherubim 101.2; De somniis 1.72.3; De specialibus legibus 4.31.6), Musonius Rufus 
(Dissertationum a Lucio digestarum reliquiae 16.95-6), Plutarch (Aetia Romana et Graeca 282c), Aspasius (In 
ethica Nichomachea commentaria 157.15), Celsus (Ἀληθὴς λόγος 6.64.3-4), Porphyry (De abstinentia 2.37.1), 
Iamblichus (De mysteriis 8.2.2-4) and Proclus (In Platonis Timaeum commentariua 3.88.30-1, 3.195.19). 
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Stoicism held the notion that god is immanent in the universe and due to this belief, the Stoic 
theology is represented by pantheism (Bénatouïl 2009:23-24). Kenny (2006:307) summarises 
this pantheistic feature of the Stoic theology by referring to Cicero’s comment on Chrysippus: 
God can be identified with the elements of earth, water, air, and fire, and in these forms he can 
be called by the names of the traditional gods of Olympus. As earth, he is Demeter; as water and 
air, Poseidon; as fire or ether, he is Zeus, who is also identified with the everlasting law that is 
the guide of our life and the governess of our duties (ND 1.40). As described by Cicero, 
Chrysippus’ religion is neither monotheism nor polytheism: it is polymorphous pantheism. 
Algra (2003:170) also outlines the Stoic theology with two words: fate and nature. This also 
points out the pantheistic features of the Stoic theology, which is on the other extreme in 
opposition to the Epicurean transcendental theology, because fate and nature pass through all 
beings. Whether it is god himself or his influence which penetrates the universe, the important 
point to note is that discussions on god’s immanence are connected to the theme of god’s 
providential care (Bénatouïl 2009:23-24).  
However, Pseudo-Aristotle, Maximus of Tyre, Aelius Aristides and Philo of Alexandria did not 
adopt the Stoic notion of an extremely immanent god because it damages the supreme god’s 
dignity. Instead, they introduced different kinds of divine mediators. In De mundo, it was the 
divine power which penetrates the universe. The Great King’s servants in the hierarchical 
system represent the way in which the divine power passes through the universe. Due to divine 
power, god can preserve the universe despite his existential transcendence. This seems very 
Middle Platonic because the Middle Platonists discharged god of the demiurgic task and 
imposed it on δαίμονες to preserve the dignity of the demiurge raised to the rank of the supreme 
god. 
In Maximus (Dissertationes 11.12.4-5), a great number of inferior deities are the intermediaries 
between god and the universe. Maximus did, in fact, not need to adapt a certain concept like 
divine power to his theological notion because in his Platonic theology, it is natural to assume 
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the existence of multiple deities.58 As such, Maximus follows the Middle Platonic way of 
distinguishing the prime god and his subjects. 
Although Aristides refers to the satraps of the Great King, he does not describe them in detail 
(Orationes 26.27). This is because of two reasons: 1) The roles of satraps were very well-
known to his readers, and 2) Aristides effectively utilised the implication of the metaphor of 
law, which was discussed in the previous section, through adapting the image of the Great King 
to his political purpose. Aristides, by confining the role of the Great King to maintaining the 
order within the system of the satraps, drives the reader to deduce that the satraps were in 
charge of various matters concerning the governance of the empire. 
Philo also illustrates a similar idea of the cosmos to that of Aristides when he referred to angels 
as the Great King’s eyes and ears (De somniis 1.140). These angels transfer god’s bidding to 
the universe and the universe’s need to god (De somniis 1.141). The fact that Philo not only 
assumes the existence of intermediary divine beings but also introduces angels as δαίμονες (De 
somniis 1.140-1; cf. De decalogo 61) indicates his Platonic understanding of god and the 
universe. The existence of intermediary deities between god and men is particularly Platonic.59 
This concept of the divine intermediaries was developed by Plato when he introduced two 
terms to his cosmology: δημιουργός and δαίμων. Δημιουργός referred to public workers such 
as independent craftsmen in ancient Greece (Walbank & Rhodes 2012:434). With this 
connotation, δημιουργός indicates the faculty of creation as the constructor of the cosmos 
(Timaeus 29.a.6)60 and the generator of the self-sufficient and perfect god (Timaeus 68.e.2). 
                                          
58 Opsomer (2005:52) points out: “at the turn of the Millennium, most Platonists appear to have considered the 
demiurge as the first god. This ordinal number ‘the first’ requires many of other gods to give order among them”. 
59 For more detailed study, see Opsomer (2005:51-99). The arguments on the divine intermediary seem to be dealt 
with mainly by Platonic tradition. Opsomer attempts to provide us with a survey of the arguments by authors. In 
my opinion, Aristotelians and Stoics may not have dared to openly participate in the argument on god’s 
intermediary divinities or beings due to their concept of god, which was either extremely transcendent or 
immanent. 
60 Dillon (1997:30) supports this interpretation: “Plato’s claim is that there really are guard-god-like natures in 
society, and that they should be properly harnessed. Similarly, here, it may be true that when the δημιουργός is 
originally introduced he is just an image, but Plato’s claim is that there really is a demiurgic figure in the universe, 
and that he does the sort of things, on a cosmic scale, that a craftsman does in society.” 
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Δημιουργός is also identified with Zeus the prime god (Timaeus 41.a.7). In Plato, δημιουργός 
is not a clearly defined figure but the easiest vehicle to describe the role of the prime principle 
to create the cosmos. Plato distributed the status of νοῦς as the creator to δημιουργός by 
implicitly identifying νοῦς with δημιουργός (Dillon 1997:32), and the immanently caring tasks 
of νοῦς to δαίμονες. 
However, this “demiurgic element” (Dillon 1997:30) assigns the executions on the structure of 
the mortal things to his engendered sons: 
καὶ τῶν μὲν θείων αὐτὸς γίγνεται δημιουργός, τῶν δὲ θνητῶν τὴν γένεσιν τοῖς ἑαυτοῦ γεννήμασιν 
δημιουργεῖν προσέταξεν.  
And He Himself acts as the Constructor of things divine, but the structure of the mortal things 
He commanded His own engendered sons to execute (Timaeus 69.c.3-5; transl. Bury 1961:179). 
These engendered sons of δημιουργός refer to δαίμονες and this imposition of the intermediary 
role of δαίμονες between god and men is a particularly Platonic innovation (Versnel 2012:410). 
Plato explains the origin of δαίμονες as honourable men becoming δαίμονες after death 
(Cratylus 398.c.1). As divine mediators, δαίμονες are involved in human affairs. They, for 
example, supervise humankind (Leges 818.c.1), lead the dead to a certain place (Phaedo 
107.d.6, 113.d.2) and mix the temporary pleasure with evil (Phaedrus 240.a.9). This 
supervising role of δαίμονες was accepted by Stoicism and Middle or Neoplatonism to adjust 
their cosmology to the emergence of monotheistic prevalence in theology and to answer the 
questions of the theodicy (Versnel 2012:410). In this sense, the remarkable feature of Middle 
Platonism is that they charged δαίμονες with the labour of creation because they regarded 
δημιουργός as the prime god who must not be profaned by contact with mortals (Opsomer 
2005:55).  
Among the Middle Platonists, Plutarch provides the most abundant source to delineate the 
Middle Platonic notion of δαίμονες (cf. Dillon 2012:1158). In his corpus, they, as divine beings 
distinguished from god (e.g. De defectu oraculorum 423E.7), are involved in various human 
affairs. There are good and evil δαίμονες (e.g. Romulus 28.3.4; Septem sapientium convivium 
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153A.11) who, as guardians (e.g. Antonius 33.3.2; Cato Minor 54.10.2), maneuver the 
decisions of men (e.g. Brutus 14.3.3) to lead them into good luck (e.g. Agis et Cleomenes 43.8.1) 
or towards destruction (e.g. Quomodo adulator ab amico internoscatur 68F.7). They are also 
designers of things (e.g. Demosthenes 3.3.3) and concerned with the generation and birth of 
mortal beings (e.g. Aetia Romana et Graeca 277A.10).  
By putting δαίμονες in charge of the affairs of the mortal beings, Plutarch places δαίμονες 
between the prime god and mortal beings. Plutarch’s intermediary δαίμονες are very Middle 
Platonic. Moreover, the relation between the three, namely the prime god, δαίμονες and mortal 
beings, represents the cosmic hierarchical order, which is also one of the maim element of the 
Middle Platonic cosmic setting. The cosmic hierarchical order, however, was also a traditional 
theme, which was discussed by different philosophers since the pre-Socratic era. This thesis 
will now discuss the cosmic system which conjoin the prime god, δαίμονες and the human 
beings in the world. 
3) The cosmic hierarchical system which penetrates and holds the cosmos together:  
Ancient philosophers shared this notion of the cosmic order which had already existed in the 
time of Pythagoras and was shared by Plato, Aristotle, the Stoics and others.61 The body of all 
things is called the cosmos due to its order (Pythagoras, Testimonia Fr. 21.2-3). This cosmic 
order is eternal (Aristotle, De caelo 296a.33)62 and all parts of the universe inherently has the 
noblest arrangement and the most harmonious order (Philo, De aeternitate mundi 32.4-5). 
Pseudo-Aristotle emphasises the cosmic hierarchical order which implies the Homeric Golden 
Chain through his exclusively detailed description of the beacon-signals. It is not only the 
beacon-signals but also the other descriptive elements of the image of the Great King in 
gradational arrangement, which collaborate to convey this traditional notion of cosmic 
                                          
61 For more examples, see Aristotle (Metaphysica 984b.16; Ethica eudemia 1216a.14), Philo (De specialibus 
legibus 4.210.4; Quaestiones in Genesim (fragmenta) 1.64.2), Cornutus (De natura deorum 12.18), Plutarch 
(Septem sapientium convivium 153d.2-3), Hierocles (In aureum carmen 11.27.1-2), Numenius (Fragmenta 1. Fr. 
15.9-10), Alexander (Ἀπορίαι καὶ λύσεις 45.15-6, 63.8). 
62 This ‘eternity’ should be noted because it seems to allude to the conventional notion of Golden Chain.  
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hierarchical order. The author, therefore, elaborately arranges the subjects of the Great King in 
a successive order. 
In Maximus as well, the main point of argument is the cosmic hierarchy which consists of the 
uncountable δαίμονες (Dissertationes 11.12.23-4). The multiple layers of the universe recall 
the cosmic hierarchical order between δαίμονες of different ontic ranks. Maximus emphasises 
that god, the preserver of the universe, is holding the universe by bestowing security to his 
subjects (Dissertationes 11.12.17-8). This security is transferred from god through his subjects 
in succession to the earth (Dissertationes 11.12.24). Uncountable deities which hold different 
ranks constitute this cosmic succession. The cosmic hierarchy connects god, who is the source 
of security, to the heavenly sphere and this heavenly sphere, which is full of souls and daimones, 
to this earth (Van Nuffelen 2011:128).  
Furthermore, Aristides’ purpose in depreciating the kings of the empires before Rome is to 
justify the Roman regime by comparing the Roman system of governance with the Olympian 
governance. In doing so, the hierarchical order of the two governances is the pivotal point and 
this is conveyed through the relationship between the Great King and his satraps (Orationes 
26.27).  
In Philo as well, the thorough distinction between the inferior and the superior is embedded in 
his image of the Great King, which indicates the cosmic hierarchical relationship between God 
and all the other creatures (De decalogo 61). This hierarchical order includes the angels as the 
intermediary δαίμονες and the men on the earth (De somniis 140). In this hierarchical order, 
God as the prime principle cannot be reached even by the soul (De opificio mundi 71).  
Particularly Maximus adopted two terms to emphasise the cosmic hierarchical order: 
διαδοχὴν ὁρᾷς καὶ τάξιν ἀρχῆς καταβαίνουσαν ἐκ τοῦ θεοῦ μέχρι γῆς. 
Here is a succession, a hierarchy for you to behold, from God above to the earth below 
(Dissertationes 11.12.23-24; transl. Trapp 1997:106). 
Διαδοχή, as Trapp translates, means ‘succession’ and τάξις means ‘arrangement’ and ‘order’. 
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The former indicates the succession of the royal pedigree and the throne in Plutarch (Vita 
Romuli 3.2.3; Vita Arati 54.8.3; Vita Demetrii 4.5.2; Vita Lycurgi 31.5.1; Mulierum virtutes 
258D.3; De garrulitate 508A.6 and so forth) and the latter often means the cosmic order. 
Plutarch provides a proverbial explanation on nature and order: 
τὸ μὲν γὰρ κατὰ φύσιν τέτακται καὶ διώρισται, τάξις γὰρ ἢ τάξεως ἔργον ἡ φύσις· ἡ δ’ ἀταξία 
καθάπερ ἡ Πινδαρικὴ ψάμμος ‘ἀριθμὸν περιπέφευγεν’, καὶ τὸ παρὰ τὴν φύσιν εὐθὺς ἀόριστον 
καὶ ἄπειρόν ἐστιν. 
That which is according to nature is ordered and delimited, for nature is, precisely, order or else 
the handiwork of order, while disorder, like Pindar’s sand, ‘has eluded number,’ and what is 
contrary to nature is simply what is unbound and unlimited (Quaestiones convivales 732E.4-8; 
transl. Minar, Sandbach & Helmbold 1961:195). 
“That what is according to nature is ordered” sounds very Stoic. From the identification of 
nature with order Plutarch reminds the reader of the etymology of κόσμος by Pseudo-Aristotle 
(De mundo 397a.5-8). This metaphor emphasises the importance of order for the preservation 
of nature because without order, nature will not be sustained. This concept of cosmic order 
becomes clearer in the following definition of the politeia: 
Παρὰ πάντα ταῦτα λέγεται πολιτεία τάξις καὶ κατάστασις πόλεως διοικοῦσα τὰς πράξεις· 
Besides all these, politeia is defined as an order and construction of a State, which directs its 
affairs (De unius in republica dominatione, populari statu, et paucorum imperio 826D.12-E.1; 
transl. Fowler 1949:307). 
This definition, by which Plutarch suggests that order is the essence of governance, was implied 
through Aristides’ use of the image of the Great King as well. With the notion of the prime god, 
who maintains the cosmos through order, Plutarch’s statement that nature is order should be 
understood as order also being the essence of nature governed by god, which hierarchically 
conjoins the components of the universe. 
In conclusion, the implication and use of the image of the Great King indicate that it should be 
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accepted as a topos. It becomes clear that the image of the Great King is a conventional way of 
describing the Middle Platonic frame of the cosmos which consist of three main principles: 1) 
the transcendent prime god, 2) the divine intermediary and 3) the cosmic hierarchy. These three 
principles were implicitely discussed by ancient philosophers through their arguments on νοῦς 
and the Middle Platonists evoked these main elements of so-called ‘νοῦς theology’ to formulate 
their cosmological frame in order to answer the cosmo-theological questions of their time. The 
Great King’s seclusion, the hierarchical system of the Persian governance and his subjects with 
various duties made this image of the Great King the most appropriate to convey the Middle 
Platonic cosmic frame as the common ground for further discussions on cosmo-theological 
topics. In other words, Pseudo-Aristotle, Maximus of Tyre, Aelius Aristides and Philo of 
Alexandria, despite their allegiances to different philosophies and religions, adopt this topos as 
the foundation of their cosmo-theological arguments. The topos of the Great King also secures 
the common ground between the authors and their readers by means of conveying the stock 
arguments on the conventional cosmo-theological themes through the image which is 
constructed on well-known historical facts.  
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Chapter Seven: Conclusion 
The phrase ‘the Great King’ (ὁ μέγας βασιλεύς), which was originally ascribed to the ancient 
Persian kings, is often adopted to evoke the traditional image of the Persian system of 
governance and its kings. The image of the Great King was formed by the Greeks’ perception 
of the Persian kings and their governing systems. In the contexts of philosophical discussion, 
especially, this image is utilised to imply a conventionally accepted philosophical notion. 
This use of the image of the Great King is not prevalent in ancient philosophical writings but 
in four Greek authors who shared the propensity towards the Middle Platonic frame of 
cosmology: Pseudo-Aristotle (De mundo 398a.11-35), Maximus of Tyre (Dissertationes 11.12), 
Aelius Aristides (Orationes 26.27) and Philo of Alexandria (De decalogo 61, 177-8, De opificio 
mundi 71, De somniis 1.141).  
These four authors develop their arguments on the same basis of the cosmological frame: 1) 
the prime god, who stays away from the cosmos, immanently influences it through 2) his 
mediate deities and 3) the cosmic hierarchical order, which penetrates all existential beings. 
These three elements respectively have different philosophical backgrounds but together, they 
represent the Middle Platonic cosmic setting.  
The Epicureans are famous for the emphasis they place on the transcendence of god. This 
concept began to be systematically developed from Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover. In opposition 
to them, the Stoics elaborated the concept of god’s immanence, which was developed from 
Plato’s δημιουργός and δαίμονες. These concepts of god were sporadically embedded in the 
pre-Socratic notion of νοῦς. However, the notion of the cosmic hierarchy, which was 
traditionally represented by the Golden Chain, was presented as the presupposition of ancient 
cosmology from the time of Homer. The Middle Platonists adapted these traditional concepts 
and framed their cosmic setting in order to address the cosmological questions of their time: 1) 
they had to reformulate the relationship between divine elements as δημιουργός occupied the 
place of the prime god and 2) they had to explain theodicy with their cosmological system. 
Based on the Middle Platonic frame of the cosmos implied through the image of the Great King, 
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these four authors, despite different philosophical backgrounds, developed their own 
cosmological arguments. Pseudo-Aristotle adopts this image to describe the way in which the 
transcendent god preserves the cosmos through his power. This divine power, which is 
distinguished from god, penetrates the cosmos, holding it together in harmony according to the 
cosmic hierarchical order. The image of the Great King, in fact, depicts the divine power’s 
influence throughout the universe. Maximus of Tyre utilises this image to discuss the cosmic 
hierarchy which consists of the prime god, the intermediary deities and men. Based on this 
cosmic hierarchical order, Aelius Aristides justifies the excellence of the Roman regime by 
comparing it to the heavenly system of governance. Philo, on the other hand, polemically 
makes use of this image to highlight the exclusiveness of God in godhood and praise-
worthiness. 
These four authors acknowledged the cosmic frame which consists of the prime god, his 
mediators and the cosmic hierarchical order. This Middle Platonic frame of the cosmos forms 
the common ground on which these four authors developed their cosmological arguments. This 
can be deduced from the fact that these authors merely make a reference to the Great King as 
an introduction when they want to invite their audience to participate in their philosophically 
serious arguments on god and the cosmos.  
Therefore, according to the definition of topos introduced in chapter two, the topos of the Great 
King includes a philosophical notion which was formed out of traditional arguments on god 
and the cosmos and is accepted by different authors as a conventional way of conveying the 
Middle Platonic frame of the cosmos. 
Before closing this thesis, the benefits of the topos analysis suggested by Thom (2003:570-573) 
should be reaffirmed: 
1) A good understanding of the topoi present in a text helps to identify the issues involved and 
to locate the text within the cultural and moral discourse of the time. 
2) A topos may also help us to understand connections within the text between apparently 
unrelated materials. 
3) A better understanding of the topoi involved may in the same way provide insight into the 
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compositional integrity. 
4) The point of a passage may lie in its manipulation or adaptation of a topos that is assumed.  
Throughout this thesis, these benefits of the topos analysis can be validated. First of all, the 
philosophical issue, which is implied through the image of the Great King, is identified as 
the Middle Platonic frame of the cosmos and the meaning of this image is thus understood 
in its philosophical discourse of the time. Second, through the topos analysis of this image, 
its function as the introduction to the main cosmological discourses is defined. Third, the 
main points of the arguments, which the four authors attempt to make, are clarified.  
These advantages can influence other problems such as the problem of dating De mundo. 
By confirming the philosophical propensity of this image towards Middle Platonism, the 
topos analysis of the image of the Great King can be seen to contribute to confining the date 
of De mundo to the time after 80 BCE. Furthermore, the prominence of the Middle Platonic 
cosmology during the imperial era becomes clearer through the topos analysis of this image.  
The topos analysis therefore has an invaluable impact upon understanding ancient writings 
in the appropriate moral and philosophical contexts of the time and this will provide this 
field with the revaluation of ancient texts, which are often regarded as old-fashioned and 
insignificant, by redefining the relationships between the ideas and thoughts prevalent in 
these texts. Subsequently, this will revitalise the studies of ancient texts and lead to a deeper 
and wider moral-philosophical world of antiquity. 
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